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ABSTRACT 
 
Sir Henry Wilson remains one of the most controversial British Army 
generals of the Great War. A colourful character in life, he attracted 
admirers and detractors in equal measure; in death, his reputation was 
ruined by a biography based on his personal diaries. The Wilson of the 
historiography is, at best, a politician rather than a soldier, at worst an 
ambitious Francophile intriguer. This thesis looks beyond this accepted 
characterisation, reassessing his role in the formation of British and Allied 
strategy in the final months of the war. Wilson attained influence, and 
subsequently power, when Lloyd George consulted him after failing to 
persuade Britain’s leading generals to change their strategic focus. The 
thesis re-examines Wilson’s policy critique, which led to the creation of the 
Supreme War Council, and negated plans for a major Allied offensive on 
the Western Front in 1918. This thesis aims to shine new light on Wilson’s 
work on the Council, with an analysis of its policy recommendations. The 
research will also explore the manpower crisis, the key issue for the 
entente in this period, and Wilson’s contribution to the establishment of 
Allied unity of command. The diplomatic skills Wilson deployed to defuse 
serious strains between the entente powers will be examined, with 
particular reference to his time as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. His 
contribution to the debate on Britain’s post-war imperial grand strategy will 
also be evaluated. The thesis will refute the long-established one-
dimensional view of Wilson and suggest that he played a more influential 
role in British strategic development than has hitherto been acknowledged. 
 3 
CONTENTS 
Abstract        2 
Acknowledgements       4 
Abbreviations       5 
Introduction and Literature Review    7 
Chapter One: Wilson and his Networks                                 39   
Chapter Two: Future Strategy Paper            79   
Chapter Three: The Supreme War Council                          124 
Chapter Four: The Manpower Crisis                                    168 
Chapter Five: Unity of Command                                         211 
Chapter Six: Wilson and British Grand Strategy                  257 
Conclusion:                                                                          299 
Bibliography:                                                                        310 
      
 4 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis would not have been possible without the support and 
assistance of a large number of people. In particular, my supervisory team 
of Professor Gary Sheffield and Professor Stephen Badsey have been 
hugely helpful, patient, and wise. 
 
My thanks to the staff at the various archives I have visited, especially 
those at the Imperial War Museum, London, the Liddle Hart Centre for 
Military Archives at King’s College London, and the Churchill Archives 
Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge. I am particularly grateful to Dr Paul 
M. Harris who was kind enough to share with me his database of Staff 
College graduates, together with other insightful advice. Others, who at 
one time or another have offered valuable counsel or simply a listening 
ear, include Professor John Bourne, David Budgen, Brian Curragh, 
Jonathan Grun, James Halstead, Timothy Halstead, John Hussey, Dr 
Spencer Jones, Phil McCarty, Paul Potts, Professor Peter Simkins, and Dr 
Andy Simpson. 
 
Most of all, my gratitude goes to my wife Jean, for her graceful and 
unflinching support for this, the latest in a lifetime of obsessions. 
 
 
 5 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AC   Army Council 
ADC   Aide-de-Camp 
AEF   American Expeditionary Force 
AG   Adjutant General 
BEF   British Expeditionary Force 
BGGS   Brigadier-General General Staff 
BLO   Bodleian Library Oxford 
CB   Companion of the Order of the Bath 
CAC   Churchill Archive Centre 
CIGS   Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
C-in-C   Commander-in-Chief 
CoS   Chief of Staff 
DCIGS  Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
DMO   Director of Military Operations 
DMI   Director of Military Intelligence 
EEF   Egyptian Expeditionary Force 
EWB   Executive War Board 
FM   Field Marshal 
GHQ   General Headquarters 
GOC   General Officer Commanding 
GQG    Grand Quartier General 
GS   General Staff 
IWC   Imperial War Cabinet 
 6 
JN   Joint Note 
OH   Official History 
LHCMA  Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives 
MGO   Master General of Ordnance 
MP   Member of Parliament 
NLS   National Library of Scotland 
PA   Parliamentary Archives 
PMR   Permanent Military Representative 
PPS   Parliamentary Private Secretary 
QMG    Quartermaster General 
SWC   Supreme War Council 
TNA   The National Archives 
WO   War Office 
 
 
 7 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis is a re-examination of Sir Henry Hughes Wilson’s impact on 
British strategy in the First World War. It concentrates on the final 18 
months of the conflict, from mid-1917 until the end of 1918 and considers 
his impact at this crucial point in Allied relations. The period was chosen 
because, for the first time, he combined influence with power. Until then, 
Wilson’s wartime career had been, for him, an unsatisfying succession of 
advisory and liaison-related roles, punctuated by an undistinguished 
period as a corps commander. Wilson’s fortunes changed during this 
period because senior politicians in Britain and France were searching not 
only for new ways to bring the war to a victorious conclusion, but also for 
senior military figures prepared to develop and implement such a strategic 
change. Wilson’s ability to speak the politicians’ language, and apparent 
willingness to do their bidding, improved his fortunes and ultimately led to 
his appointment as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), the British 
government’s principal military adviser, in February 1918. There was, 
however, no inevitability about Wilson’s rise to prominence. Britain’s Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George led a shaky and problematic coalition 
government. Sir Douglas Haig as Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the Western Front, and Sir William 
‘Wully’ Robertson as CIGS, were a formidable partnership, popular with 
Unionist politicians, the public, and, for the most part, the Press.1 At the 
same time, Wilson was no politicians’ cipher, a mere catalyst through 
                                            
1 Haig was C-in-C from 19 December 1915 until the end of the war; Robertson was CIGS 
from 23 December 1915 to 18 February 1918. 
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which non-specialists got their way in steering Allied strategy. As this 
thesis argues, he had clear strategic views of his own, the result of 
important pre-war roles at the heart of the British Army’s strategy-making 
system. This was dominated by his unshakable belief in the need to 
maintain the strongest possible links with Britain’s principal ally, France. 
This conviction was developed in the years preceding the outbreak of war 
in 1914 and Wilson pursued it doggedly thereafter.  
 
Wilson has suffered more opprobrium than most Great War British 
generals. In his case the brickbats were thrown not because he was 
viewed as a ‘chateau general’, one of the so-called ‘donkeys’ leading lions 
to destruction in a ‘futile’ war. Instead his detractors were, initially at least, 
colleagues and contemporaries. The focus of their criticism was not his 
talent, or otherwise, for leading men, planning offensives or tactical 
doctrine, but his character. The British official historian of the Great War, 
Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds expressed ‘contempt and dislike’ 
for Wilson.2 Lloyd George, who bestowed on him both power and 
influence did so only, he wrote with the benefit of hindsight, because there 
was no obvious alternative. Wilson, said Lloyd George, was ‘a shrewd 
politician’; a back-handed compliment from one of Britain’s canniest 
parliamentary pugilists.3 Wilson’s reputation was undone not by his 
actions, which for the most part were not unusual in the higher echelons of 
the British Army at the start of the 20th century, but by his writings. Like 
                                            
2 Ian F.W. Beckett, (ed.), The Memoirs of Sir James Edmonds (Brighton: Tom Donovan 
Editions, 2013), p. xxiii. 
3 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (2 vols.), (London: Odhams, 
1938), (vol. II), pp. 1688, 1713. 
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many of his class and education Wilson kept a journal for much of his 
adult life. In it he scribbled thoughts and impressions of the day’s events. 
Had he not been assassinated in 1922 it is likely he would have joined in 
the ‘battle of the memoirs’ and used both the diaries and his extensive 
correspondence, especially that from his time as CIGS, to write his own 
epitaph.4 As it was his reputation was left to the tender mercies of his 
friend and biographer C.E. Callwell and his widow’s naïveté.5  
 
While the diaries are a goldmine for the historian, the publication of a 
selection from them in 1927 created an image of their author which has 
stood the test of time. The expressions of irritation, outrage, and abuse, 
aimed at foe - and often ‘friend’ - with which Wilson peppered his jottings 
ruined his reputation. Two years later, the Great War veteran Sir Andrew 
MacPhail demolished what remained of Wilson’s character in what was 
effectively an extended review of Callwell’s book.6 For almost a century, 
the cacophony of late-night scribbled exclamations drowned out any 
opportunity for a more even-handed analysis. Sir Hubert Gough’s 
biographer accurately described Wilson as ‘an extraordinary man’ who 
was ‘imaginative, shrewd and articulate’. He also thought him ‘lacking an 
original mind or depth of intellect’.7 This latter claim, this thesis will argue, 
is incorrect. In life Wilson had many admirers, both political and military. 
                                            
4 Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: A Political Soldier (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008 [2006]), p. 290; Ian F.W. Beckett, The Great War (Second Edition) 
(Harlow: Pearson Education, 2007), pp. 645-6. 
5 Callwell, C.E., Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (2 vols.) (London: 
Cassell, 1927). 
6 Sir Andrew MacPhail, Three Persons (London: John Murray, 1929), pp. 17-153. 
7 Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Goughie: The Life of General Sir Hubert Gough CGB, GCMG, 
KCVO (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1975), p. 5. 
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Lord Esher, an advisor on military matters to successive British Cabinets, 
thought him ‘always loyal...If he is trusted he will run as straight as any 
thoroughbred...’8 His charm and witty facetiousness made him good 
company. He also had many enemies who, no doubt correctly, mistrusted 
his love of ‘intrigue’, or in the modern idiom, ‘office politics’. That said, 
Wilson was not alone in using connections, friendships and networks to 
further his career. He was, rather, ‘the most politically adept member of 
the most politically aware generation of soldiers Britain had seen since the 
Commonwealth.’9 Those wishing to thrive in any organisation have always 
had to form alliances, kowtow to authority occasionally, sometimes flatter 
to deceive. For almost a century Wilson was condemned not so much for 
what he did, as for what he wrote. His reputation had to wait until 2006 for 
Keith Jeffery’s reassessment.10 Focussing on Wilson the ‘political soldier’, 
it provided a much more even-handed analysis of his career. This thesis 
builds on this ‘revisionist’ view of Wilson, and aims to shed new light on his 
contribution to the strategic debate facing the Allies in the final 18 months 
of the Great War.  
 
Wilson’s detractors, both contemporaries and subsequent historians, 
made much of his love of ‘intrigue’, suggesting this was why he rose to 
become the government’s principal military advisor. Wilson was a 
schemer, so the narrative goes, a lover of politicians, whose 
                                            
8 Esher to Derby, 29 December 1917, in Oliver, Viscount Esher (ed.), Journals and 
Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher (vol. IV), 1916-1930 (London: Ivor Nicholson & 
Watson, 1938), p. 172. 
9 Brock Millman, ‘Henry Wilson’s Mischief: Field Marshall [sic] Sir Henry Wilson’s Rise to 
Power 1917-18,’ Canadian Journal of History, vol. XXX, (December 1995), p. 468. 
10 Jeffery, Wilson. 
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ungentlemanly conniving paved the path to greatness. In fact, until the 
alignment of several other stars in the civil-military firmament, Wilson’s 
Machiavellian ‘talents’ had done little to advance his prospects. His pre-
war career followed a similar path to other able contemporaries, 
culminating in Commandant of the British Army Staff College (1907-10) 
and then Director of Military Operations (DMO) at the War Office. While in 
the latter post, Britain’s ‘strategic reorientation’ towards partnership with 
France hardened, in opposition to a resurgent Germany. Wilson was not 
sole creator of this position, but his, ‘...drive, enthusiasm and complete 
conviction about the necessity to render effective land support to France 
were to provide the stimulus to move military strategy on from the period 
of consideration and of deciding between alternatives to that of detailed 
planning for action.’11 Wilson’s ‘masterful blueprint’ for the BEF’s 
mobilisation worked like clockwork.12 He had good reason to hope that 
when war came he would be appointed to a senior position. In fact, the 
reputation he gained from his involvement in the toxic Curragh Incident of 
March 1914 hampered Wilson’s advancement for at least three years. 
Britain’s first wartime  Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith, stymied his hopes of 
being Chief of Staff (CoS) to the BEF. ‘Squiff’ as Wilson contemptuously 
called him in his diaries and correspondence, believed him to be the true 
ringleader of this nadir in civil-military relations, dismissing Field Marshal 
Lord Roberts, another key participant, as ‘in a dangerous condition of 
                                            
11 John Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c.1900 
– 1914 (London: Routledge, 1974), p. 289. 
12 Ian Beckett, Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, The British Army and the First World 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 208. 
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senile frenzy.’13 According to Asquith, Wilson was at one time or another ‘a 
poisonous mischief-maker’, a ‘clever ruffian’, and ‘that serpent’.14 It was 
Wilson, therefore, and not the prime-movers Johnnie and Hubert Gough, 
who was blackballed for his role in the ‘Incident’. The result was that 
Wilson spent the years 1914-1917 in a series of largely unrewarding roles. 
There was no inevitability about Wilson’s rise to the post of CIGS.  
 
The accession of Lloyd George to the office of Prime Minister, in 
December 1916, was fundamental to Wilson’s advancement. Nonetheless, 
it took six months before he came to the Welshman’s attention. Lloyd 
George had always opposed what he saw as the unimaginatively wasteful 
strategy of large-scale attritional offensives on the Western Front. Wilson’s 
apparent willingness to view the strategy embodied in the Haig-Robertson 
axis from a different perspective, presented the Prime Minister with an 
opportunity to effect change. Wilson’s chance came when, as the costly 
Third Ypres campaign was grinding to a close, Lloyd George asked his 
generals for their proposed strategy for 1918.  Haig and Robertson could 
come up with nothing more imaginative than another large-scale offensive 
in Flanders. Frustrated, Lloyd George, who had already been in 
discussions with Wilson, asked him, and Haig’s predecessor Field Marshal 
Lord French, to propose an alternative. This was the turning point in 
Wilson’s fortunes and he grasped the opportunity. Unlike French, who 
criticised Haig and Robertson personally, Wilson concentrated on strategic 
                                            
13 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 21 March 1914, in Michael and Eleanor Brock (eds.), H.H. 
Asquith: Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 58-9. 
14 Ibid., 6 November 1918, p. 311, 20 December 1914, p. 333, 28 December 1914, p. 
342. 
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priorities, critiqued his colleagues’ proposals, and recommended a 
defensive posture in the west to await the arrival of the American 
Expeditionary Forces (AEF). Significantly for future Allied strategy 
however, he ruled out large scale campaigns in ‘sideshow’ theatres, 
something he knew was a favoured option of the Prime Minister. Wilson 
was no Lloyd George dupe; he was prepared to go against the strategic 
thinking of his fellow generals, but not to the point of refocussing Allied 
military priorities away from the Western Front to please his political 
master. As the most recent work on the British Army in the Great War has 
noted, in 1918 Wilson ‘was no more biddable’ than Robertson; their 
differences were ones of detail rather than core principles.15 Wilson’s most 
significant achievement, in a seminal strategy paper of October 1917, was 
to press for a body to take responsibility for what he hoped would be 
joined-up inter-Allied strategic planning, what became the Supreme War 
Council (SWC) at Versailles, outside Paris.16 His paper was, in effect, a 
job application for high office. It was also a bold gamble. 
 
Haig and Robertson were resilient individuals who, despite some 
important differences on strategy, presented a united front when dealing 
with politicians. They saw Wilson, rightly, as a stalking horse for Lloyd 
George’s opposition to another major offensive on the Western Front in 
1918. When Wilson became Britain’s Permanent Military Representative 
(PMR) at the SWC it was not a foregone conclusion that he, or the new 
                                            
15 Beckett et. al., British Army, p. 348. 
16 TNA, CAB 27/8, WP 61, ‘Present State of the War, future prospects and future action 
to be taken,’ General Sir Henry Wilson to War Cabinet, 20 October 1917 (hereafter CAB 
27/8, WP 61). 
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body he came to dominate, would survive, let alone be successful. The 
Allies had ‘spent three years, against a background of strategic rivalry and 
personal mistrust’, unable to develop an effective coordinating 
machinery.17 Wilson had Lloyd George’s backing, but Haig and Robertson 
had significant support in the country and at Court. Robertson dominated 
the Army Council, the body which effectively ran the British Army machine, 
and ensured it made life difficult for Wilson and his staff. As this thesis 
shows, despite the hurdles placed in his way, and thanks in part to initial 
apathy amongst Britain’s Allies on the War Council, Wilson’s strategic 
views dominated the business of the SWC between November 1917 and 
February 1918, when he became CIGS. It resulted in more than a dozen 
Joint Notes (JNs), policy documents covering a range of important, 
sometimes prosaic, subjects. Two, JN1 and JN12, put paid to the prospect 
of another major Allied offensive in the west in 1918. It also stymied Lloyd 
George’s hopes for new large-scale offensives in the Middle East and 
elsewhere. The SWC model for inter-Allied cooperation was far from 
perfect, but it was considered effective enough to have been revived at the 
start of the Second World War in 1939. 
 
Wilson’s hand was strengthened when Georges Clemenceau became 
French Prime Minister at the end of 1917. He developed a nuanced 
relationship with the ‘Tiger’, one which helped preserve the Anglo-French 
alliance at a time of extreme stress. French resources were stretched to 
                                            
17 William Philpott, ‘The Supreme War Council and the Allied War Effort, 1939-40’, in 
Philippe Chassaigne, and Michael Dockrill, (eds.), Anglo-French Relations 1898-1998: 
From Fashoda to Jospin (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 109. 
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breaking point and Clemenceau, although ‘a prickly ally’, appreciated the 
need to nurture the alliance, as did his army’s Chief of Staff (CoS) 
Ferdinand Foch.18 Wilson took a similarly pragmatic view. Thus, just as in 
the first 18 months of the war, Wilson’s skills as a soldier-diplomat came to 
the fore, acting as both lightning rod and catalyst between two mercurial 
Prime Ministers. This was particularly relevant in the seemingly endless 
dispute over the British taking over more of the French front. Wilson 
reminded the politicians of the importance of doing more to meet French 
demands, but defended the British position at a time of acute manpower 
shortages. It was a difficult balancing act. As CIGS, he was horrified by the 
lack of men for the front and the determination of the government to 
prioritise naval and other sections of the war economy at the expense of 
the Army. Throughout the war he had criticised politicians for their failure, 
as he saw it, to deploy conscription energetically. Once at the War Office 
this was an abiding theme.  
 
A logical, but by no means inevitable concomitant of the creation of inter-
Allied strategic planning, through the auspices of the SWC, was the 
establishment of unity of command. For most of the war Wilson was no 
more an advocate of this model for strategy implementation than any other 
senior British soldier. Nonetheless, when the Allies were under greatest 
pressure following the shock of the German 1918 Spring Offensive, he 
was a key influence in Haig accepting Foch as Allied ‘Generalissimo’.19 
                                            
18 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime 
(London: Simon & Schuster, 2003 [2002]), p. 90. 
19 Foch’s title of ‘Général en Chef des Armées Alliées’ was agreed by Lloyd George on 14 
April and formalised on 22 April 1918; he was appointed Marshal of France on 5 August 
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Foch and Wilson had been friends for more than a decade. It meant that 
as CIGS Wilson could deploy his diplomatic skills to neutralise, or at least 
soften, French criticism of British efforts. Once again, however, Wilson 
was no dupe. His defence of the British interest led to several serious 
spats between the two. Had it not been for their relationship the Anglo-
French partnership might have foundered just when it was most needed.  
 
STRUCTURE 
The thesis comprises six substantive chapters, with a thematic structure. 
This was chosen in preference to a chronological approach to allow for 
concentration on subject areas in which Wilson’s contribution is under-
represented in the literature. The preliminary chapter considers Wilson’s 
military and political networks; the allies, friends and confidants who 
helped shape his strategic thinking. Also discussed are Wilson’s 
opponents, both soldiers and politicians. Wilson’s detractors have placed 
great emphasis on his ‘politicking’. This chapter aims to put the subject in 
context and argues that Wilson was far from unique in deploying ‘intrigue’ 
to achieve his goals. The second chapter examines the creation of the 
SWC; the result of Lloyd George’s desire to regain control of British 
strategy on the Western Front. Wilson was principal architect of this body 
which, as is discussed in Chapter Three, had a major role in the 
development of war policy in the winter of 1917-18. Wilson and his team 
dominated the work of the joint secretariat of the SWC and produced a 
                                            
1918, Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Foch in Command: The Forging of a First World War 
General (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 316 and 406. 
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significant body of work designed to enhance inter-allied co-operation. A 
theme which had both enabled and confined allied strategy throughout the 
war was that of manpower. Chapter Four considers this fundamentally 
important issue in the latter stages of the conflict, when British and French 
resources were under severe pressure and the USA’s contribution to the 
war effort was problematic. Wilson’s presence in this debate was coloured 
by his abiding interest in the politics of Ireland, the land of his birth; a ‘blind 
spot’ where his normally sound political judgement deserted him. The fifth 
chapter examines another consistent strand in the Anglo-French Alliance, 
the notion of unity of command. Wilson, in line with other British officers, 
opposed the concept but had argued since 1915 for a more structured, 
holistic approach to Allied war planning. Only in 1918, in the face of 
unprecedented pressure on the Alliance caused by the German March 
offensive, did Wilson accept the need for unity of command embodied in 
his friend Foch. The final chapter considers theatres beyond the Western 
Front where, as CIGS, Wilson had to balance the challenges of the 1918 
war effort with Britain’s Imperial post-war future.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Wilson played a key role in the British Army’s planning for a continental 
war and during the conflict held several senior and influential positions. 
Inevitably therefore there are few scholarly works on strategic and 
command issues of the Great War in which his name does not feature. 
Very often, however, Wilson’s notorious ‘scheming’ and penchant for 
‘mischief’ colours the writing, effectively blurring the overall view of a 
 18 
soldier who at the time had at least as many loyal admirers as 
detractors.20 Too often Wilson appears as a one-dimensional figure, 
descriptions of his personal characteristics masking close analysis of his 
professional views and actions. Specifically, too many works interpret 
Wilson’s of-the-moment comments in his private diary both as a reflection 
of his considered views and, by extension, evidence of his subsequent 
conduct. Whether this is a reasonable assumption is at the heart of this 
thesis. The research attempts to fill in the gaps in Wilson’s Great War 
career, concentrating not on his party-political ambitions but on the 
execution of his military responsibilities, with reference to his interest in 
and contribution to military strategy and higher level, or grand strategy. 
 
Wilson began the war as Sub-Chief of Staff to the BEF’s C-in-C Field 
Marshal Sir John French, and spent much of 1915 as Principal British 
Liaison Officer with the French Army. He spent 1916 in the unfamiliar role 
of battlefield commander, as General Officer Commanding (GOC) IV 
Corps in a quiet sector of the Western Front around Arras. An uneventful 
year was enlivened only by the embarrassing loss of a kilometre of front 
line trench to a German attack.21 The incident confirmed, if confirmation 
were needed, that whatever skills Wilson might have he did not excel in 
commanding large bodies of men. He spent much of 1917 in varied, 
                                            
20 The Secretary to the War Cabinet, Sir Maurice Hankey, called Wilson an ‘arch 
intriguer’, Stephen W. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets; Vol. I, 1877-1918 (London: 
Collins, 1970), p. 238; Beaverbrook condemned him as ‘a schemer and intriguer both’, 
Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War: 1914-1916 (London: Oldbourne Book Co, 
1960), p. 192. 
21 J.E. Edmonds, Official History of the War: Military Operations France and Belgium, 
1916, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 210-226. 
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unfulfilling roles until his fortunes finally changed in the autumn with the 
creation by the Allied governments of an overarching body charged with 
developing a higher direction for war policy, the SWC. Most works 
concerned with the SWC have credited Wilson with being one of the 
principal figures in its creation, but while several outlined its functions and 
defined role, details of the day to day activities of this body, and the work 
of Wilson in particular, are limited. William Philpott noted its role in 
initiating a ‘more dynamic management’ of the coalition war effort, but 
passed over Wilson’s contribution.22 Jeffery acknowledged that the SWC 
‘completed much useful, mostly prosaic, work towards the promotion of an 
efficient and well coordinated war effort.’23 Whether this work was 
common-place or not is considered in this thesis. Meanwhile, the 
contribution of this effort towards greater Allied co-operation and ultimate 
victory has received limited critical attention. Wilson’s role in steering the 
Council towards the contentious issue of allied strategic unity, and 
ultimately unity of command, is deserving of further study. 
 
One element of this thesis considers Wilson’s actions in the role of CIGS 
from February 1918 until the end of the war. These 10 months culminated 
in ‘the greatest military victory in British history.’24 Wilson’s role in this 
period merits more nuanced study than is available in the literature, where 
                                            
22 William Philpott, ‘Marshal Ferdinand Foch and Allied Victory’ in Matthew Hughes and 
Matthew Seligmann (eds.), Leadership in Conflict 1914-1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 
2000), p. 39. 
23 Keith Jeffery (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: 
1918-1922 (hereafter MCHW) (London: The Bodley Head for the Army Records Society, 
1985), p. 17. 
24 Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities (London: 
Headline, 2001), p. 263. 
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too often he is painted either as too senior and detached to be of 
relevance in a fast-developing war of manoeuvre, or a mere cipher for 
both British politicians, and Foch, the ultimate ‘Generalissimo’ of the Allied 
armies on the Western Front. The period is examined in the context of the 
wider responsibilities of the CIGS, a subject which has received scant 
attention in the historiography. Wilson, and his predecessor Robertson, 
were not only concerned with the conduct of the war on the Western Front, 
but also in all other theatres, including Italy, Salonika, the Middle East 
(principally Palestine and Mesopotamia), and the turmoil in various regions 
of formerly Tsarist Russia. These campaigns, in some cases distractions, 
in others major diversions, were part of Wilson’s workload in 1918. An 
analysis of how he balanced these with his responsibility to the war on the 
Western Front is a comparatively neglected area of study but is essential 
in properly assessing his effectiveness. 
 
For a figure whose name appears so frequently in the historiography, 
Wilson has attracted surprisingly few modern biographers, but more than 
certain other key figures in the British military elite, such as Henry 
Rawlinson or Hubert Plumer. The most recent, and by far the most 
scholarly, examination of his life, by Keith Jeffery, foregoes a detailed 
examination of his military and strategic influence in favour of an 
exhaustive analysis of his often overt political activity, with particular 
reference to his lifelong interest in Irish Unionist politics.25 The impact of 
                                            
25 Jeffery, Wilson. 
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the first Wilson biography on his reputation has already been noted.26 Two 
others, dating from the 1960’s, before many official archives were open to 
scholars, followed a similar line to Callwell, quoting extensively from 
Wilson’s indiscreet diaries while offering only limited strategic context and 
analysis.27 The fifth work on Wilson concentrated on his assassination and 
the political events leading up to it. Perhaps inevitably it is of limited value 
to the focus of this research.28 Brock Millman’s article on Wilson’s role in 
the creation of the SWC made a valuable contribution to the subject but 
omitted an analysis of Wilson’s strategic influence once in a position of 
real power.29 
 
This relative dearth of writing specific to Wilson means that a review of the 
historiography of his military career must also look to the biographies of 
his contemporaries, both soldiers and statesmen, studies of the military 
and political events with which he was concerned, and works on the 
organisational structures within which he operated. From the relative 
molehill of Wilson biography, the researcher is faced with a veritable 
mountain of associated material. As a result, this review is limited to those 
works considered of direct relevance to Wilson’s impact on British strategy 
in the last 18 months of the war. The development of Wilson’s career in 
the build-up to the war, and its first three years was excluded from detailed 
study in part because this entailed too broad a remit. Secondly, there is 
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already a growing body of modern scholarship available on the 
development of the British Army between the end of the Boer War and its 
involvement in the early phase of the Great War.30 By contrast, this author 
believes, the historiography of Wilson’s military career in the final 18 
months of the war offers greater scope for further study. 
 
As noted, the best biography of Wilson, and the most recent, is Jeffery’s. It 
addressed key phases in Wilson’s Great War career. A single chapter was 
devoted to his role as British PMR to the SWC, and as CIGS from 
February 1918 until the end of the war. The sub-title ‘A Political Soldier’ 
summed up the work’s primary focus. The author’s Preface made clear his 
focus: ‘This biography seeks to assess Wilson’s life and career in the light 
of more complete evidence than hitherto available, and to place him 
clearly in his social, national and political context.’ Thus, the study laid 
more emphasis on Wilson’s ‘political’ activities than on his strategic 
thought, although the latter was not ignored. Jeffery said the work aimed 
to illuminate many aspects of modern Britain, including civil-military 
relations, social and political linkages with the ‘Establishment’, the role of 
the Irish Protestant Ascendancy in the British military, ‘and the problems 
posed by Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism to the United Kingdom 
during the first quarter of the twentieth century.’31 The result is an analysis 
of Wilson’s prominent and developing role in Ireland’s political tribulations. 
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Wilson’s relationship in the final two years of the war with Lloyd George is 
covered in some detail, particularly his role as stalking horse for the 
premier’s wish to break the Haig-Robertson alliance. The book has many 
strengths. Its weaknesses, if they are such, are centred on the priority 
given to the political elements vis a vis the military elements of Wilson’s 
career. This thesis aims to complement Jeffery’s seminal study. 
  
Another area offering potential for further study is the chapter covering 
both Wilson’s role in the creation and functioning of the SWC, and as 
CIGS. A total of 25 pages were devoted to this 12-month period (from late 
October 1917), the most important in Wilson’s military career. An 
otherwise positive review by David R. Woodward criticised the ‘thin 
treatment’ of Wilson’s leadership as CIGS.32 While it would be wrong to 
suggest that verbosity is an indicator of quality, the brevity of this section 
offers scope for further scrutiny of key strategic issues. These include 
Wilson’s role in championing, and then developing, the notion of ‘unity of 
command’ on the Western Front, the rationale for the attempted creation 
of a Strategic Reserve controlled by the SWC, and planning for the Allies’ 
campaigns in 1918 and 1919. Wilson’s influence and decision-making 
during the British setbacks of March and April 1918 were passed over 
lightly, as was his role in preparations for, and during the Allied 
counteroffensives from August onwards. Once in post at the War Office, 
Wilson’s contribution to greater co-operation between the Allied 
                                            
32 David R. Woodward, review of Wilson in Journal of Military History, April 2009, vol. 73 
(2), pp. 665-666. 
 24 
commanders merits further examination, as does its impact. Another area 
that received limited attention from Jeffery, is Wilson’s responsibilities for 
the conduct of the war in other theatres. The Italian campaign was 
considered in the context of pressure on manpower and resources in the 
latter part of 1917, but other theatres received only cursory attention. As 
with his predecessor Robertson, Wilson’s brief as CIGS was wide, with 
contending demands and a Prime Minister looking for ways to win the war 
at ‘acceptable’ cost. One area that has received some attention is the 
campaign in the Middle East, particularly Palestine, where Lloyd George 
believed military progress might be made at limited cost. Matthew Hughes 
showed that Wilson and Robertson had differing views to the Prime 
Minister.33 Nonetheless, details of Wilson’s work in these theatres are 
scant across a historiography dominated by strategy on the Western 
Front.  
 
Jeffery assessed Wilson’s time as DMO, in a chapter entitled ‘Politics, the 
Irish Question, and War’.34 His work on preparing plans for the BEF’s 
deployment to France at the outbreak of war received detailed discussion, 
but Wilson’s role in the Curragh Incident of March 1914 dominated the 
section. By contrast, Roy A. Prete concentrated on Wilson’s role while 
DMO in working with the French on plans for the BEF’s complement, 
mobilisation, initial location on the continent and its role on the left wing of 
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the French Army.35 Prete argued that while Wilson did much to reassure 
the French about his country’s intentions if Germany attacked, planning 
was ultimately defective due to the British government’s failure to make 
firm policy decisions. The result was that, ‘The French Staff merely made 
demands and Wilson, on behalf of the British Staff, made every effort to 
comply.’36 The result of this apparent misunderstanding over what were 
good intentions and what were firm commitments was never ironed out 
prior to the outbreak of war. As a result, the French were disappointed 
when their expectations of British commitment were not always met, or at 
least not with the alacrity they expected. These doubts were an abiding 
theme in Anglo-French relations throughout the war. As this thesis will 
demonstrate, there were plenty of occasions when misunderstanding and 
frustration found Wilson smoothing frayed relations between British and 
French commanders.37 The soldier-diplomat was a role in which Wilson 
excelled, and one he played for much of the war. The historiography of 
inter-allied liaison work is extensive and focused on the work of key 
individuals. Interestingly, the liaison work of arguably the most influential 
British officer, Wilson, has received little detailed attention until now.38 
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Books of less direct value in reassessing Wilson’s military effectiveness 
include the three main biographies which preceded Jeffery’s work. 
According to Jeffery, Callwell’s ‘official’ biography painted a picture of a 
man who was an ‘over-ambitious, self-serving monster, with such violent 
passions and prejudices as to appear at times actually unbalanced.’39 
There is no doubt that Callwell’s work, which called extensively on 
Wilson’s 41 manuscript diaries, has provided a handy if simplistic 
character portrait.40 The book itself, while quoting liberally from the diaries, 
comprised a detailed résumé of Wilson’s life. Often, diary extracts appear 
to have been chosen as much for their colourful tone as for their value in 
illuminating and informing the accompanying narrative. Almost inevitably, 
considering the era in which he was writing, Callwell told his story from a 
personal angle with limited referencing of source material. Most 
importantly from the perspective of this research, Wilson’s actions and 
responses to events were recorded with little if any analysis of broader 
motivational context, or their effects.  
 
Basil Collier wrote Brasshat before he had access to the wealth of material 
in the official archives. The narrative, while detailed, included little analysis 
of events and their causes and effects. An important limitation was the 
lack of historiographical referencing. Collier’s was a sympathetic 
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biography, too often coming down on the side of his subject when 
evidence pointed to the contrary. Field Marshal Lord Kitchener’s accurate 
prediction that the war would be a long one, as opposed to Wilson’s 
assessment that it would be short and bloody was dismissed as ‘the 
uninstructed guess of a man who must differ from the majority at all costs, 
while Wilson’s was a sound inference from reliable intelligence. It was only 
by unforeseeable chance that Wilson was wrong and Kitchener very 
nearly right.’41 The chapters devoted to Wilson’s role in pre-war planning 
and his contribution to the BEF’s deployment in the first six months of the 
war were its strongest.  
 
The other main Wilson biography also suffered from being too dependent 
upon Wilson’s diary, unsupported by his correspondence and other 
primary source material. In The Lost Dictator Bernard Ash noted the risks 
involved: ‘The diaries are highly intimate and highly personal and often 
represent Wilson’s private views rather than his public intentions, and 
…because for the most part the entries were written in haste, following 
immediately upon occurrences, and therefore did not always represent his 
more considered thoughts.’42 Despite the sagacity of this observation, the 
work sometimes construed much from little detail. Wilson’s year as 
Principal British Liaison Officer with the French in 1915 was, according to 
Ash, the period during which he began considering the need for greater 
co-ordination between the Allied armies and, ultimately, the formation of 
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the SWC. While the personal diaries support this suggestion, Ash went 
further and construed that the liaison role held ‘the key to power in the 
military operations of the Western Front.’ If the co-ordination of the Allied 
armies rested in him, Wilson could be more powerful than the BEF’s C-in-
C Sir John French or his French counterpart General Joseph Joffre: ‘He 
could be a more powerful person than Asquith or Kitchener.’43 Wilson’s 
role was important and influential, but it is far-fetched to suggest that it 
was as pivotal as Ash claimed. Equally, there is no specific reference in 
his diaries to indicate that Wilson, despite his tendency to hubris, viewed 
his position in 1915 so loftily. Ash further claimed that the SWC had such 
power that in late 1917 and early 1918 Wilson, with Foch controlling 
France’s military representative General Maxime Weygand, ‘were for all 
practical purposes in control of Allied military operations.’44 Wilson might 
have wished it was so, but, as this thesis discusses, the claim is in stark 
contrast to the facts. The book’s least convincing argument, however, was 
enshrined in its title. Wilson’s strong views on the future of Ireland meant 
that he was feted by, and had strong sympathies with, the Conservative 
and Unionist Party, and in 1922 eventually became one of its MPs, for the 
Ulster seat of North Down. Diary comments and his political views 
generally would undoubtedly be considered reactionary today, but they 
were not unusual in an Edwardian officer and gentleman. From these 
unguarded personal diary entries and remarks to friends and 
acquaintances, Ash speculated on a post-war world in which Wilson, had 
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he lived, would have taken effortless control of his party, then the country, 
attempted a ‘reconquest of Ireland, the subjugation of India, Egypt and 
other lands’ accompanied at home by ‘military confrontation with the 
forces of organised labour.’45 This conclusion, which underpins the whole 
work, was best summed up by a more scholarly historian: ‘Ash’s fanciful 
prediction that Wilson might have become some sort of quasi-fascist 
leader, while it may well have been a useful device to sell his biography, is 
absurd.’46 
 
The historiography on this period in the development of the British Army 
and the administrative structures that underpinned it, is substantial, with 
Wilson given credit for the efficient deployment of forces in August 1914.47 
John Gooch characterised Wilson as the first DMO to display the ‘tenets of 
the General Staff mind as it was understood in Germany’.48 The 
performance of the BEF has been much studied. For some historians, the 
‘Old Contemptibles’ of 1914 were let down by their commanders. Tim 
Travers argued that senior officers brought an Edwardian culture to the 
battlefield, one at odds with the industrialised nature of modern conflict.49 
Nikolas Gardner developed the theme and further suggested that at the 
highest levels of command, personal rivalry often worked to the detriment 
of concerted action and effective operational control. According to 
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Gardner, the ambitious and self-serving Wilson, as Sub-Chief of General 
Staff in the BEF, undermined his superior, Sir Archibald Murray.50 Gardner 
noted that several of Wilson’s colleagues from his time as DMO formed 
the nucleus of the staff of the Operations section at GHQ. As a result, he 
contended, this partisan group looked to Wilson rather than Murray for 
guidance, something that wore down the latter’s authority. Thus, Wilson 
gained undue influence over Field Marshal French, to the detriment of the 
BEF. While accepting that Murray was undermined by Wilson, a recent 
essay has argued convincingly that there is little evidence of Wilson’s 
‘influence’ resulting in Sir John changing policy in response to his advice.51 
 
One of the major characteristics of the Great War was that it was a conflict 
of coalitions. From the start France and Britain were dependent upon each 
other. Initially, due to the size of the French Army, the British were junior 
members of the Allied coalition on the Western Front. As Britain’s 
contribution grew, so did her influence and ability to take greater control of 
events. By mid-1917 the BEF took on the lion’s share of the fighting. 
Nonetheless, ensuring a degree of equanimity between Paris and London 
was a constant challenge for military commanders and politicians. 
Scholars are in accord that over the four and a half years of the war 
Wilson played a role in addressing this challenge. There is less agreement 
in the historiography about the periods when this engagement was 
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particularly active, and even less about when it had an appreciable impact 
– for better or worse. One area where Wilson had a long-standing 
involvement was the debate on the notion of ‘unity of command’. His view, 
his diaries and correspondence suggest, was that closer Anglo-French co-
operation should be encouraged rather than feared. As the war 
progressed, his thoughts developed from the ad hoc and informal, based 
for the most part on personal relationships, towards support for more 
formalised structures; until late 1917 Wilson was walking a lonely road.  
 
William Philpott’s contribution to understanding the genesis and 
development of the concept of Allied unity of command offered a 
comprehensive view of Wilson’s involvement in the preparation of Anglo-
French plans for war with Germany, and of the first 18 months of the 
conflict.52 Describing Wilson as deserving of his ‘historical reputation as an 
ardent Francophile and self-important, outspoken, ambitious political 
intriguer,’ he detailed the gulf between government policy makers and 
military planners.53 Wilson’s appointment in early 1915 as the BEF’s 
Principal Liaison Officer to French Army Headquarters, the Grand Quartier 
General (GQG), was, according to Philpott, the formalisation of a function 
he had carried out unofficially since the beginning of the war ‘smoothing 
out differences between the headquarters as they arose’. Much less 
credible is the suggestion by one of Wilson’s contemporaries, quoted by 
Philpott, that he was now so influential that he was ‘virtually [British] 
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Commander-in-Chief under Joffre’.54 Philpott’s central thesis, that French 
strategy dominated military decision-making throughout the war, while a 
matter of ongoing debate, effectively minimised Wilson’s role in the later 
stages of the conflict. Much of the book concentrated on the period 1914-
16, with less attention devoted to the final two years of the war. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, Wilson’s work at the SWC, and as CIGS, was 
passed over lightly, with Foch emerging as a Generalissimo employing 
consensus rather than coercion to achieve for the first time a functioning 
co-operative relationship between the Allied armies. Wilson’s own 
contribution to Allied policy-making thanks to his long-established 
friendship with Foch and his important role as the British government’s 
chief military advisor, is not considered. The omission offers scope for 
further study and will be addressed in this work. 
 
Elizabeth Greenhalgh’s recent biography of Foch echoed Philpott’s 
characterisation of the Marshal while Generalissimo from March 1918 as a 
conciliator who was able to transcend national self-interest for the greater 
good; a skill which led to victory on the Western Front.55 Here, the Wilson-
Foch relationship is more nuanced with Wilson shown as being anything 
but a willing dupe to his French friend’s policies, the pair often disagreeing 
profoundly, albeit usually good naturedly. The 1918 Anglo-French dispute 
over the availability or otherwise of additional British manpower is handled 
in depth. Foch’s role in the controversy is rounded and detailed; Wilson’s 
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less so. As senior soldier at the War Office, Wilson held direct 
responsibility for the military aspects of this issue and his actions in spring 
1918 over the manpower crisis will receive more analysis in this thesis.56 
Greenhalgh addressed Foch’s relationship with Haig, implying that not 
only did the British C-in-C welcome the fact that the Allied armies finally 
had a single authority in Foch but from henceforth took a junior and 
subservient role. Conversely, Haig’s most recent biographer has pointed 
out that Foch’s respect for his British colleague grew over the summer of 
1918 to the point at which he was ‘exerting real influence on the 
generalissimo’s strategy.’57 Wilson’s contribution to this developing 
relationship, and to the broader co-operative working between other Allied 
senior commanders and politicians, has been passed over in the 
historiography and will be addressed in this study. 
 
Greenhalgh devoted a significant part of an earlier book to the formation of 
the SWC and the development of Foch’s powers following his formal 
appointment as generalissimo on 14 April 1918.58 There are valuable 
insights into the creation of, and tensions in the functioning of, the 
Versailles body, but it is ultimately dismissed as a ‘talking shop’,59 an 
interesting contrast to Jeffery’s verdict on the Council’s work. The book 
reveals the author’s scholarship of the French military and political scene 
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during the Great War that is not always mirrored in evaluation of British 
protagonists. For example, the decision to replace Wilson as Britain’s 
PMR to the SWC with Sir Henry Rawlinson is described as ‘bizarre’ but 
the probable result of Haig preferring to ‘have one of his own men at 
Versailles’.60 In fact, while Rawlinson was undoubtedly one of Haig’s ‘most 
important lieutenants’, their relationship was nuanced.61 In March 1915 
Haig had saved Rawlinson’s career after the battle of Neuve Chapelle and 
as a result the junior officer was to some extent ‘beholden’ to the C-in-C.62 
Nonetheless, Rawlinson remained his own man. While Haig might have 
been content to see Rawlinson at Versailles, Wilson would also have 
welcomed the appointment, the latter two having been friends since 
1886.63  
 
Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to the strategic aims of 
Britain’s political leaders, together with the impacts of these changing 
priorities on war policy. As a senior officer with as many political friends - 
and enemies - as military ones, Wilson was deeply concerned with, and 
often involved in, these issues. Samuel R. Williamson’s book considered 
relationship-building at governmental and military levels in the run-up to 
the war, and the contribution of Wilson’s work as DMO.64 David French 
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adopted a similar interpretation of the first two and a half years of the 
conflict, observing that the pre-war failure to define a formal alliance 
between Britain and France impacted negatively on the fighting efficiency 
of the Allied armies.65 He paid particular attention to the British 
government’s dilemma in favouring, as in previous conflicts, a ‘limited war’, 
contributing economically but keeping the human cost to a minimum, while 
over time being gradually pulled into a much deeper conflict by the 
inevitable demands of its main ally.66 The book questioned the ‘Easterner-
Westerner’ distinction commonly applied to both politicians and senior 
soldiers as too simplistic. French’s companion volume, covering the period 
of Lloyd George’s coalition government continued the theme of 
characterising the ‘East-West’ debate as one concerned more with limiting 
casualties than simply territorial in nature.67 French asserted that a ‘pivotal’ 
figure in favour of a Western Front-only policy was Wilson’s predecessor 
as CIGS, Robertson. Wilson, French contended, believed that the war 
would be won in the west but that significant progress to that end might be 
achieved by additional campaigns elsewhere; a perspective that found 
favour with Lloyd George. In fact, as this thesis aims to demonstrate, once 
Wilson had both influence and power he paid lip-service to the notion of 
offensives on multiple fronts, while doing little to enhance it. 
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The apparent proximity of views between Wilson and the Prime Minister, 
and the events that stemmed from them, received extensive coverage in 
Woodward’s Lloyd George and the Generals.68 Wilson ended 1916 
effectively unemployed following his period as commander of IV Corps. 
The first half of 1917 saw him participate in a fruitless diplomatic mission 
to Tsarist Russia, followed by a short-lived role as Chief of the British 
Mission to the French Army. The latter posting was another in which 
Wilson’s familiarity with the French language, the country’s politics and its 
army were put to good use. Lloyd George created the role for Wilson to 
smooth British support for the planned spring campaign of France’s new 
C-in-C Robert Nivelle. The appointment ended once the offensive failed to 
achieve its ambitious objectives and its architect was dismissed. 
According to Woodward, Wilson’s career revived under Lloyd George for 
three main reasons. Firstly, they shared a similar temperament, in contrast 
to some of the more reserved senior British Army officers with whom the 
Prime Minister did business. Secondly, Lloyd George’s preferred war 
policy disagreed profoundly with that advocated by his two most senior 
officers, Haig and Robertson.69 Thirdly, Lloyd George, ever searching for a 
less costly way of winning the war, needed an ally who not only apparently 
sympathised with his views but who was willing to see them to fruition. 
Whether Wilson fitted this description as perfectly as Woodward suggests, 
is considered in this thesis.  
 
                                            
68 David R. Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (Newark: University of Delaware 
Press, 1983). 
69 Woodward, Lloyd George, pp. 243-4. 
 37 
The familiar narrative of Wilson’s appointment to the position of the 
government’s principal military advisor is best told in Woodward’s work on 
Robertson, the man he effectively usurped in February 1918, and will not 
be repeated in this study.70 When Robertson was appointed CIGS in 
December 1915 he ensured that his powers were much greater than those 
of his predecessors. The three previous occupants for the post since the 
outbreak of war had found themselves over-ruled, over-looked and over-
shadowed by the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener. By the time 
of Robertson’s appointment Kitchener’s conduct of the war, in political and 
military circles if not in the public mind, was discredited. In addition, 
Robertson was a more robust character than his predecessors.71 The 
result was that in future the government received military advice directly 
from the CIGS, and that Robertson issued orders to the Army, albeit under 
the Secretary of State’s authority.72 This latter point was of great 
significance as the war progressed; as Robertson’s stature grew no 
Secretary of State felt powerful enough to challenge him. This situation 
was greatly resented by Lloyd George who ensured that when Wilson 
replaced Robertson this latter power was rescinded and returned to the 
political head of the military.  
 
Wilson’s network of friendships and alliances amongst both his fellow 
officers and politicians has been little studied in the historiography, and yet 
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is essential in understanding why he finally rose to exercise both power 
and influence in 1917. The next chapter looks to shine a light on this 
neglected area for what it reveals about Wilson’s military effectiveness.  
 39 
CHAPTER ONE 
WILSON AND HIS NETWORKS 
The image of Wilson which dominates the historiography is that of a silver-
tongued ‘Svengali’, winding gullible men - politicians for the most part - 
around his little finger.1 His ability to say what his masters wanted to hear, 
smiling to their faces while rubbishing many of them behind their backs in 
his diaries, is presented as somehow unique in the British army of the 
time. This, it is suggested, was not the ‘normal’ conduct of an officer and a 
gentleman, and thus Wilson’s ‘untrustworthiness’ stood out as exceptional, 
maverick behaviour. Such behaviour, it is implied, gave impetus to 
Wilson’s career progression and ultimate appointment to the post of CIGS. 
Kitchener’s biographer George H. Cassar described Wilson as ‘Arrogant, 
presumptious, impatient, given to scheming…[his] intellectual gifts 
commended him to politicians and equally rendered him suspect to his 
colleagues and subordinates in the army.’2 An early historian of the War 
noted, presumably euphemistically, that Wilson ‘the most lucid, supple, 
and ambitious of British generals, of whom a military colleague cruelly said 
that he got into a state of sexual excitement whenever he saw a 
politician.’3 This chapter considers his network of friends, and foes, in 
order to illuminate why, until autumn 1917, the trajectory of Wilson’s war-
                                            
1 George H. Cassar, Kitchener’s War: British Strategy from 1914 to 1916 (Dulles, VA: 
Potomac Books, 2004), p. 81. 
2 Idem, Kitchener: Architect of Victory (London: William Kimber & Co, 1977), p. 229; see 
also Paul Guinn, British Strategy and Politics: 1914 to 1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1965), p. 266, and John Grigg, Lloyd George: War Leader: 1916-1918 (London: Faber & 
Faber, 2011 [2002]), pp. 286-287. 
3 C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War 1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1934), pp. 500-501; see also, Sir Sam Fay, The War Office at War (London: Hutchinson, 
1937), p. 100. 
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time career failed to live up to his pre-war expectations. It will also 
consider how his fortunes changed once politicians who admired, rather 
than decried, his ‘diplomatic’ talents came to the fore. 
 
The commonly accepted view of Wilson’s character as exceptional is 
peculiar, considering the amount of space given over in the historiography 
to the overt ‘politicking’ which took place in the British Army of the late-
Victorian and early Edwardian period and which continued into the Great 
War. It is unclear, therefore, why Wilson’s love of gossip and ability to 
make friends of politicians and other men of influence has been 
considered remarkable for so long. Haig, Hubert Gough, John French, 
‘Wully’ Robertson, all ‘politicked’ in one way or another before, during - 
and after - the war. Kitchener’s ‘capacity for intrigue’, most notably against 
the Viceroy Lord Curzon while the former was C-in-C India was 
‘notorious’.4 It would have been unusual had career officers not attempted 
to further or at least bolster their positions by pulling strings and using 
friendships to best advantage. As the ‘management guru’ Charles Handy 
observed, all organisations comprise ‘pressure groups and lobbies, cliques 
and cabals, rivalries and contests, clashes of personality and bonds of 
alliance. It would be odd if it were not so, and foolish of anyone to pretend 
that in some ideal world those differences would not exist.’5 What was true 
                                            
4 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 
p. 126; see also Kenneth Rose, Superior Person: a Portrait of Curzon and his Circle in 
late Victorian England (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969); Kitchener was C-in-C 
India 1902-9. 
5 Charles Handy, Understanding Organizations (Fourth Edition) (London: Penguin 1993 
[1976]), p. 291. 
 41 
when Handy was writing was true in the First World War. It remains so 
today. 
  
Far from the pariah his post-war reputation would suggest he ought to 
have been, Wilson had many long-standing friendships with both fellow 
officers and politicians. Inevitably, under the pressure of the greatest 
military conflict Britain had ever faced, these friendships came under 
stress from time to time. Despite this, and significantly, the vast majority of 
these friendships survived the war. Indisputably he also had enemies; 
some of them very powerful. His love of gossip and displays of self-
assurance sometimes bordering on arrogance meant he was not to 
everybody’s taste. Nonetheless, if Wilson was as evidently duplicitous a 
character as his enemies suggested, it is difficult to understand why 
Winston Churchill, Foch, Hankey and Lord Milner all remained loyal to him 
in the post-war period, and to his memory after his death. The truth is that 
Wilson was extremely adept at playing the ‘political’ game, but so were his 
peers. As Hew Strachan noted, the Curragh Incident ‘emphasised that the 
British army entered the First World War deeply politicised and well versed 
in the arts of political intrigue.’6 This was so because most senior officers 
had a ‘penchant for intrigue and lobbying’, in part a legacy of the 
organisation’s imperial history and the resulting tension between 
centralising authority in London and the long-established independence of 
the Indian Army. Wilson was the soldier ‘who most obviously acted as the 
bridge between the politics of empire and the politics of integrated control’. 
                                            
6 Strachan, Politics, p. 116. 
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Simply put, in an example of his familiar role as a bridge between 
opposing positions, Wilson was able to reconcile the near-autonomy of the 
old Victorian Army of Empire with a modern organisation founded on a 
clearly-defined partnership between politicians and soldiers. Schooled by 
Lord Roberts, he ‘brought the in-fighting skills of his mentor to bear on the 
problems of grand strategy and coalition warfare’.7 Significantly, and the 
historiography fails to give due emphasis to this point, Wilson was unable 
to apply these ‘skills’ to full effect until the last 18 months of the war. Only 
then, when politicians and soldiers who took a similar strategic view to his 
came to prominence, did Wilson achieve true power and influence.  
 
MILITARY NETWORKS 
Along with his contemporaries, Wilson’s network of friends and allies was 
built on the foundations of his early military service, interlocking circles of 
relationships which touched and often melded. The senior ranks of the 
British Army at the end of the nineteenth century were riven with 
factionalism.8 Pre-eminent were the so-called ‘rings’ composed of acolytes 
of Lords Roberts and Wolseley.9 Wilson was a member of the ‘Roberts 
Ring’, serving as his private secretary in South Africa. These informal 
groupings served as nurturing grounds for promising young officers who 
found their careers assisted by powerful mentors.10 Stephen Badsey noted 
                                            
7 Strachan, Politics, p. 124. 
8 Badsey, Doctrine, Strachan, Politics, and Bond, Staff College. 
9 Field Marshal Sir Garnet Wolseley (1833-1913), succeeded the Duke of Cambridge as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in 1895; Field Marshal Lord Roberts V.C. (1832-1914) 
succeeded Wolseley in 1901. The post was abolished in 1904; see also Badsey, 
Doctrine, p. 35. 
10 Badsey, Doctrine, p. 38. 
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that ‘The Chief’, as Wilson referred to Roberts, was adept at ‘exploiting 
political contacts and the press to promote his military views and career’. 
This behaviour was a ‘product of the entire nature of the British Army at 
the start of the twentieth century.’  Roberts, like Wilson later, might have 
been ‘an intriguer and a self-advertiser’, but while he ‘bent the unofficial 
rules a little further than his opponents and victims felt was comfortable, 
he neither broke them nor invented them.’11 
 
Wilson and Roberts were ardent Unionists opposed to Home Rule for 
Ireland, where both had been born, and both had firm views on the 
essential nature of British imperialism.12 Roberts was a leading figure in 
the National Service League, which campaigned for compulsory military 
training on the continental model, a subject dear to Wilson’s heart and one 
he took every opportunity to promote both before and during the Great 
War.13 The League was closely aligned with Unionist [Conservative] Party 
politicians, including their wartime leader Andrew Bonar Law, the MP and 
historian Leo Amery, and Milner. Interestingly, and further evidence of the 
range of overtly political views amongst officers at this time, French, Haig 
and Ian Hamilton all took a sceptical view of the practicalities of 
conscription in peacetime.14 Roberts’s control of service career 
opportunities meant that as C-in-C he often advanced, or ‘did a job’, for 
                                            
11 Badsey, Doctrine, p. 119. 
12 Strachan, Politics, p. 111. 
13 The National Service League was established in 1902, and Roberts became its 
chairman in 1905; Gregory D. Phillips, The Diehards: Aristocratic Society and Politics in 
Edwardian England (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 97-
102. 
14 Strachan, Politics, p. 110. 
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loyalists who had served with him.15 Those who impressed ‘Bobs’ and 
benefitted from his support included French, Gough, Hamilton, Henry 
Rawlinson, Robertson, and Wilson.16 By contrast Haig was a protégé of 
Sir Evelyn Wood.17 Rawlinson, a close friend of Wilson and an acolyte of 
Roberts, had a ‘difficult’ nuanced relationship with Haig during the Great 
War.18 One of Roberts’s Aides-de-Camp (ADCs) in South Africa was 
Hereward Wake who Wilson chose in the autumn of 1917 as one of his 
staff in the SWC secretariat. Edward Stanley, another Conservative MP at 
the turn of the century, was Roberts’s private secretary during his time in 
South Africa. In 1917, as Lord Derby, he replaced Lloyd George as 
Secretary of State for War. All were to play key roles in the war and in 
Wilson’s career. The officer corps of the British Army in the years before 
the Great War was a small world in which everybody knew each other. 
Barriers between groupings were porous and, thanks to the social 
background of most army officers, most knew politicians as well. Roberts 
died on a visit to the Western Front in November 1914 with Wilson at his 
bedside. Wilson was an insignia-bearer at his old chief’s funeral.19  
 
Another officer who played an important role in Wilson’s career, and was 
especially relevant during the Great War, was Field Marshal Sir John 
French. He had also served under Roberts when the latter became C-in-C 
                                            
15 Badsey, Doctrine, pp. 53 and 155; Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, p. 35. 
16 Ibid., pp. 156-8, Sheffield, The Chief, p. 24, and Jeffery, Wilson, p. 39. 
17 Sheffield, The Chief, pp. 25-6. 
18 Gary Sheffield, ‘Omdurman to Neuve Chapelle: Henry Rawlinson, Douglas Haig and 
the Making of an Uneasy Command Relationship, 1898-1915’, pp. 37-51 in idem. 
Command and Morale. 
19 Wilson diary, 14 and 19 November 1914. 
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in South Africa. French was 12 years older than Wilson, and his diary 
references, even negative ones, were couched in the affectionate terms 
reserved for an elder sibling.20 Wilson, like many of French’s fellow 
officers, admired his bravery but was often frustrated, and sometimes 
irritated, by his mercurial temper and mood swings. Nonetheless, they 
developed a close association in the decade before the war.21 French 
played a conflicted but key role in the Curragh Incident, and lost his CIGS 
post in the process. He had been a friend and supporter of Kitchener but 
by 1914 there was antipathy between the two. It meant that when French 
was recalled to command the BEF in France he had little political capital 
with Asquith or Kitchener to invest in his friend and ally Wilson. At the start 
of the war Wilson had hoped to become French’s CoS. He believed, 
although there is no direct primary archival evidence, that his role in siding 
with the Ulster Unionist cause during the Curragh Incident meant Asquith 
vetoed the appointment.22 Instead, he secured the new and incongruous 
position of ‘Sub-Chief of Staff’ to Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald 
Murray.23 This caused confusion and resentment within the BEF’s senior 
command. French was another soldier who was both adept at and willing 
to play the political card. He precipitated the ‘Shells Crisis’ of May 1915, 
embarrassing Kitchener and Asquith, and hastening the end of Britain’s 
last Liberal government.24 French’s failures as C-in-C cost him his 
command, when in the latter half of 1915 Haig, Robertson and to some 
                                            
20 The best modern biography of French is Holmes, Little Field Marshal; see also Cassar, 
Tragedy. 
21 Badsey, Doctrine, p. 199. 
22 Wilson diary, 30 July 1914. 
23 Jeffery, Wilson, p. 132. 
24 Holmes, Little Field Marshal, pp. 287-9. 
 46 
extent Wilson, turned against him; his overt politicking hampered his 
cause.25 Resentment at his dismissal lingered. In October 1917, when 
Lloyd George was casting around for alternative policies to those of the 
Haig-Robertson partnership, French, in concert with Wilson, was an 
enthusiastic contributor.26  
 
Although on good terms during the Great War, French had not always 
been a Wilson admirer. In 1904 he condemned Wilson and his close friend 
Henry Rawlinson because, he believed, they had stood in the way of one 
of his protégées: 
Now both those fellows did much harm in Roberts’ time. They are 
very clever and were R[obert]’s special “Pets”…these two young 
gentlemen must have their wings clipped. Their chance is in the 
weakness of others…27 
 
Wilson and Rawlinson met in Burma in 1886 and became lifelong 
friends.28 Almost exact contemporaries, and both originally members of 
‘smart’ Greenjacket regiments, their career paths crossed often.29 Wilson 
followed Rawlinson, or ‘Rawly’ as he knew him, as Commandant of the 
Staff College at Camberley in 1907. There both favoured a broad 
curriculum which included encouraging officers to consider the political 
aspects of their duties.30 Wilson gave a lecture on the vexed question of 
                                            
25 John Spencer, ‘Friends Disunited: Johnnie French, Wully Robertson and “K. of K.,” in 
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26 See Chapter 2, ‘Future Strategy Paper’. 
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28 Jeffery, Wilson, pp. 13, 19-20. 
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30 Bond, Staff College, pp. 263-6. 
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conscription to the Staff College on 4 November 1909.31 Where they 
differed was Wilson’s career followed a staff officer biased trajectory. 
Rawlinson followed a staff route but also gained combat command 
experience in South Africa and the Great War. Haig’s intelligence chief 
John Charteris, a Wilson critic, noted ‘Rawlinson is a good fighting 
soldier…, which Wilson is not.’32 Wilson succeeded Rawlinson in 
command of IV Corps in 1916 when the latter was elevated to lead Fourth 
Army in the forthcoming Somme campaign.33 Later, when the wheel of 
fortune had turned and he found himself CIGS, Wilson chose Rawly to 
succeed him as Britain’s PMR at the SWC. In fact, once ensconced in the 
War Office, Wilson was more focussed on making his own strategy than 
on the views of his erstwhile colleagues at Versailles. Rawlinson, although 
frustrated, was mollified when Wilson influenced his move from Versailles 
to the command of Fifth (soon to become Fourth) Army in March 1918 
after Hubert Gough’s dismissal.34 They remained on good terms and in 
July, speculating on the future of General Sir William Birdwood, then 
commanding Fifth Army, Rawlinson told Wilson ‘Don’t go and make him C-
in-C in India! I want to go there myself after the war!’35 Rawlinson, due no 
doubt in part to the help of Wilson, who as CIGS sat on the Army Council 
which decided such matters, had his wish in 1920. Another valuable ally, 
particularly when he became CIGS, was his old friend General Sir John 
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32 Charteris diary, 24 April 1915, in John Charteris, At GHQ (London: Cassell, 1931), p. 
87. 
33 The most complete modern study of Rawlinson’s career is Prior and Wilson, 
Rawlinson. 
34 Sheffield, Command and Morale, p. 50. 
35 IWM, Wilson papers, (HHW 2/13A/23), Rawlinson to Wilson, 8 July 1918. 
 48 
‘Jack’ Cowans. He was Quartermaster General to the Forces (QMG) 
throughout the war and a contemporary of Wilson’s in the Rifle Brigade.36 
 
As in any professional body, progress in the British Army of the early 20th 
century relied, at least in part, on personal connections. The ‘rings’ of 
influence of the late-Victorian period were gradually replaced by less 
formal ‘teams’ or ‘firms’, groupings of officers brought together when the 
most senior obtained a new post. Rather than patronage based on family 
connections and money, shared experiences at the Staff College or in 
previous appointments were the key drivers.37 Significantly, senior officers 
did not enjoy free rein to hand-pick their subordinates. Power of 
appointment lay with the Army Council.38 Instead, senior officers had to 
negotiate and lobby for those they wanted. Wilson’s Great War career 
path was, by comparison with many of his peers, fragmentary. Instead of 
periods in command of units or departments, Wilson hopped from a quasi-
staff/liaison role in 1914, to formal Anglo-French liaison in 1915 and then a 
corps command the following year. In 1917 he toured Russia, liaised again 
during the Nivelle offensive, was effectively unemployed, had a brief home 
command and finished the year establishing the British secretariat at the 
SWC. Unsurprisingly therefore, when he took on the latter role Wilson’s 
‘team’ of trusted lieutenants was a limited one.  
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Most important was Sir Charles Sackville-West, known by Wilson as ‘Tit 
Willow’.39 He had been one of the directing staff at the Staff College and 
they became firm friends.40 In 1910 when Wilson moved to the War Office 
as DMO, Tit Willow joined him.41 He distinguished himself on the Western 
Front before Wilson overcame objections from Robertson and the Army 
Council and made him his CoS at Versailles.42 As evidence of the ubiquity 
of ‘intriguing’ between senior officers, once Wilson had moved to the War 
Office as CIGS, Sackville-West denounced his successor Rawlinson as a 
Haig loyalist. He portrayed him as a new Robertson plotting behind 
Wilson’s back and supporting GHQ’s offensive strategy: ‘Versailles is to 
become an appanage [sic] or buffer between LG & DH & you are left out... 
What a pie’.43  As Sheffield has argued convincingly, this was an incorrect 
assessment of the complex Rawlinson-Haig relationship.44 In any case, 
Wilson paid little attention to the criticism of his old friend and when 
Rawlinson moved on Wilson ensured that Sackville-West took the post. 
Illustrating the trust between them, Wilson consulted Sackville-West on the 
controversial subject of a suitable new title for Foch once he was in overall 
command of Allied forces in France. Wilson also sought assurance on the 
American PMR General Tasker H. Bliss’s position on the future 
                                            
39 Sackville-West obituary, The Times, 9 May 1962. 
40 Another loyal ally from this period, also a Staff College instructor, was Major-General 
Sir George ‘Uncle’ Harper. 
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deployment of US forces.45 Another loyalist Wilson had to fight the War 
Office to secure for Versailles was his ADC, Viscount Duncannon, an MP 
and one of the founders of the right-wing, pro-conscription National 
Party.46 Wilson knew Duncannon as ‘the Lord’ and discussed a possible 
future in parliament with him in the summer of 1917.47  
 
Wilson’s fondness for mixing military life with the political found him 
another admirer in the shape of Leopold Amery, another Unionist MP and 
an influential figure in the British war effort. Amery and Wilson became 
acquainted during the Boer War. When the former was commissioned to 
write The Times history of the conflict he cited Wilson as a particularly 
valuable source.48 They met frequently during the Great War. In 1916 
Amery hosted regular parties at his home when guests included Milner, 
the Ulster Unionist leader Sir Edward Carson, Geoffrey Robinson (later 
Dawson), editor of The Times, Lord Astor (proprietor of the Observer), and 
the writer and Unionist politician F.S. ‘Fred’ Oliver. Lloyd George, his 
Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS) Philip Kerr, and Wilson when on 
leave from his duties as IV Corps commander, ‘occasionally joined our 
discussions’.49 In early 1917 Amery was one of two political secretaries 
appointed to Lloyd George’s new War Cabinet where ‘we were to be at the 
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disposal of its members and at the same time free, as a kind of informal 
“brains trust”, to submit our ideas on all subjects for our chiefs.’50 In the 
summer, when effectively out of work, Wilson, in Amery’s opinion ‘much 
the most active brain in the Army…’ had ‘nothing to do except think and 
talk, both gifts in which he excelled.’ It meant that, once ensconced as 
head of Eastern Command: 
For the first time in the war he was in a position to see it from a 
wider perspective than that of the Western Front and, for the first 
time, headquarters in London gave him the opportunity for 
continuous intercourse with Lloyd George, Milner and the rest of the 
War Cabinet, as well as with an old confederate like myself.’51  
 
In late 1917, when Wilson was setting up his military secretariat at 
Versailles, Amery joined him as political secretary to the British section. 
Amery continued to report to Hankey but, never one to downplay his own 
role, considered himself to be the ‘personal representative of Lloyd 
George and Milner, and liaison officer with the War Cabinet…’52 Despite 
Cabinet support, the appointment was held up temporarily by Robertson 
and Derby.53 Amery played an important role at the SWC and authored 
several detailed, and often wordy, strategy reports, especially on Britain’s 
post-war imperial future. These reflected not only his own views, but also 
those of Wilson, and of Milner whom he saw regularly. This trio did much 
to lay the foundations of British strategic policy in 1918. Milner was a 
strong voice in the War Cabinet. His authority was underpinned by 
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Amery’s intellectual diligence. Wilson provided eloquence, and a military 
vision more to Lloyd George’s taste than that of Haig and Robertson. 
Amery was a linguist and scholar whose papers provided the intellectual 
heft for Wilson’s strategic arguments. Wilson was alive to Amery’s failings 
and once noted: ‘He is much too academic and much more in the mood of 
arranging what would happen after the war than arranging how to win the 
war. All this displeases me.’54 Amery was, nonetheless, a useful and 
influential ally. Wilson gave him a preview of the paper that made the case 
for the establishment of what became the SWC and Amery thought it 
‘unanswerable’. During the following week, Wilson lobbied Milner, Carson 
and Derby who were all allegedly prevaricating because of Robertson’s 
likely opposition.55 On 30 October he saw Amery again, recruited his 
support and: 
…pushed into him the absolute necessity of a Superior Direction 
which if properly handled would give us a dominating influence in all 
plans. He came to see me before dinner to tell me he had seen 
Milner and he thought Milner was now convinced of the necessity.56 
 
As discussed in the next chapter, Wilson’s cajoling of Amery and lobbying 
of Milner paid off. Once at Versailles, Wilson assembled other loyalists to 
his operations team. This was common practice. When Robertson was 
promoted to the post of CIGS in late 1915 he took with him from France 
Edward M. Perceval as his CoS. Perceval soon moved to command a 
division and Wully replaced him with Robert Whigham. Both had been 
instructors under Robertson at the Staff College. Another Camberley 
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colleague, Frederick ‘Freddie’ Maurice, moved from GHQ to the War 
Office as Robertson’s DMO. The new CIGS also ensured that ‘most of the 
junior officers’ in his various departments had trained under him at the 
Staff College and were both ‘capable and loyal’ to their chief.57 In 1914, 
when Wilson was appointed the BEF’s Sub-Chief of Staff, ‘almost the 
entire operations section consisted of his former subordinates at the War 
Office’.58 Three years later at Versailles Wilson established three teams, 
under Sackville-West as CoS. They were tasked with viewing strategy 
from the following perspectives: Allied or ‘A’ Branch, Enemy or ‘E’ Branch 
and Man-Power and Munitions (Allied and Enemy) or ‘M’ Branch.59 Wilson 
picked the officers who headed each branch.60 Brigadier-Generals Herbert 
‘Bertie’ Studd and Sir Hereward Wake headed, respectively, ‘A’ and ‘E’ 
Branches, and Frederick ‘Freddie’ Sykes headed ‘M’ Branch.61  Studd had 
been a student of Rawlinson at the Staff College and served at the War 
Office while Wilson was DMO.62 Wake was at the Staff College under 
Wilson as commandant, graduating in 1908.63 They served together in 
South Africa, and as a staff officer at GHQ in 1914 Wake joined Wilson at 
‘Bob’s’ deathbed.64 Sykes was another Staff College graduate of Wilson’s. 
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He served at the War Office while Wilson was DMO, where he ‘made 
some valuable contacts,’ working with George Macdonogh, the future 
Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) at the War Office, and later Adjutant-
General (AG). Sykes was one of the leading proponents of air power 
before and during the war. Wilson ‘supported Sykes’ flying ambitions, but 
he was more interested in his abilities and value as an intelligence 
officer’.65 Two months after Wilson became CIGS, Sykes was promoted to 
Major-General and appointed Chief of the Air Staff.66 Wilson and Sykes 
continued to work closely, in an effort to improve co-operation between 
Army and Air Force. Wilson recruited other Staff College graduates from 
his time at Camberley, notably Lieutenant-Colonels R. Riley (graduated 
1907), Alfred Ollivant (1908), and Archibald Wavell (1910).67 Another 
beneficiary of Wilson’s promotion was Sir Percy Radcliffe. He had served 
in Wilson’s pre-War Operations directorate and succeeded Freddie 
Maurice as DMO in April 1918.68  
 
Absent from Wilson’s pre-war circle of friends was Haig, but absence of 
friendship should not be taken as evidence of discord. Haig was not 
known for his social skills and was unlikely to have been comfortable with 
Wilson’s irreverent and often flippant style.69 Launcelot Kiggell, a close 
friend of Haig’s and his CoS with the BEF, believed Haig ‘had a good deal 
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to do’ with Wilson receiving his CB [Commander of the Order of the Bath] 
in 1908.70 The evidence suggests they got on well enough in the pre-war 
period, to the point of secretly conspiring on military strategy.71 When Haig 
was CoS India he wrote to Wilson seeking the DMO’s views on the 
strategy of both Germany and the Ottoman Empire.72 He also recruited 
Wilson’s input and support for his abortive plans for the mobilisation of the 
Indian Army to Europe in the event of war.73 It is hard to believe Haig 
would have shared such sensitive information with a man who, according 
to Haig’s early biographer Alfred Duff Cooper, ‘produced no impression 
but distrust in the mind of the cautious Scotsman.’74 With his characteristic 
ability to spot a poison chalice, Haig declined to take sides overtly in the 
toxic Curragh affair which so undermined Wilson’s credibility with Asquith; 
thus he avoided alienating either side.75 They had very different roles once 
war broke out. Haig’s combat commands were never threatened directly 
by Wilson’s liaison work. Nonetheless, according to Charteris, in 1914 
Haig believed Wilson to be ‘a politician, and not a soldier, and “politician” 
with Douglas Haig is synonymous with crooked dealing and wrong sense 
of values.’76 Haig’s prominent role in the removal of French in 1915, and 
his abandonment of Robertson in early 1918 when both were fighting for 
their professional lives, illustrates how willing, and adept, he was at high 
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level ‘politics’.77 In the summer of 1918 Haig told Wilson ‘he had never had 
such a free hand, never been so little worried & therefore never been so 
happy as under me.’78 Rawlinson later reported that Haig had told him 
‘how much easier he found it with you [Wilson] as CIGS instead of Wullie 
[sic].’79 One of Haig’s aristocratic friends claimed that he had considered 
Wilson ‘an enemy’ yet on the day of his assassination he had appeared in 
her rooms in full Field Marshal’s uniform with ‘tears rolling down his 
face.’80 It is safe to conclude that the relationship was, at the very least, 
nuanced. 
 
Jeffery argued convincingly that once French fell, neither Haig nor 
Robertson were minded to give Wilson a prominent role in the Army 
hierarchy.81 As a result, he ended up in command of IV Corps, part of First 
Army, for much of 1916 in a relatively ‘quiet’ sector around Arras.82 He 
found himself in the new C-in-C’s sights in May when his forces lost and 
failed to retake a stretch of trench in a minor German attack.83 Haig 
demanded an inquiry and noted that IV Corps had ‘much decreased in 
military value’ since Wilson took over and added later in the typescript 
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version of his diary that he had ‘failed as a commander in the field.’84 It is 
unclear whether or not Haig ever really intended ‘degumming’ Wilson, but 
the latter heard later that he had only been saved by support from his 
Army commander General Charles Monro.85 Nonetheless, there were 
repercussions. When Monro became C-in-C India he was succeeded by 
Major-General Richard Haking, Wilson’s junior. Wilson believed he should 
have inherited the command ‘but of course Haig would not have [it]. And 
how pleased Robertson will be.’86 Despite this disappointment, all 
indications are that when Wilson became CIGS he and Haig enjoyed an 
amicable relationship. In the wake of the 1918 German Spring Offensive 
Wilson, by then CIGS, finally resolved, with apparently great reluctance, to 
recommend Haig’s replacement. Even then, neither man’s diary indicates 
any personal animosity.87 
 
Wilson had a different relationship with Robertson, the man he would 
eventually replace as CIGS. Robertson succeeded Wilson as 
commandant at the Staff College in 1910. According to Sir James 
Edmonds, Wilson embarrassed Robertson, a poor man by army officer 
standards, by demanding that he pay for some items of furniture he had 
left in the commandant’s quarters. The details of the story are unclear, but 
‘the two men were never close thereafter’.88 When it became clear at the 
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end of 1914 that Murray was not up to the demands of the role of French’s 
CoS, Wilson hoped his time had come.89 This time there is no doubt that 
Asquith vetoed his appointment, which went instead to Robertson.90 
Wilson recorded that he and Robertson discussed which of them might get 
Murray’s job but neither felt they would be able to work with Sir John ‘the 
chance of a lifetime & two men in a car both refusing it.’91 Robertson finally 
took the post and brought administrative order where Murray had presided 
over chaos, impressing French and visitors alike with his administrative 
efficiency.92 Importantly for their future relationship Wilson had to make do 
with the much less prestigious job of the BEF’s principal liaison officer with 
the French Army. He clearly felt cheated by Asquith. As a consolation 
prize, he was promoted to (temporary) Lieutenant-General and wrote, 
somewhat self-deludingly, that the new role made him ‘much bigger and 
more powerful than before’.93 At the same time, Robertson was aware that 
he had not been French’s first choice.94 Despite his professional efficiency 
Robertson’s dour and blunt character was not to the Field Marshal’s taste 
and before long Wilson was dining regularly in French’s mess while 
Robertson did so elsewhere with his own team. Robertson made light of 
this in his memoirs, but it can have done little for his future relationship 
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with Wilson.95 Robertson’s elevation to the role of the government’s 
principal military adviser at the War Office in December was another 
disappointment to Wilson. He described 1915 as ‘an unkind year’ which 
began with him being denied the CoS post and ending ‘with Robertson 
getting CIGS, which at one time it looked as though I was certain to get, 
either when Murray got it, or, later, before Robertson got it.’96 Instead he 
ended up with a much less prestigious post in command of IV Corps. 
 
One of Robertson’s staunchest, and most influential, supporters while 
CIGS was a former Rifle Brigade officer and erstwhile friend of Wilson’s, 
Charles à Court Repington. During the war he wielded great power and 
influence as war correspondent of The Times and then in 1918 of the 
right-wing Morning Post. Unfortunately for Wilson, he and Repington had 
quarrelled in 1901 over a divorce case and the latter was forced to 
resign.97 Repington ‘attached the blame for his dismissal entirely upon 
Henry Wilson thereby managing altogether to exculpate himself.’98 He 
made Wilson’s life difficult during the creation of the SWC and thereafter.99 
Repington was strongly in the Haig-Robertson camp and opposed Lloyd 
George’s efforts to wrest control of strategy on the Western Front away 
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from the War Office and GHQ. Another Wilson adversary was Sir Hubert 
Gough, who played a leading role in the Curragh Incident. Hubert, and 
particularly his brother Johnnie, had been on good terms with Wilson 
before this affair. For example Johnnie, another former Rifle Brigade 
officer, Rawlinson and Wilson played golf together on Boxing Day 1913.100 
After the Curragh the Goughs’ relationship with Wilson was strained, with 
Johnnie apparently never speaking to Wilson again.101 In his bitter memoir 
Soldiering On Hubert Gough accused Wilson of encouraging the revolt ‘to 
refuse any concessions by Mr Asquith’s Government, while he never 
emerged from the background.’102 Gough never forgave Wilson and in 
March 1917 did his best to scupper his chances of being appointed chief 
liaison officer at the French C-in-C General Robert Nivelle’s headquarters. 
In a letter to Sir Clive Wigram, King George V’s private secretary, he 
branded Wilson a ‘thorough intriguer’ and ‘danger’ to the British Army 
should he be given any power.103 Wilson was ultimately responsible for 
ordering Gough’s dismissal after the disaster of the German Spring 
Offensive in 1918, although, as is discussed later, the War Cabinet and 
Lloyd George in particular were looking for a scapegoat. Almost four 
decades later, Gough’s animosity was unabated. He devoted a short 
chapter in his memoir to Wilson who, he wrote, ‘exercised a considerable 
and somewhat baleful influence on the conduct of the First World War. 
This was due to his own lack of sound strategical sense and his blind 
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devotion to everything French, coupled with the glib and easy way with 
which he talked.’104 
 
A particularly notable absentee from the Wilson supporters’ club was King 
George V. He cultivated the opinions of leading soldiers throughout the 
war, including Haig, whose wife Dorothy had been Maid of Honour to the 
King’s mother, Queen Alexandra.105 Badsey has noted that these 
connections reflected a long-held view amongst ‘most regimental officers’ 
in the British Army that they ‘saw their loyalty as being to the sovereign 
rather than the government’.106 Robertson, French, Horace Smith-Dorrien, 
Hubert Gough and others kept the King informed of their activities and 
views. Interestingly, Wilson was not in this charmed circle and his 
interactions with his sovereign were limited to formal occasions even once 
he became CIGS.107 
 
POLITICAL 
The course of the events discussed above is important in understanding 
Wilson’s attitude, both to his fellow officers and, more importantly, 
politicians. Aware that Asquith was responsible for his failure to progress, 
Wilson courted those politicians whose views on how the war ought to be 
fought, and on other key issues such as conscription and Irish Home Rule, 
coincided with his own. These included strongly pro-Unionist Tories such 
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as Lords Curzon and Milner, together with Liberal Winston Churchill and - 
fundamentally for his future career - Lloyd George. Although like Asquith a 
Liberal, Lloyd George struck Wilson as a much stronger potential war 
leader than the apparently blasé ‘wait and see’ Prime Minister.108 Wilson 
and Lloyd George, who became Secretary of State for War on 6 June 
1916, saw each other from time to time during that year.109 Of particular 
note was Wilson’s assertion that while Britain would win the war he agreed 
with Lloyd George that more help ought to be given to Russia. In order to 
do this, he suggested, Haig ought to be ‘told exactly how many men he 
was going to be given & when, & then he could calculate how many fronts 
he could attack on...Lloyd George was clearly dissatisfied with Haig and 
also with Robertson, but did not, of course, discuss either of them 
directly.’110 Wilson’s apparent willingness to restrict the freedom of British 
action in the west in order to help an ally prosecute the war elsewhere 
would resonate in the Wilson-Lloyd George relationship for the rest of the 
conflict. As for the Welshman’s antipathy towards Haig and Robertson, 
this soon became more overt. 
 
Wilson was a dyed-in-the wool Unionist who cultivated like-minded 
politicians. Chief among them was Bonar Law, and Churchill, although a 
Liberal, was a life-long supporter and regarded Wilson as ‘an officer of 
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extraordinary vision and faith’ even though, ironically enough, from time to 
time Wilson despaired of his friend’s capriciousness.111 Wilson was an 
established acquaintance of Lloyd George by the time the latter entered 
10 Downing Street on 6 December 1916. Lloyd George’s coalition 
administration was in fact ‘a thoroughly Tory beast with an attenuated 
Liberal tail’.112 Senior Unionists such as Bonar Law, Curzon and Milner 
wielded significant influence in the new government. The new Prime 
Minister needed allies, in both political and military circles.113 In the latter 
he found slim pickings, thanks in part to ‘a psychological gulf between 
civilian and service leaders’.114 Wilson was one of the few senior British 
officers who in autumn 1917 was seemingly able and willing to help bridge 
the gap. Lloyd George’s plan to subordinate his country’s military strategy 
to the French, a cack-handed attempt at limiting British casualties, had 
backfired with catastrophic results for civil-military relations. Consequently, 
senior military figures distrusted him and ‘the ultimate result of the prime 
minister’s effort to reduce the army’s leverage was to enhance it.’115 
  
Following the Nivelle debacle, Haig was in a stronger position than ever, 
with his Conservative supporters ready to back him in a trial of strength 
with the Prime Minister. In Whitehall, the War Office was dominated by 
Robertson and his team. Lloyd George judged that instead of getting 
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independent counsel from the government’s principal military adviser he 
received little more than Haig’s position from the uncritical Robertson. 
Wully avoided any suggestion of disagreement between himself and the 
C-in-C when interacting with politicians, but he was far from the Haig 
lackey Lloyd George believed him to be.116 As a result, the Prime Minister 
sought alternative military pundits.  For once Wilson was in the right place 
at the right time: ‘In party political terms, his loyalties were very different 
from Lloyd George’s, but so too were those of most of the Prime Minister’s 
cabinet colleagues, and Lloyd George may have felt that Wilson’s political 
credentials could buttress his position with the Conservatives on whom he 
depended.’117 Unlike the tongue-tied Haig, Wilson was loquacious, 
irreverent and in some ways similar in character to Lloyd George. Both 
men wore their hearts on their sleeves, both had the ‘gift of the gab’, both 
reveled in the company of like-minded, apparently clever men. Lloyd 
George’s ally, the newspaper proprietor Sir George (later Lord) Riddell 
noted that temperamentally ‘Wilson was much better fitted than Robertson 
to get on with L[loyd] G[eorge]. W[ilson] had the happy knack, which suited 
LG, of interspersing serious business with jokes and badinage.’118 Unlike 
the dour and abrupt Robertson, Wilson listened, seemingly in thrall, to 
politicians - particularly those with power - and appeared as if he agreed 
with their every word. He ‘was endued with the political mind, and could 
and did talk the language of the politicians.’119 Unlike Robertson, whose 
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contemptuous dismissals of what he saw as political interference in 
military strategy infuriated the Prime Minister, Wilson reserved his abuse 
of the ‘frocks’ for his diary and letters to trusted friends. 
 
Lloyd George had long been an admirer of Wilson’s.120 As Prime Minister 
he knew where to turn for alternative military advice. Even then, it was 
almost a year before Wilson attained real authority. For the first months of 
the new premiership Wilson was senior British liaison officer at GQG. 
Wilson and Nivelle got on well, despite some misgivings in the War Office. 
Nivelle’s April offensive failed to achieve its objectives and he was 
replaced by General Philippe Pétain.121 Pétain distrusted Wilson, 
considering him too close to Nivelle, and had him sent home.122 Wilson 
was put on half-pay, during which time he threatened to get into ‘mischief’ 
if he failed to find appropriate employment.123 He spent the summer 
considering a parliamentary career but generated little enthusiasm, either 
personally or amongst his political friends.124 Wilson was appointed to 
head the Eastern [Home] Command on 1 September 1917, something of a 
sinecure according to his diary, which recorded desultory duties over the 
following weeks. 
 
                                            
120 Jeffery, Wilson, p. 177. 
121 For a recent assessment of the Nivelle Offensive, which began on 16 April 1917, see 
Elizabeth Greenhalgh, The French Army and the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 170-219. 
122 Wilson diary, 31 May 1917; see also Max Egremont, Under Two Flags: The Life of 
Major-General Sir Edward Spears (London: Phoenix, 1998 [1997]), p. 55. 
123 Millman, ‘Wilson’s Mischief’, pp. 467-486  
124 Jeffery, Wilson, pp. 196-8. 
 66 
Wilson’s chance came in October when, with Third Ypres dragging on, he 
was called in to critique Haig’s and Robertson’s proposals for Allied 
strategy for 1918. Unsurprisingly he took the opportunity to make some 
suggestions of his own. This was a crucial point in Wilson’s career, but the 
patronage of Lloyd George alone was unlikely to have been sufficient to 
propel him to the highest position in the British Army. Years of assiduous 
cultivation of political allies finally began to pay off. Most important of these 
was the support of Milner, whom Wilson had got to know when he became 
DMO at the War Office.125 Both strong Unionists, they saw eye to eye 
more often than either did with the Prime Minister. One area of agreement 
was a determination that Britain’s imperial ambitions would emerge from 
the war not only intact, but enhanced. Lloyd George took a more nuanced 
approach to this point; he had no intention of seeing the British Empire 
founder but his wartime predilection for ‘sideshows’ was more concerned 
with victory over Germany by dint of defeat of her friends than further 
expansion of the ‘Pax Britannica’.126  
 
Milner was one of the Prime Minister’s most important supporters and a 
member, without portfolio, first of the War Cabinet, established on Lloyd 
George’s accession to the premiership, and the smaller War Policy 
Committee set up to advise on future strategy in June 1917.127 In Milner, 
Wilson had a ‘friend and mentor’ at the heart of government.128 They 
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participated in the Allied delegation to Russia in early 1917, with Wilson as 
senior British military representative, and Milner supported his proposals 
for the SWC. They met four times while Wilson was writing his report for 
the War Cabinet in October and it is unlikely that the scheme could have 
succeeded without Milner’s backing.129 In addition, Milner and Amery were 
confidants, the younger man regarded Milner as ‘my leader, as well as my 
best friend’.130 
 
Another politician who Wilson considered a friend, if a critical one, was 
Bonar Law. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, Bonar Law was a permanent 
member of the War Cabinet and supported Wilson as CIGS. They met in 
1912 when Wilson was DMO and Bonar Law Leader of the Opposition; 
they associated regularly thereafter.131 In late 1915 Wilson was convinced 
that Asquith and his coalition government was not up to winning the war, 
in part because of Asquith’s reluctance to enact full military conscription. 
Bonar Law’s support was fundamental to Asquith remaining in power, but 
according to Wilson: ‘It is impossible to conduct successful war if you base 
yourself on INDECISION. You can get nothing but indecision out of the 
PM Quod est.’132 Bonar Law had, as discussed in the next chapter, 
supported Wilson’s suggestion to put Anglo-French liaison on a more 
formal footing by creating a ‘committee of six’ political and military 
representatives. Nonetheless, he had little truck with his friend’s desire to 
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remove the Prime Minister. Wilson had barely arrived on the Western 
Front before he was urging Bonar Law to ‘get rid of Squiff’.133 In March he 
denounced the ‘ramshackle of a coalition’ running the country, 
condemning Asquith as a man ‘who has never gone to war, who has no 
intention, even now, of going to war, & who has no intention either of 
allowing anyone else to go to war.’ He urged Bonar Law to withdraw his 
party from the coalition:  
You owe Squiff no loyalty, absolutely none. You saved him once 
when you joined him & a bad day’s work it was – whereas you owe 
the whole of your loyalty to our country & you know as well as I do 
how shamefully, how disastrously Squiff has tried to govern us.134 
 
Wilson, the so-called ‘political soldier’ still had much to learn in his 
dealings with the professionals, and telling them their job was something 
to avoid. Seemingly irritated by the back-handed compliment about loyalty, 
Bonar Law put Wilson in his place. Things were not as simple as Wilson 
suggested. His arguments ‘would do for an article in the Daily Mail’, but 
were unrealistic. If the Unionists broke up the government there would 
have to be a General Election, no party would achieve a majority, social 
and political unrest could result and ‘martial law’ might be necessary. 
Bonar Law believed that instead of unity the nation would be ‘bitterly 
divided’. His view was that: 
With all its disadvantages the best chance of winning the war is by 
a Government such as the present; and of course as long as I hold 
that view I shall not do anything to change it. Do not suppose that I 
don’t fully realise that the other what I may call the ruthless-method 
may not be the best; but that must be a matter of opinion, and my 
judgement is against it.135 
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Wilson learned his lesson. Over the next 18 months his manner in dealing 
with the ruthlessly resolute Lloyd George was much more deferential, less 
hectoring. 
 
THE FRENCH 
Wilson’s ability to develop and sustain alliances with British politicians was 
echoed in his relationships with members of the political-military 
establishment in France.136 Britain and France had been entente partners 
since 1904, but few British officers had fostered close ties with colleagues 
across the Channel. Wilson was one who had. His work with Foch and 
others to plan Britain’s role should Germany attack France had nurtured a 
climate of trust which was of great importance during the war.137 Wilson’s 
ability to keep the Anglo-French entente alive at times of great stress was 
his most significant contribution to Allied victory in 1918. Wilson’s 
francophilia was well known both before and during the war, and appears 
prominently in the historiography of his career. He visited France often in 
the pre-war period, reconnoitring the frontiers of France, Germany and 
Belgium where battles might be fought should Germany invade.138 Thanks 
to a French governess, Wilson spoke the language well, although there 
are varying assessments as to his fluency. Edward Spears, who undertook 
several Anglo-French liaison roles during the war and did speak French 
                                            
136 Huguet, Britain and the War, pp. 19-23; Gooch, Plans of War, pp. 119-124. 
137 Williamson, Grand Strategy, pp. 89, 141, 223. 
Jeffery, Wilson, pp. 85-87. 
138 Wilson visited the French and Belgian frontiers in October 1911 and in early 1912: 
Wilson diary, 4-24 October 1911 and 27 February-3 March 1912. 
 70 
fluently, wrote that in 1914 Wilson ‘did not speak French as well during this 
stage of the war as he did later.’139 Peter Wright, who worked as an 
interpreter in the British Military Secretariat at the SWC and another of 
Wilson’s Staff College graduates noted: 
Though not good at French, he understood something far more 
difficult than their language, the free, violent, rhetorical modes of 
speech used by Latins, always baffling, usually shocking, and 
sometimes exasperating to grave contained, romantic 
northerners.140 
  
 Whatever the precise level of Wilson’s fluency, he was more 
accomplished than most of his peers. When war broke out, Wilson knew 
the French Army well, the Franco-German frontier intimately, and had 
forged a number of alliances with military and political figures. Most 
important for the course of Anglo-French relations were his friendship with 
Foch, and his acquaintanceship - it would be misinterpreting the 
relationship to describe them as ‘friends’ - with the politician Georges 
Clemenceau.  
 
Wilson’s friendship with Foch began in 1909 when Wilson was 
Commandant of the Staff College and he visited his opposite number at 
the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre. They agreed on the threat Germany 
posed to peace in Europe.141 The pair got on so well that Wilson attended 
the wedding of Foch’s daughter in 1910.142 Between December 1909 and 
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May 1914, they met at least 11 times. When war came this familiarity 
meant ‘they were able to communicate honestly with each other’.143 Such 
frankness stood them in good stead throughout the conflict.144 In 1915 the 
relationship was put under considerable stress. With Wilson in his liaison 
role and Foch in command of the French Northern Army Group fighting 
beside the BEF, they co-operated to smooth over tensions between their 
respective C-in-Cs, French and Joffre.145 The French military authorities 
trusted Wilson. Soon after taking up the liaison post he was permitted a 
tour along whole of their line from Amiens to the Swiss border: ‘No other 
officer in any army, not even a Russian, has been allowed to go down the 
French line except me.’146 As Callwell noted:  
Wilson was so essentially a persona grata at French GQG and 
amongst French superior commanders in general, that he 
possessed altogether exceptional qualifications for filling the post of 
principal liaison officer between Sir John’s headquarters and 
Chantilly [Joffre’s HQ]. That, in view of the relations existing 
between the leaders and the General Staffs of the two allied hosts, 
such liaison work needed to be in skilled and tactful hands had 
been plainly demonstrated during the previous months…147 
 
This ability to pour oil on the troubled waters which often existed between 
the Allies should not be underestimated. French’s relations with Joffre and 
his staff were notoriously poor. There were many occasions during 1915 
when Wilson, often in concert with Foch, smoothed out the peaks and 
troughs in his chief’s mercurial approach, to the benefit of both allies. This 
contribution was not - as some of Wilson’s colleagues often suggested - 
                                            
143 Greenhalgh, Foch, pp.10, 81. 
144 Huguet, Britain and the War, p. 129. 
145 Sheffield and Spencer, ‘Soldiers in Strife’, pp. 83-99. 
146 Wilson to Lady Wilson, 21 January 1915, quoted in Callwell, Wilson (vol. I), p. 203. 
147 Ibid., (vol. I), p. 204. 
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an uncritical allegiance to the French position. Wilson regularly clashed 
with his Gallic colleagues, most often, and with the greatest passion, with 
Foch and Clemenceau.148 Instead, Wilson had the ability to see issues 
from the French perspective and then strive to harmonise what sometimes 
appeared to be irreconcilable differences. His long-standing relationship 
with Sir John helped in this regard. Familiarity with French colleagues 
allowed both sides to adopt a frankness which between other less well-
acquainted individuals might have done irreparable damage. It should be 
stressed that Wilson never favoured the French position at the expense of 
the British. There is no evidence for Gough’s assertion that Wilson had a 
‘blind devotion to everything French’.149 He was, nonetheless, able to oil 
the wheels of communication at times of greatest inter-Allied friction. This 
was particularly true during his tenure at the SWC and then as CIGS when 
his loyalties were put to the test regularly. In his memoirs Foch paid 
testament to this diplomatic balancing act, noting his ‘old friend’s… 
patriotic vigilance and far-sighted intelligence’.150 
 
The strength of the Wilson-Foch alliance is illustrated by the fact that in 
1916, while the former was commanding IV Corps, they still saw each 
other often. Wilson promoted his friend’s career in the summer when 
Clemenceau, then French War Minister, suggested Joffre might have to be 
removed. Clemenceau suggested that the choice was between Foch, 
General de Cuières de Castelnau, and Pétain. Clemenceau apparently 
                                            
148 See Chapter Five ‘Unity of Command’.  
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150 Colonel T. Bentley Mott (trans.), The Memoirs of Marshal Foch (London: Heinemann, 
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favoured Foch ‘and so do I, telling him I knew all three & that Foch was the 
most brilliant by far…’151 Later in the summer, Foch complained to Wilson 
about his ‘dissatisfaction’ with Haig:  
Haig is always civil & nice, but tells him nothing, & the relationship 
between them is not such that Foch can converse freely with Haig 
& tell him all his plans & hopes & experiences. Then there is no one 
on Haig’s staff senior enough to go between them, as I used in the 
old days to work between Sir John & Foch, seeing Foch often twice 
a day…& possessing Foch’s entire confidence and also Sir John’s. 
 
At the same meeting Foch told him that he had seen Clemenceau’s 
opposite number as War Minister, Lloyd George, who had apparently 
criticised Haig while praising Wilson.152 Even allowing for a degree of 
hubris, it is possible to see more than a grain of truth in this diary entry. In 
Wilson’s absence, Anglo-French military relations rested for the most part 
with Sidney Clive, a junior officer with little command experience. One of 
IV Corps staff officers, Brigadier-General General Staff (BGGS) Hugo de 
Pree, (a cousin of Haig’s) recalled that Wilson and Foch ‘used to be 
closeted together for hours, discussing, gossiping and chaffing. They used 
to exchange caps and in this get-up they would stride up and down the 
drawing room, laughing heartily and exchanging experiences.’153  
 
Wilson’s relationship with other senior French generals was more 
problematic. He got on well with Joffre’s successor Nivelle. In March 1917, 
during the controversy over Lloyd George’s decision to put Haig and the 
BEF under French command, he returned to familiar ground when he was 
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persuaded to accept the appointment of Britain’s Chief Liaison Officer at 
GQG. This episode in Wilson’s career is a case study in the tensions and 
jostling for power and authority which went on in the senior echelons of the 
Allied armies during the Great War. Thanks to Lloyd George’s sleight of 
hand the French were once more in the ascendant in deciding Allied 
strategy, with the British C-in-C effectively under their command. In order 
to reinforce Nivelle’s authority their plan, initially, had been that Wilson 
would be tantamount to Chief of Staff at GQG giving Nivelle’s orders direct 
to Haig ‘and the French intended to make sure that he would be a willing 
instrument in their hands.’154 Clive, as British Head of Mission at GQG, 
was considered insufficiently senior by Nivelle. The French C-in-C’s 
rationale in requesting Wilson for this role, whatever its official title, merits 
reiteration in full as it sums up the French view of him and their 
determination to get him on board: 
I cannot dream of accepting the heavy task which has been 
entrusted to me in respect of the British Army unless I can have at 
my disposal a certain number of British staff officers speaking 
French well, familiar with our methods of work and capable, not 
only of serving as liaison officers, but also of foreseeing the 
problems of every kind which we shall have to settle together, and 
of studying their solution. 
The British General Officer who will be placed at the head of this 
Mission must have the necessary authority and experience to fill 
this rôle. That is why I have asked you to have General Wilson 
nominated to this post; he has both during and before the war done 
a great deal of work with the French General Staff and for every 
reason he seems to me to be absolutely qualified to perform these 
duties. I must be allowed to insist once more on his appointment.155 
 
                                            
154 Spears, Prelude, p. 144; Wilson diary, 5 February 1917. 
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Haig resisted the appointment, unsurprisingly considering the hand he had 
already been dealt by Lloyd George. He finally accepted it when it was 
agreed that Wilson would report directly to him.156 Wilson too was 
reluctant, his diary making clear that he would only accept the position if 
Haig asked him, and if he could resign if he considered the post 
untenable. Milner urged him to take the post ‘because he did not think that 
any other man in the world could hold the two armies together.’157 Wilson 
agreed after another meeting with Haig at which: 
I told him that within a month of my going to Beauvais [the location 
of Nivelle’s headquarters] any number of people would tell him that 
I was intriguing to put him out - that in point of fact I probably could 
put him out if I wished - and so I advised him not to have me but to 
keep Clive.158 
 
Haig ‘having concluded that it would be best to trust him’ told Wilson he 
should take the role.159 Edward Spears, then a junior British liaison officer 
with the French Army wrote: ‘I dined with General Henry Wilson and his 
officers. He was in splendid form. He had a post that suited him admirably, 
great power and no responsibility, and he had around him an appreciative 
audience of particularly clever men.’160 Egremont noted that Wilson and 
Spears ‘came to loathe each other’, and thus the latter’s judgements 
should be treated with caution.161  Wilson’s new posting, however 
agreeable, did not last long. The failure of Nivelle’s offensive and his 
subsequent downfall also resulted in Wilson’s removal. In May, Spears 
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 76 
was promoted to the British Mission in Paris, responsible for liaison 
between the British and French governments. Pétain succeeded Nivelle, 
and on 17 May told Spears that he wanted Wilson, whom he did not trust, 
out of his headquarters by the time he arrived: ‘Wilson, Pétain said, was 
an intriguer: a supporter of the ousted Nivelle, too close to Foch and 
therefore no friend of his.’162 Three weeks later Wilson was back in 
London looking for a job. 
 
Wilson’s relationship with Clemenceau was more complex. They were 
never ‘friends’, but they developed a level of mutual respect once 
Clemenceau became French Prime Minister on 19 November 1917, while 
Wilson was establishing himself at Versailles. Clemenceau was at first 
opposed to the establishment of the SWC. He favoured a more direct form 
of unity of command for Allied forces in the west headed by a French 
general. Nonetheless, Wilson’s mix of charm and intellect won over ‘the 
Tiger’ who saw him as easier to deal with than his colleagues Robertson 
and Haig.163 Wilson’s diary reveals that Clemenceau had a distinctive style 
for getting his way. Several times in the last year of the war Wilson was 
treated to an outburst of irritation and often anger, usually directed at 
British generals or the British government’s alleged failure to devote 
sufficient men, materiel and/or fighting spirit to the war. Wilson then had to 
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mollify Clemenceau, reassure him of Britain’s fidelity as an ally and, 
sometimes, intercede with Haig on his behalf. Even allowing for the Tiger’s 
politically canny histrionics, Wilson’s diplomatic skills usually succeeded in 
soothing Clemenceau’s mood before matters got out of hand and 
damaged the alliance irretrievably. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As the foregoing discussion has shown, Wilson’s fondness for gossip and 
‘intrigue’ was not unusual in the officer corps of the British Army at the 
beginning of the 20th Century. Plenty of his peers also involved themselves 
in ‘politicking’ in order to enhance their careers, promote their strategic 
views, and influence military policy. Where Wilson did stand out was his 
overt familiarity with politicians, a profession viewed with open cynicism by 
many of his military colleagues. Wilson’s contemporaries understood the 
need to work with the political tide but usually did so while metaphorically 
holding their noses. Wilson, instead, cultivated politicians and debated 
with them on military policy, including conscription, and, as will be 
discussed later, on his interest in Irish politics. Such openness harmed 
rather than enhanced Wilson’s professional fortunes, especially his role in 
the Curragh Incident of March 1914. In the next three years Wilson failed 
to achieve the recognition he felt he deserved following a promising pre-
war career. It was only in 1917, when politicians in Britain who saw 
Wilson’s potential were in the ascendant, that his stalled trajectory took 
flight once more. A similar change in the civil-military leadership in France 
enhanced his influence and he was able to finally develop his desire for 
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formalisation of Anglo-French strategic planning and decision-making. As 
the next chapter explains, he achieved this by proposing the establishment 
of an independent body to take control of inter-Allied strategy, one headed 
by politicians advised by military experts acting apart from their general 
staffs. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FUTURE STRATEGY PAPER 
The paper Wilson submitted to the War Cabinet on 20 October 1917 has 
received limited attention in the historiography.1 For Millman it was the 
product of Wilson’s tireless pursuit of self-interest.2 For Woodward it was 
the latest weapon in Lloyd George’s equally tireless campaign to wrest 
control of the war from Haig and Robertson, with Wilson little more than a 
dupe, albeit a willing one.3 In Jeffery’s biography the episode is limited to a 
brief summary of Wilson’s recommendations.4 This chapter considers the 
development of Wilson’s thinking by analysing the paper in detail for the 
first time, and aims to set it in its broader strategic context. While Wilson 
might have seen opportunities for personal advancement, his report 
deliberately avoided overt criticism of colleagues. He told Lord Esher that 
he ‘had avoided saying a word...that could offend D[ouglas] H[aig] and 
hoped their relationship would be cordial.’5 Instead the report was a 
closely argued critique on the course of the war, and of the events and 
decisions Wilson believed had brought Britain and her allies to the current 
impasse on the Western Front.  Rather than an exercise in political point-
scoring, the paper should be seen as a formal statement of Wilson’s long-
held strategic views. Had the paper been merely an exercise in criticism of 
the past, it is doubtful his career would have gained the momentum it did. 
                                            
1 CAB 27/8, WP 61. 
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Unlike Lord French, who was also consulted, and allowed personal 
invective to intrude on what was an otherwise detailed review, Wilson 
adhered to the War Cabinet’s request for a study of ‘the present state of 
the war, the future prospects, and the future action to be taken’. His 
response shaped the characteristics not only of British strategy, but that of 
her main Allies, for the rest of the war. It paved the way for his 
appointment as Britain’s PMR at the SWC, and confirmed his position as 
Lloyd George’s favoured professional adviser on war policy. Whether he 
intended it or not, it also served as Wilson’s informal application for the 
post of the government’s principal military advisor, the CIGS.  
 
THE PAPERS 
Wilson and French were asked to produce their ‘appreciations’ by the War 
Cabinet on 11 October 1917.6 That afternoon they were at work in Lord 
French’s office at Horse Guards, Wilson sitting at Wellington’s desk.7 They 
conferred throughout the writing period; the two papers, although different 
in style, were products of extensive collusion.8 The context for the 
Cabinet’s request was the receipt of status reports from Haig and 
Robertson. Haig’s, requested on 25 September, reviewed the military 
situation on the Western Front. It offered the C-in-C’s views of the British 
role if Russia dropped out of the war ‘having regard to the weakened state 
                                            
6 TNA, CAB 23/13/21, War Cabinet, 11 October 1917. 
7 Wilson diary, 11 October 1917. 
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of France and Italy’.9 Robertson submitted two reports, as requested at a 
meeting of the War Policy Committee on 5 October. His principal 
document, in response to Lloyd George’s concerns about the costly 
battles on the Western Front, was an assessment of the prospects for a 
major offensive in Palestine, specifically, an advance north from the 
present line at Gaza-Beersheba. His second paper examined such a 
campaign in detail.10 There was also a supporting report from the First Sea 
Lord, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, on prospects for moving troops to the 
Middle East to undertake such an offensive.11 Wilson’s analysis, while it 
took an holistic view of the war thus far, addressed the key elements in 
both papers.12 His report was closely argued and impersonal, in stark 
contrast to Lord French’s more discursive invective-ridden assault on two 
of the British Army’s most senior soldiers.13 
  
The request for their strategic advice surprised neither Wilson nor French. 
At a War Cabinet meeting the day before, ‘the view was clearly expressed’ 
that Haig’s report ‘did not provide a convincing argument that we could 
inflict a decisive military defeat on Germany on the Western Front next 
year’ even if Russia remained an effective participant.14 As a result, the 
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Prime Minister recalled that at the start of the war, when ‘equally grave 
decisions’ had to be taken, his predecessor had called a ‘War Council’ to 
hear the views of a range of military experts. That had not happened 
because of lack of confidence in the commanders, he said. Wilson and 
French would be invited to offer their views, regardless of possible 
objections: 
In reply to a suggestion that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
might resent this procedure, the Prime Minister pointed out that 
neither General Sir Charles Douglas, then Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, nor Field Marshal Lord French, the Commander-in-
Chief Designate of the British Expeditionary Force had resented the 
War Council held in August 1914, and he himself would undertake 
to explain the matter fully to General Robertson.15 
 
In fact, according to Esher, the 1914 meeting ‘was called because no 
confidence was felt that Sir C Douglas or Sir John French were capable of 
giving military advice upon such grave issues’.16 Wilson and French dined 
with Lloyd George who had ‘told Robertson that it is no slight on him but 
that the patient after a three year course of treatment not being yet cured 
he thinks it advisable to call in another couple of specialists!’17 Whatever 
Lloyd George told Robertson, the latter was not mollified. Hankey noted 
that Robertson had told Derby he was considering resignation. Curzon 
had warned him that if the CIGS was forced out he would ‘probably’ 
resign, as would Cabinet members Lord Robert Cecil, Carson, the Foreign 
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Secretary Arthur Balfour, and Derby.18  The whole process caused an 
exasperated Esher to ask: ‘Is this Government or Anarchy?’19 
 
At the War Cabinet meeting the following day, aware of Curzon’s threat, 
Lloyd George justified his actions by referring to the ‘Council of War’ of 
August 1914. He did so ‘impartially and judiciously’ and was ‘quite at his 
best, handling Robertson (who was as sulky as a bear with a sore head) 
quite admirably’.20 He said that in the light of the papers from Haig, the 
CIGS and the Admiralty he believed there were four ‘alternative policies’ 
facing Britain. In short, these were: 
1. Concentration of ‘the whole of our forces on the Western front’ with 
all other theatres treated as not only subordinate but with forces 
sufficient for ‘safety on the defensive’. This, Lloyd George said, was 
Haig’s recommendation. 
2. Concentrate mainly on the Western Front but maintain active 
operations in other theatres, such as Mesopotamia and Palestine, 
in the hope that by ‘rough handling’ the Turks might be induced to 
‘come to terms’. 
3. Lloyd George ascribed the third option to the French C-in-C Pétain. 
This comprised of limited attacks while concentrating on economic 
warfare until Russia recovered and the USA could supply enough 
men to ensure superiority.  
                                            
18 CAC, Hankey diary, HNKY 1/3, 10 October 1917, and CAC, Esher journal, 15 October 
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19 Ibid., 17 October 1917. 
20 Ibid., 11 October 1917. 
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4. Option four was described by the Prime Minister as ‘knocking the 
props from under Germany’. The underlying basis was to counter 
the loss of Russia by depriving Germany of her Allies, ‘with a view 
to an eventual great concentration against an isolated Germany. 
This might be achieved by a combination of military and diplomatic 
operations against Turkey.’ First it would be necessary to deliver a 
major military blow against them.21 
 
Lloyd George said ‘a turning point in the war’ had been reached. Wilson 
set to work only to be interrupted that afternoon by Milner who told him 
and French that ‘relations between LG and Robertson are impossible. 
Faults on both sides and mutual dislike. LG often unfair and Robertson 
often special pleading of gross and offensive type.’22  
 
HAIG’S PAPER 
This was influenced by the apparent ineffectiveness of Britain’s main 
Allies, and the progress of the Third Battle of Ypres.  It was produced 
during the Battle of Broodseinde, at a time when the offensive was still 
considered, by the C-in-C at least, to be going the BEF’s way.23 Haig’s 
confidence is clear from his diary, which in the week before the 
submission of his report referred at least five times to the progress the 
BEF was making.24 Unsurprisingly, the conclusion of his report was to 
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urge further operations on the Western Front in 1918, building on what he 
believed were the successes of 1917. In the coming year the main weight 
of the fighting would fall to the British. While he knew the Prime Minister 
believed there might be alternatives to concentrating on the Western 
Front, he wanted to stick to the policy of devoting effort and resources to 
defeating Germany in the west. Haig, somewhat unconvincingly, said he 
had examined and ‘carefully considered’ the other options but there was 
not one of them ‘which offers any prospect of defeating the German 
armies, and until we defeat those armies I see no prospect of gaining the 
peace we seek’.25  
 
According to Wilson, Lloyd George condemned both Haig and Robertson 
as:  
…pig-headed stupid and narrow-visioned. Haig has submitted, what 
LG called, a “preposterous” paper which sets out to prove that the 
west front is the only front. LG says that, in fact, on Haig’s own 
showing the Western front is a hopeless front. Allenby has 
apparently said that he needs 2 to 1 to beat the Turks and therefore 
it would follow that it was no use sending troops out there. Haig 
claims that even if the Boches are reinforced by 32 Divisions from 
Russia he can still beat them although inferior in men and guns.26 
 
By this stage of the war the C-in-C’s positive outlook was viewed by some 
senior politicians with more than a degree of cynicism, with his head of 
intelligence Charteris fielding much of the criticism. Haig’s optimism failed 
to convince Esher. It was ‘too long and too discursive; but it is elevated in 
tone, and very sanguine about prospects on this Front. I did not care much 
                                            
25 CAB 27/8, GT 2243, p. 2. 
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for it.’27 As will be seen, Haig’s ‘sanguine’ approach to the threats facing 
his front coloured British strategy into the spring of 1918. According to 
Wilson, Derby agreed with him that Haig’s staff was ‘rotten and that all his 
forecasts are wrong and that Robertson endorses them. But Derby is a 
weak creature... he cursed Charteris heartily which amused me.’28 Derby 
had turned against GHQ’s head of intelligence in February 1917 for his 
overly optimistic appraisals, telling Lloyd George that Haig had been ‘badly 
let down by Charteris’.29 Esher said Charteris was considered a “national 
danger” by all the Army Commanders, and goes by the name of the “U. 
Boat”.’30  
 
ROBERTSON’S PAPER 
Robertson’s submission had a similarly critical reception. It took a familiar, 
strongly pro-Western Front position, with gloomy predictions for the 
prospects of expanded operations in Palestine. An offensive towards 
Jerusalem, even if successful, entailed extending the British front from 30 
to 50 miles. He predicted at least three costly battles against strong 
Turkish resistance leading to ‘little result beyond the moral advantages 
which we may gain’.31 Worse, he calculated that the British force of seven 
infantry and three cavalry divisions would need reinforcing by three 
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infantry divisions plus two in relief.32 This, Robertson claimed, meant that 
‘Turkish territory will become, for an indefinite period, the decisive theatre 
and the West front must meanwhile be delegated to secondary 
importance.’33 He warned of ‘disastrous’ consequences if the government 
insisted on major offensives on two fronts; expecting success from 
concentrated action in the Middle East would be a ‘more dangerous’ 
gamble than usual.34  The estimate of forces required for a push to 
Jerusalem increased when General Sir Edmund Allenby, C-in-C Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force (EEF), reported that he would, in fact, need 14 
infantry divisions, and another six in relief, a demand one authority 
described as ‘one of the most absurd appreciations every presented to a 
British government.’35 
 
The Royal Navy estimated it needed 100 ships to transport six divisions 
from France to the Middle East, with them arriving no sooner than the third 
week of February 1918. This would mean that ‘the whole of the traffic in 
the Mediterranean’ would be ‘seriously interfered with’, with severe 
impacts on supplies of coal and wheat to Italy which was already 
struggling to resist the Central Powers.36 As for the consequences at 
home, diverting transports from trans-Atlantic convoys would reduce 
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British imports by up to 1.2 million tons from November 1917 to December 
1918.37 
 
WILSON’S PAPER 
Wilson’s Paper was as much concerned with the political-military interface 
as with pure military strategy. In Wilson’s view, Britain’s war policy thus far 
had been reactive rather than proactive. Britain had ‘tried to adapt 
ourselves to the ever-changing, ever-increasing demands, but, generally 
speaking, following on German leads rather than taking a line of our own. 
As examples we have Gallipoli, Salonica [sic], the defence of the Suez 
Canal and Kut.’ A review was required because in three years Britain had 
moved ‘from being the most “contemptible” to being the most formidable’ 
of Germany’s enemies.38 Russia was effectively lost as an ally, to be 
replaced by the USA which might be of significant value in ‘the somewhat 
distant and problematical future.’39 Wilson was not, unlike Haig, convinced 
that the time was right or the resources available to strike a decisive blow 
in the west. Haig had said he was ‘confident that if the course I have 
recommended be adopted whole-heartedly we shall gain far more than a 
limited success in the field next year.’40 Wilson disagreed. It was ‘no use 
throwing “decisive numbers at the decisive time at the decisive place” at 
my head if the decisive numbers do not exist, if the decisive hour has not 
struck or if the decisive plan is ill-chosen.’41 
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For Wilson, timing was crucial. The autumn of 1917 saw discussion 
amongst politicians and public about the prospects for a negotiated peace. 
In September, the Germans had made indirect overtures to the French 
and British governments hinting at a compromise in which Germany 
seemed ‘willing to accept defeat in the West for compensations in the 
East’.42 British politicians were concerned that a war-weary France might 
sue for peace. Esher set the tone for those who might be prepared to 
consider a compromise. He told Robertson that awaiting the Americans 
seemed to be the favoured French policy and ‘what a policy!’:  
The sooner our excellent rulers make Peace the better. Why not 
accept the terms offered by Germany? They are more favourable 
than we are likely to obtain this day twelvemonth…as matters 
stand, no unbiased mind can resist the conclusion that while we 
have bested the Germans in the West, they have won, hands down, 
on the Eastern Front.43 
 
Esher told Haig that it was ‘amazing’ that Lloyd George and some of his 
colleagues could ‘not see that their sole chance of making a favourable 
peace is to balance the tremendous successes of Germany on the 
Eastern Front by equally striking ones on the Western.’44 Esher was 
known for his pessimism. In December 1916, he had given Wilson the 
impression that he did not think Britain could win the war.45 Nonetheless, 
Russia’s inability to fight added to fears that the Allies might be forced to 
                                            
42 David R. Woodward, ‘David Lloyd George, a negotiated peace with Germany, and the 
Kulhmann Peace Kite of September 1917’, Canadian Journal of History, March 1971 vol. 
VI (1), p. 86. 
43 CAC, Esher papers, Esher to Robertson, 22 October 1917.  
44 Ibid., Esher to Haig, 23 October 1917. 
45 Wilson diary, 1 December 1916.  
 90 
seek a compromise.46 Millman has argued that British grand strategy from 
mid-1916 until the end of the war was characterised by a general feeling of 
‘pessimism’ amounting to defeatism. Some of Britain’s political and military 
leaders were focussed on concluding the war on acceptable terms, in 
contrast to their public utterances epitomised by Lloyd George’s 
commitment to total victory thanks to a ‘knockout blow’ on the Western 
Front.47 Wilson took a more positive view than Millman allowed. He 
remained opposed to a compromise peace and was confident that, with 
changes to strategic decision-making, Britain could emerge from the war 
with her Empire and prestige intact. His advice to the War Cabinet made 
clear that if a compromise was forced upon Britain:  
It is incontestable that the German position is better to-day with all 
the gains I have mentioned above (vis-à-vis terms of peace) than it 
would be had they not gained Turkey as Allies, had they not 
effectively occupied all the Balkans, Roumania [sic], Poland and 
part or Russia; had they in fact, during the last two years, restricted 
themselves to attempting a final decision, as we have done in the 
main theatre, i.e. the West.48 
 
He was making these points now, not because the West ‘is not the 
decisive front – because it is’, but because the final decision could only be 
reached when the decisive numbers were applied at the decisive place 
‘and the place and the time are not yet, and the Germans are trying their 
best that they never shall be’.49 
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Wilson summarised his views in a section headed ‘the Future’.  He asked 
if it were possible for the Allies, ‘now that we are only three instead of four 
– for the moment I do not count America’, to ‘enlarge our view’ and draw 
up plans so that ‘when the decisive moment arrives we can produce the 
decisive numbers at the decisive place?’50 According to Wilson there were 
three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, routes towards attaining this 
object: 
(i) By eliminating some of the smaller of our enemies and thus 
releasing all the troops and material we now have in such 
secondary theatres – and incidentally setting free a large 
amount of tonnage. 
(ii) By recruiting the necessary number of men, and placing 
 them in the field where and when required.  
(iii) By an enormous and overwhelming increase in guns, munitions, 
aeroplanes, tanks and all engines of war.51 
 
Regardless of which course(s) the War Cabinet chose, and this was the 
principal theme throughout, it was ‘essential that a much closer and more 
effective co-operation’ should be established between the Allies.52 
The next section of this chapter considers these potential routes. 
 
THEATRES OF WAR 
Haig’s assessment of the state of the war and prospects for 1918 was 
clear. While allowing for the possibility of ‘local’ successes against Turkey 
or Austria-Hungary, this would weaken the British position on the Western 
Front. The BEF would have to go on the defensive, with the negative 
impact that would have on French morale. If Britain rejected large-scale 
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offensive actions in France and Flanders in 1918 there was no likelihood 
of either France or Italy conducting offensives of their own. As for the 
nascent American forces, they would ‘not be capable of achieving any 
important results alone by offensive action next year’.53 Therefore, 
‘success on the Western front is the only real alternative to an 
unsatisfactory peace’.54 At this point, in his personal copy of Haig’s report, 
Wilson wrote: ‘This is true but what is under consideration is whether such 
a success would not be made easier if Turkey (& Bulgaria) were 
knocked.’55 For Haig: ‘The question for decision therefore, is whether the 
allies are capable of overcoming the Germans on the Western front even 
though Russia should be unable to take an active part in the war next 
year.’56 Wilson disagreed: ‘No. This is only part of the question,’ he wrote 
in the margin.57  
 
Despite knowing that the Prime Minister harboured hopes of winning 
important victories in other theatres, Haig urged that ‘we must take risks 
elsewhere and cut down our commitments in all other theatres to the 
minimum necessary to protect really vital interests’. Britain should adopt a 
similar approach to its Allies and stand back from assisting them directly. It 
was not in the Allied interest for ‘the only really effective offensive army 
which will exist next year’ to throw away ‘what is a good prospect and 
practically the only prospect of a real victory by disseminating its 
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forces…Great Britain has not the means to maintain more than one 
offensive.’58 
 
Robertson agreed. Even if successful in Palestine ‘the military effect would 
be of no value to us’.59 It was ‘very desirable’ to reduce the number of 
Britain’s enemies, but since Russia’s ‘collapse’ he did not see an 
extensive offensive campaign in Palestine ‘as a sound military measure’. 
In his view ‘the right military course to pursue is to act on the defensive in 
Palestine and the east generally, and continue to seek a decision in the 
West’.60 Throughout the war Robertson consistently opposed any large-
scale offensives that would impact negatively on Britain’s effort in the 
west. In 1915, he condemned the forthcoming Gallipoli offensive as a 
‘ridiculous farce’.61 Once he became CIGS he was, from time to time, 
prepared to consider actions away from France and Flanders, to exploit 
perceived enemy weaknesses or to boost morale at home. He would not, 
however, subjugate the BEF’s needs for those of armies in other 
theatres.62 
 
In response Wilson reiterated his strategic belief in the primacy of the 
Western Front. On this point at least, he emphasised, he was in step with 
his colleagues: 
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I have always been (even years before the war broke out) and I 
shall always remain, an ardent “Westerner”, for the simple reason 
that it is along the west front that the bulk of the forces of our 
principal enemy is disposed and the death-grapple must be 
engaged in at the time and place and in the manner best suited to 
our cause.63 
 
Britain, he said, had been unable to consider the ‘decisive maxim’ (major 
offensives with the potential for strategically important results) until Spring 
1916. The Battle of the Somme had been ‘one of the steps we are 
treading to a final decision’. Since then ‘we have had several attempts at a 
final decision, or shall we call them steps towards a final decision, notably 
at Arras, Messines, Ypres, Chemin-des-Dames, Champagne and Verdun, 
but the final decision has not yet been reached.’64 For Wilson, Britain’s 
single-mindedness on the Western Front meant potential opportunities 
had been missed elsewhere:  
In no other theatre than along the Western front has any serious 
attempt been made by us during the last twenty months to reach a 
decision in that theatre...We have been unwavering and 
unwearying in our hopes and in our actions to gain a final decision 
by a series of actions each of which we hoped would have given us 
that decision, but which, as events proved, were only steps in [sic] 
the ladder leading to the final decision.65 
 
Wilson questioned Haig’s and Robertson’s continuing optimism for 
decisive results in the west in 1918: ‘We seem to be as confident of 
success when Russia and Roumania have collapsed and France is 
temporarily weakened as we were when all these three countries were 
capable of heavy offensive actions.’66 Conversely, Germany, having failed 
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to win in the west in 1914, had turned eastwards and had ‘succeeded in 
the Balkans, in Roumania and now in Russia.’  Germany’s plan had been 
to gain territory and supplies ‘and put himself in the position to mass a 
much larger number of troops in the decisive theatre (i.e. in the West) 
when the time for the death-grapple came.’67  
 
Although Lloyd George had long favoured ‘knocking away the props’,68 
Wilson believed opportunities ‘to “knock out” some of our smaller 
antagonists’, had disappeared.69 As far as Austria-Hungary was 
concerned the matter was ‘too complex’ and ‘eminently fitted’ for a 
decision by a ‘Superior Council’.70 Bulgaria could not be tackled until 
Turkey had been taken out of the war. As for Turkey, the Allies had 
missed the boat. Wilson had, he said, been a long-time advocate of 
‘getting Turkey out of the war.’ In a rare criticism in this document of his 
military colleagues Wilson went on:  
I cannot help thinking that, had we taken a somewhat broader and 
longer view of different theatres and made a juster [sic] appreciation 
of the moment for the decisive action, we could, and we ought to, 
have detached Turkey, and with her probably Bulgaria. But this is in 
the past, and the question here is – can we do so in the future.71 
 
The answer, he concluded, was ‘no’. This was a significant change of 
heart. Less than three weeks earlier Wilson had told Rawlinson that he 
favoured sending ‘10 or 12 D[i]vs to Egypt to make sure of beating the 
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Turks this winter [and] bringing them back to France for the summer 
offensive of 1918…HW is for concentrating on the Turk this winter.’72 At a 
meeting with Lord French and the Prime Minister, the latter had been ‘mad 
to knock out the Turk in the winter’ and a similarly enthusiastic Wilson had 
‘expressed the strong belief that if a really good scheme was thoroughly 
well worked out, we could chase the Turks out of Palestine and very likely 
knock them completely out during the mud months, without in any way 
interfering with Haig’s operations next Spring and Summer’.73  Once 
required to provide an authoritative assessment, and demonstrating a mix  
of both opportunism and pragmatism, Wilson changed his mind. On the 
day the War Cabinet asked for his views, and in the light of Robertson’s 
and Jellicoe’s negative reports, Wilson discussed the issue with the 
French CoS, Foch, who thought it ‘late for Syria [Palestine] and we must 
spend the winter in making guns, arms etc.’74 By the following day he had 
concluded that ‘we are late to plan and carry out an attack on the Turks 
this winter’ and thus ‘this confines us to Europe’.75 Having garnered the 
facts Wilson came ‘very reluctantly, to the conclusion that we are too 
late’.76 It was a notable conclusion, bearing in mind the Prime Minister’s 
abiding interest in other theatres. Wilson explained that a successful 
offensive against Turkey in either Palestine or Mesopotamia would have 
had to have been carried out during the ‘mud-months’ in France, a period 
spanning 1 November and 30 April, when weather in the region was 
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‘admirably suited for campaigning. We are too late now – in the middle of 
October – to make plans for the coming winter, and we are too late for 
other reasons also.’77 Robertson’s study had claimed two German 
divisions were available to reinforce the Turks and, if it became clear 
Britain intended a major offensive, more would be sent.78 Wilson agreed. 
The Germans had anticipated British intentions and had ‘taken a much 
firmer grip of the Turk, they have massed a large force in a central 
position, they have accumulated munitions and stores and vastly improved 
the communications in the Asiatic theatre.’79 Another problem was 
shortage of troops. Agreeing with Haig and Robertson, Wilson advised 
that there would be insufficient manpower to send the necessary force to 
campaign in the Middle East and to remain effective in the west.80 Thirdly, 
he reiterated the Admiralty view that ‘dwindling tonnage and difficulties of 
escort would make the transportation, upkeep and return of the necessary 
force impossible’.81 Wilson then sounded the death-knell for future large-
scale adventures against Turkey:  
For all these reasons, but not because the West is the decisive 
theatre in the winter, I am clearly of opinion that it is impossible to 
send an expedition against the Turks this winter and wrong to send 
an expedition next spring or summer.82 
 
Thereafter, though Lloyd George returned to the point often, the War 
Cabinet’s appetite for major offensives away from the Western Front, on 
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the premise that of themselves they would bring about Germany’s defeat, 
waned. Wilson, as will be discussed, continued to pay lip-service to the 
notion, but at Versailles and later as CIGS, he ensured the BEF’s 
manpower would not be denuded at the expense of major offensives 
elsewhere.  In future, initiatives beyond France and Flanders would be 
motivated by the defence and extension of Britain’s imperial interests 
rather than as potential war-winning operations. As result they would be 
limited, pragmatic and always subservient to operations in the west. 
 
MANPOWER/RESOURCES 
Wilson argued that Britain and her Allies would not be ready for a major 
offensive in the west in 1918. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, he had 
been a long-time and prominent advocate of conscription, including 
conscription for Ireland, and was in step with his military colleagues who 
believed the government could and should do more to provide men for the 
war.83  However, Haig and Wilson disagreed on a crucial point. Haig 
believed that with concerted effort the BEF could conduct a major 
offensive in 1918. Wilson did not. According to Haig, Germany had so far 
brought few divisions to the Western Front from the Eastern. Evidence, he 
believed, that Germany ‘does not expect any immediate total collapse in 
Russia’.84 Wilson noted in his copy of Haig’s report: ‘This may be so but it 
may equally be taken as affording truth that Germany is not really 
frightened by our present attack?’ The marginalia records that Wilson’s 
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discussions with the DMI Macdonogh, ‘make clear that the Boch [sic] can 
draw, easily, on the Russian front’.85 In fact, as the latest history of the 
campaign shows, Wilson was wrong. The recent fighting had pushed the 
Germans to the limits of their endurance.86 According to Haig, of the 147 
German divisions on his front, 135 had been driven from their positions or 
withdrawn ‘broken by their losses’ since 1 April 1917, ‘many of them twice 
and some three times…I quote this as proof of what our armies are 
capable of.’87  Wilson did not question the statistics but instead asked: 
‘How many English and French divisions have been roughly handled in the 
same period?’88 Haig insisted that in the light of such favourable 
circumstances it should be:  
Beyond question that our offensive must be pursued as long as 
possible. I have every hope of being able to continue it for several 
weeks still and of gaining results which will add very greatly to the 
enemy’s losses in men and moral[e], and place us in a far better 
position to resume an offensive in the spring. Amongst other 
advantages, we shall end this year’s campaign with practically all 
the observation points originally held by the enemy in our 
possession – a very important consideration.89 
 
As Haig’s recent biographer noted, capture of the Bourlon Ridge would 
allow British artillery to bring down accurate fire on the Hindenburg Line, 
and on the important railhead at Cambrai.90  Thus Haig was confident of 
entering next year’s campaigning season ‘with excellent prospects of 
decisive success if we throw into the scale wholeheartedly the full weight 
of the Empire’s strength and if Russia can maintain on her front even the 
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number of German divisions now there’. He added: ‘Future developments 
in Russia are so uncertain that in considering our future plans we cannot 
ignore the possibility that she may be able to do at least as much.’91 
Wilson was sceptical, noting ‘the assumption about Russia is a large 
one’.92 Nonetheless, as Haig conceded, the Prime Minister had asked the 
C-in-C for his proposed policy in the event of Russian capitulation. If this 
happened, Haig believed, Germany would have to keep 59 divisions in the 
east to monitor Russian activity and to supervise her allies in the region. 
Haig thought Germany could only divert 32 divisions to the west, bringing 
the complement to 179 divisions.93 By 1 April 1918, these would be faced 
by 176 Allied divisions, comprising 62 British divisions ‘if our forces in 
France remain as they are’, 100 French, 12 American and 2 Portuguese.94 
He conceded that at ‘first sight such a force would appear to be insufficient 
to justify the hope of a successful offensive on this front next year’, but 19 
of the German divisions were of ‘poor quality, only fit for defensives on 
quiet fronts’.95 Wilson asked ‘what of the Belgian, the Portuguese, the 
Americans and some French’.96 Haig claimed German losses were being 
largely replaced by ‘quite inferior material’ and that by May or June 1918 
‘the German reserves will be exhausted.’97 Alongside this statement 
Wilson wrote: ‘What of the French and British Reserves.’98 As for troop 
numbers, Haig calculated that the Allies would be up to 30% stronger 
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thanks to the greater number of battalions, and of men in battalions, in 
British, American and Portuguese divisions.99 Wilson made a note to 
check this claim with the DMI and subsequently wrote in his copy 
‘Macdonogh agrees.’100 Wilson disagreed with the assertion that the 100 
French divisions Haig calculated on having available in 1918 could be 
considered as ‘fully equivalent’ to the same number of German divisions 
facing them, writing: ‘This is not the present state of affairs.’101 Wilson was 
right to be sceptical. Between 1 November 1917 and March 1918, the 
Germans moved 48 divisions from east to west (with two going in the 
opposite direction), and eight more from Italy to the Western Front. On 21 
March, the first day of Operation Michael, the start of the German Spring 
Offensives, there were 191 German divisions on the Western Front, 22 
more than Haig had predicted.102 
 
Thus, Haig was ‘confident that the British Armies in France, assisted by 
the French and American Armies, will be quite capable of carrying through 
a sustained and successful offensive next year,’ but only if certain 
conditions were met. Diverting troops would put this ‘successful offensive’ 
at risk, he warned. All the 62 British divisions currently in France would be 
needed, at full establishment, with new drafts trained by early spring. 
Moreover, ‘further drafts to replace wastage in next year’s offensive should 
be trained and sent to France in time to take their place in the ranks when 
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required’.103 Wilson’s note on his copy of the Haig paper noted that 
Macready, the AG, and Sir Auckland Geddes, the Director of National 
Service, ‘profess this is impossible’.104 French demands for the BEF to 
take over more line had to be resisted to allow troops to recover, take 
leave and be trained. This would be ‘both justifiable and wise’, particularly 
as the French armies were unlikely to consent to major offensives in the 
foreseeable future, ‘since the British armies alone can be made capable of 
a great offensive effort it is beyond argument that everything should be 
done by our allies as well as ourselves to enable that effort to be made as 
strong as possible...’105 Correctly predicting French opposition, Haig 
argued that the best test of commitment was not the actual length of line 
held, but the numbers of enemy divisions faced, and the intended role of 
the armies concerned in the offensive he wanted to launch next spring. It 
was necessary therefore to ‘refuse to take over more line and to adhere 
resolutely to that refusal, even to the point of answering threats by threats 
if necessary’.106 Wilson wrote ‘Whew!’ against this sentence.107 
 
Having consulted Macdonogh on Haig’s manpower assumptions, Wilson 
concluded that Britain could not recruit ‘a sufficient number of men to 
overwhelm the enemy by numbers’, at least not until the USA was able to 
‘transport very large forces and maintain them in the field, and this will 
certainly not be the case in 1918’.108 None of Britain’s main European 
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Allies was in a position to assist. Unlike Haig, whose paper still held out 
some hope that the Russians would continue as a viable force, Wilson 
considered them relevant only for the numbers of German troops which 
would be diverted to the west when they collapsed. Early in 1917 Wilson 
had undertaken an inspection tour of Russia, and although his initial 
impressions of the Tsarist forces had been positive, he became less 
sanguine once he returned to London.109 He calculated, like Haig, that 
once Russia withdrew from the war, something he considered imminent, 
Germany would be able to divert ‘between 20 and 40 divisions’ to the 
west.110 As for the Italians, their own commanders felt it unlikely they could 
maintain their present numbers into 1918.111 Worse still, the French army 
was ‘already declining’ and would soon be forced to reduce its number of 
divisions.112 
 
Wilson then turned to the British position. In his personal copy of Haig’s 
report, annotated in his own hand, he highlighted the C-in-C’s 
assumptions about both recruitment and ‘wastage’ and noted he would 
check them with Macdonogh, the DMI. Although a long-standing ally of 
Robertson, Macdonogh also worked amicably with Wilson and briefed him 
at least twice during the writing of his report.113 As a result, Wilson told the 
War Cabinet that the British were ‘roughly speaking’ in the following 
position: 
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If the Infantry in France is filled up to establishment now – we are at 
this moment some 50,000 to 60,000 Infantry under establishment – 
and if we take, in the coming 12 months, a punishment equal to that 
which we have taken in the last 12 months, then the present deficit 
of 50,000 to 60,000 will be turned into a deficit of anything from 
100,000 to 200,000. 
 
In the 12 months from October 1918 the situation would be even worse 
‘with nothing in Reserve to make good wastage except the boys who 
become matured and returned Expeditionary Force men’, that is, those 
who had been wounded and returned to the ranks.114  
 
The German position, he argued, was more positive. Against a growing 
British shortfall, and not taking into account the potential for up to 40 
additional divisions currently facing the Russians, Wilson calculated 
Germany had an extra 100,000 men available for the front line in field 
depots. In Germany, Macdonogh reported, there were another 620,000 fit 
men.  To this could be added an estimated half a million young men from 
the ‘1920 Class’ of recruits. This came to a potential 1.2 million men 
available for drafting in Germany in the coming 12 months.115  This was 
twice the figure Haig’s paper had predicted.116 In fact, as Zabecki has 
noted, while at the beginning of 1918 there were 1.1 million men fit for field 
service employed in German war industries, it was not thought practical to 
put them in uniform. The next ‘class’ of new recruits, totalling 637,000 
men, higher than Macdonogh’s estimate, would not be ready until the 
autumn of 1918.117 In reality, GHQ’s estimate of the German manpower 
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situation was more accurate than that of the General Staff at the War 
Office. At the time, however, distrust in London of the assessments of 
Haig’s intelligence operation meant his pronouncements were received 
with scepticism.118 In the light of such contradictory predictions it is not 
surprising that Wilson concluded this section with the assessment that 
‘until the Americans can be got over in sufficient force we cannot hope to 
beat the enemy by force of numbers’.119 The manpower challenge 
continued to dominate British strategy for the rest of the war. 
 
SUPERIOR DIRECTION 
Having undermined the optimistic predictions of Haig and Robertson, 
Wilson’s argument moved to its denouement. In his report Haig had taken 
a dim view of inter-Allied control of war strategy. In a reference to the 
failed Nivelle Offensive of April 1917, when he and his army had been 
placed under French orders,120 he recommended that in future, Britain 
should:  
Insist on occupying the predominant positions in the Councils of the 
Allies to which our strength entitles us. More than once already we 
have subordinated our judgement to that of our allies with highly 
unsatisfactory results. We cannot afford to make such mistakes 
again, and whatever they may threaten [,] our allies cannot afford to 
quarrel with us. 121 
 
Robertson believed ‘the principle of “unity of command” and “one front” 
must be cautiously applied. In theory it is attractive, in practice it has not 
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been encouraging.’ Like Haig he reminded the War Cabinet that it was 
‘responsible for the Nivelle era and its consequences’. As far as Robertson 
was concerned, Allied co-operation had seen Britain and France obliged to 
send 150 heavy guns to Italy, and another 550 to Russia. ‘All are lost to 
us,’ he said.122 Despite these guns, diverted from Flanders, the Italians 
had cancelled a promised offensive and decided to adopt a ‘more passive 
attitude’ on their front. General Luigi Cadorna, the Italian Army’s 
commander, thought this volte-face ‘would not prejudice Allied operations 
elsewhere’.123 In the light of these developments Robertson was 
dismissive of Britain’s Allies’ willingness to fight. In his view, the French 
had also ‘failed us badly this year’ and ‘must be made to fight’. Thus: 
As far as “unity of command” is concerned, we should endeavour to 
acquire for ourselves the control of operations next year on the 
West front, as we are entitled to do by our successes this year, the 
efficiency and spirit of our Armies, and the stability of our 
Government as compared with that of practically all our European 
Allies.124 
 
As a long-term advocate of closer Allied co-operation, Wilson disagreed. 
Lloyd George had discussed the notion of a form of superior direction with 
him in August and suggested a trio of senior officers to review Robertson’s 
recommendations. Wilson had counselled against this as unfair to 
Robertson, but maintained the view that an inter-Allied body, including 
senior political representatives, was required.125 While writing his policy 
paper, Wilson met the French Minister of Propaganda, Henri Franklin-
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Bouillon, and pressed on him ‘the necessity of the Superior Organisation 
which I think essential to the prosecution of the war and he was much 
taken with it and said he would discuss it with LG this afternoon.’126 The 
next day Wilson had lunch at the Ritz with Lloyd George, Franklin-
Bouillon, the French Prime Minister Paul Painlevé ‘and another minister 
(with a snub nose).’ The French delegation was in London to urge Britain 
to take over more French line, to discuss Middle East strategy, and recent 
German peace overtures.127 Wilson took the opportunity to lobby support 
for his idea: 
All were insistent on my going back to Paris [as head of liaison] but, 
as I told them, unless the Superior War Cabinet is started there is 
no place for me. At the lunch I drew a graphic for the snub-nose of 
this organisation (on the back of his menu) which he made me sign, 
and Painlevé, who was sitting on my left insisted on my drawing a 
similar graphic for him and signing it.128 
 
In his report Wilson avoided the implication that ‘superior direction’ of the 
war would inevitably mean ‘unity of command’ at the military level, offering 
assurances to the soldiers about their future status vis-a-vis such an 
organisation. There seems little doubt, however, that this was his ultimate 
expectation.129 After dining with Lloyd George and French on 17 October 
he wrote: 
It became very clear to me tonight that LG means to get Robertson 
out and means to curb the powers of the CinC in the field. This is 
what I have been advising the last 2 ½ years and this is what the 
whole of my paper is directed to. Not to getting R[obertson] put out 
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but to forming an [sic] Superior Direction over all the CGSs and 
CinCs.130 
 
In 1915 Wilson had written to Bonar Law advocating a ‘Committee of Six’, 
made up of the British and French C-in-Cs, Foreign Secretaries and War 
Secretaries, to adjudicate on joint strategic plans.131 In August 1917, while 
‘unemployed’ on half-pay, Wilson revived the idea and discussed it twice 
with the Prime Minister.132 Little wonder then that in his final report he 
advised that it was at the political-strategic interface where fundamental 
change was required. He told his War Cabinet audience that he did not 
believe the current state of affairs was the fault of the senior generals.133 
Instead, he implied, responsibility lay with them, and other Allied leaders, 
because: ‘The superior direction of this war has, in my opinion been 
gravely at fault from the very commencement – in fact, it is inside the truth 
to say that there has never been any superior direction at all.’134 At first 
reading this might have appeared a career-limiting conclusion, especially 
for a soldier so experienced in the dark arts of political intrigue. In fact, 
Wilson was in no peril. He and Lloyd George had discussed the subject 
several times; the Prime Minister was not going to be surprised by 
Wilson’s conclusions.135 Joffre, while in command of the French armies, 
had tried: ‘With poor results indeed but still he tried, to assume and 
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exercise a kind of benevolent control over all the Allies, but his position 
was not sufficiently exalted his powers were not sufficiently great to admit 
of success.’136 Since then the Allies had tried ‘many expedients but always 
with most disappointing, sometimes even with disastrous results’: 
We have had frequent meetings of Ministers, constant 
conversations between Chiefs of the Staffs, deliberations of 
Commanders-in-Chiefs, Mass [sic] meetings of all these high 
officials in London, in Paris, in Rome. We have tried the experiment 
of placing one Commander-in-Chief under the orders of another, 
and all these endeavours have failed to attain any real concerted 
and co-ordinated effort in diplomacy, in strategy, in fighting or in the 
production of war material.137 
 
For Wilson, the failure of Britain and France and more recently Italy to 
address the issue of co-ordinated control had resulted in fragmented and 
self-seeking strategies: 
Curiously enough, our constant thought of a decision in the West – 
a frame of mind amounting almost to an obsession – has led us to 
consider only that part of the Western front which is held by 
ourselves, and partly because of this and partly from other causes 
the tendency for the whole line from Nieuport to Trieste to be cut up 
into three sections – British, French, Italian – has become more and 
more accentuated.138  
 
This was noticeable in the latest status reports from Haig and Robertson 
‘although the latter very wisely remarks that “the British Army alone cannot 
with the war. Our allies must be made to fight”.’139 
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Inter-Allied co-ordination was also vital to improve war materiel production. 
Wilson asked if the Allies could increase output so that ‘we shall be able to 
overwhelm the enemy?’140 He believed they could, but on two conditions: 
(a) That there is absolute co-ordination between the four countries 
of England, France and Italy and in future America. 
(b) That the whole of our united energies are concentrated on this 
one work, and that the date of the attempt to reach a “final 
decision” is made subordinate to the completion of this great 
effort. 141 
 
In other words, in Wilson’s strategic analysis, Allied co-operation and co-
ordination was fundamental if victory was to be snatched from the jaws of 
defeat. Without decisive action, the prospects for this essential co-working 
were gloomy:  
It seems to me that there is less concerted action now in our 
strategy and in our various plans than at any time since the war 
began. I do not wish to exaggerate, but human nature being what it 
is and our Commanders-in-Chiefs and Chiefs of Staff being what 
they are – all men of strong and decided views, all men whose 
whole energies are devoted to their own fronts and their own 
national concerns – we get as a natural and inevitable result a war 
conducted not as a whole but as a war on sections of the whole.142 
 
Consequently, there was ‘a war on the British front’, one on the French 
and one on the Italian ‘and the stronger and the better the various Chiefs 
the more isolated and detached the plans’.143 
 
This was the core of Wilson’s strategic argument.  ‘All this confusion, 
overlapping and loss of collective effort’ was inevitable and ‘the better the 
sectional Commanders-in-Chiefs are, the more loyal and responsive the 
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Chiefs of the Home Staffs, the more we see the whole of the national effort 
restricted to the national fronts.’ Lack of concerted, effective, oversight 
was ‘undoubtedly prolonging the war to an unnecessary and even to a 
dangerous extent.’144 He summed up thus: ‘The net results seems to me 
to be that we take short views instead of long views, we look for decisions 
today instead of laying our plans for tomorrow and as [con]sequence we 
have constant change of plans, with growing and increasing irritation and 
inefficiency.’145 The time had come for the establishment of ‘an intelligent, 
effective and powerful superior direction’.146 This would result from the 
creation of a small ‘War Cabinet of the Allies informed and above all 
entrusted with such power that opinion on all the larger issues of the war 
will carry weight of conviction and be accepted by each of the Allies as 
final.’147 Deploying all his political subtlety, Wilson reassured the politicians 
that there was ‘no question’ of overruling national Cabinets since the 
‘Supreme War Cabinet, or Superior Direction as I have called it’ would 
represent them. He also attempted, unsuccessfully, to reassure the 
generals that there was not ‘the least danger of any interference with the 
soldiers in the field, since the Chiefs of the Staff in each country will 
remain as today’.148 This new body would look beyond the narrow confines 
of sectional fronts and treat the line of battle ‘from Nieuport to 
Mesopotamia as one line, and it would allot to each of the Allies the part 
which it would play’. According to Wilson, if such a body had been in place 
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a year or two earlier it would have arbitrated on whether the Allies should 
have sought a ‘final decision’ on the Western Front ‘or whether the time for 
such an attempt should be postponed until a favourable decision had been 
reached in some of the minor theatres, thus enabling a larger force to be 
concentrated at a later date for the death-grapple in the West’.149 
 
Wilson’s grand vision was that his ‘Superior Direction’ would define the 
‘broad line of action’ for the next one or two years and decide ‘when and 
under what conditions and in which part of the main theatre the final 
decision should be attempted and reached’.150 With this body in place the 
‘vexed question’ of taking over more line from the French could be 
addressed. Thanks to the current state of strategic decision making, 
without agreed plans for the future, this was impossible. If Wilson’s 
mechanism was adopted it would be ‘quite easy’ to solve ‘when the broad 
lines of next year’s campaign have been arranged’. It would lay out broad 
policies for a joint air campaign and adjust war material manufacture 
accordingly. In short this body would take over the ‘Superior Direction’ of 
the war ‘a thing that has not yet been done, and for the lack of which we 
have suffered so grievously in the past and without which we shall, so 
certainly, suffer even more in the future’.151 Without such a body each ally 
would continue to concentrate on ‘his own war, each thus drifting further 
and further from his neighbour, while all the time the enemy, under one 
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governing authority, will be able to concentrate and to defeat each of the 
local efforts.’ 
 
As for the naysayers: 
I may be told that, excellent as such an idea is in theory, it is wholly 
impossible in practice; that we are already overloaded with 
machinery; that if we cannot come to decisions under the present 
conditions, then we certainly cannot under any others; that there 
are no men fitted by knowledge, temperament or position to fill the 
new posts, and so on and so on. My answer would be very simple. I 
admit the difficulties but I deny the impossibilities. Further, we have 
tried every other conceivable variant and always with the same 
unsatisfactory result – in short, if we cannot make up our minds to 
catch a hold of the situation as a whole and really direct and 
command the main issue of this war, we are gambling with the 
future in a manner we have no right to do, and we are in fact 
running a very serious chance of losing the war by stalemate. 
 
We (the Allies) hold all the cards in our hands – men, munitions, 
guns, aeroplanes, food, money and the High Seas – there remains 
only the question of how to play them and when to play them, and 
my absolute conviction is that there is no other way than by the 
creation of a Superior Direction.152 
 
FRENCH’S PAPER 
Field Marshal Lord French’s paper has received limited critical attention in 
the historiography. It has been largely passed over, dismissed as partisan 
and invective-ridden and by implication of little merit. Haig described it as 
‘a poor production’ and ‘evidently the outcome of a jealous and 
disappointed mind’.153 It is true that it was more personal in tone than 
Wilson’s, and critical of both Haig and Robertson, but this does not justify 
it being overlooked. In fact, study reveals a clarity of argument which, 
while more strident in tone than the usual public discourse of senior 
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military figures of the time, in several ways echoed Wilson’s own line of 
argument. Historians have noted that French’s paper, as originally 
submitted to Hankey, required editing by the Cabinet Secretary and 
Wilson before it was considered suitable for War Cabinet consumption.154  
Until now, French’s first draft and his final submission have not been 
compared in detail. This section will attempt to fill this gap in the 
historiography. 
 
Wilson delivered the finished reports to Hankey. According to the latter’s 
diary, the papers should have gone in the first instance to Robertson as 
CIGS, a fact Hankey had failed to record in the relevant minutes. French 
objected, Lloyd George refused to rule on the matter and the documents 
went first to the Cabinet Secretary. Eventually Hankey passed them to 
Derby: 
The whole subject is so thorny and Robertson is in so prickly a 
state that I did not wish to make any mistake in procedure... The 
reports confirmed my worst anticipations. They both recommended 
a central council including a staff of generals, in Paris, to be 
independent of the national General Staffs. This, alone, is enough 
to drive Robertson into resignation. They both condemned the 
continuation of the Flanders offensive, next year, which is the 
course what Robertson and Haig recommend. In addition, Lord 
French’s report hits out hard at Robertson and Haig whose views 
were challenged in principle and in detail. 
 
Hankey then added, but perhaps understandably omitted from his 
memoirs: 
Incidentally I may remark that the whole thing is a clever plot on Ll 
G’s part. Earlier in the year at Litchfield he sounded them both and 
ascertained this was their view, no doubt playing on their ambition 
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and known jealousy and dislike of Robertson, by letting them see 
that he agreed, accompanying this no doubt with a good deal of 
suggestions. Then he lets Haig go on, and even encourages him to 
do so, knowing that the bad weather was preventing a big result, in 
order to strengthen the argument. Then he guilelessly proposes the 
War Council, knowing perfectly well that the jury is a packed one, 
which will only report in one direction. By these means he fortifies 
himself with apparently unbiased military opinion in the great 
struggle with Robertson and Haig, which he knows he cannot face 
without it.155 
 
Wilson saw Derby on 24 October: ‘He told me he had not yet shown our 
Papers (Johnnie’s and mine) to Robertson. He said Johnnie’s was too 
personal and mine too unanswerable and if they were shown to Haig and 
Robertson there would be a hell of a row which might mean resignation of 
Haig, R. and himself!’156 At this point the Prime Minister ordered French to 
tone down his paper.157  
 
His most recent biographer ascribed French’s combatative mood not only 
to his animosity towards both Robertson and Haig but also to his 
‘increasingly gloomy outlook on the war in general’.158 Unlike Wilson’s 
diplomatic approach, his report overtly echoed the criticisms the Prime 
Minister recently deployed against his C-in-C and CIGS when they met on 
October 5: 
LG said Robertson simply “thwarted” him in every scheme... I asked 
LG about a superior organisation & he said of course that was the 
best plan but the French (and Italian) governments were absolutely 
rotten – in fact there were no governments – & so it was impossible 
to get such an organisation started; & therefore he was reverting to 
his former idea of calling me in to examine Robertson’s plans. 
Johnnie fulminated against R[obertson], & LG agreed but said that 
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R had got so much of the Press (M[orning] Post, Northcliffe, Leo 
Maxse etc) & Asquith that it was a difficult question to remove 
him… Johnnie said he felt very hopeless about the whole thing, for 
although LG knew that Robertson was not big enough for the post 
yet he funked kicking him out…the fact is that LG is profoundly dis-
satisfied (as he was on Aug 23rd) but does not know what to do, or 
how to get rid of Robertson. I saw no animus against Haig.159 
 
The main thrust of Haig’s proposal, according to French, was for the War 
Cabinet to accept that Britain could be successful on the Western Front in 
1918, and that it would be so. Such a belief had obtained since 1 July 
1916 and the results were clear. Haig had assured the Cabinet, the public 
and his troops ‘that he could break the enemy’s line in such a manner as 
to pour large bodies of cavalry through the gap he had made and compel 
a great German defeat.’ Despite bringing ‘masses’ of cavalry ‘up to points 
close to the trenches, at considerable loss in men and horses, in this 
expectation’ this had not happened. Wilson struck the accusatory words 
‘at considerable loss in men and horses’ from the original draft.160 French 
admired Haig’s ‘magnificent efforts’ but ‘the results so far obtained have 
not only fallen far below expectations, amounting almost to promises, of 
the Commander-in-Chief, but have in fact brought us but little nearer to 
any effective decision.’ Haig was now asking the War Cabinet ‘to accept 
his assurance that he can overthrow the enemy in the field and compass 
the German defeat next year. But such appeals [at this point Wilson struck 
out the words “for confidence and trust in his judgement” from French’s 
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draft]161 have been made on many previous occasions, with the results to 
which I have referred.’162   
 
French was also unconvinced by Haig’s suggestion that decisive action on 
the Western Front had a positive impact in the countries of the Middle East 
where Britain’s Imperial interests lay. Inserting a self-congratulatory 
reference, he said he imagined that: 
India and the East took more interest in the capture of Baghdad 
than all the battles on the Western front after the first definite set-
back of Germany in September 1914, which was a thing they could 
understand…fighting battles on the Western front to impress the 
East, or even to impress the German people, is not a good military 
reason...163  
 
As for comparative manpower numbers, he asked ‘on what basis’ Haig 
could claim that 132 German divisions had been severely weakened by 
recent action. British units had also suffered set-backs, and had not ‘many, 
if not all, of them gone on again and succeeded?’164 French critiqued 
GHQ’s assessment of Germans losses between 1 October 1917 and the 
end of the year. These had been put at 720,000, he said, ‘surely this is too 
much to hope for!’165 Having reviewed the figures with both Macdonogh 
and Macready he did not believe Haig was justified in suggesting the Allies 
would have a numerical advantage on the Western front in 1918: ‘The 
arguments used are the same as those brought forward early in 1916, and 
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that these have not been borne out [“falsified” in the original draft] 166 by 
the actual test of battle between July 1st 1916 and October 1917.’ 
Furthermore, there was no evidence to show that the 132 German 
divisions had been ‘broken by their losses’ and the forecast for the 
enemy’s ‘wastage’ by the start of 1918 were ‘inaccurate’ and the 
conclusions arrived at ‘unwarranted’.167   
 
French considered GHQ’s assertion that during Third Ypres the Germans 
had suffered 50% more casualties than the British. Macdonogh, however, 
had told him that the Germans had not issued any casualty figures since 
July: ‘In view of the fact that we have almost invariably been attacking, I 
find it very difficult to believe that our enemy’s losses have not been 
greatly overrated.’168 French had initially written ‘greatly exaggerated’, but 
Wilson inserted a milder verb.169 He concluded that he did not believe 
Haig had ‘inflicted any greater loss upon the enemy than he has suffered 
himself’.170 His report showed that British casualties for the period 1 July 
1916 to 9 April 1917 were ‘nearly’ 53,103 per month; casualties in the 
succeeding period [the period which included the Battles of Arras and the 
ongoing Third Ypres] were ‘nearly’ 83,318 per month. These figures were 
‘certainly a surprise to me in view of frequent reports that our casualties 
during 1917 were “increasingly light”’. 171 Since the start of the Somme 
battle Haig’s armies had incurred more than one million casualties and 
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recovered 200 square miles of French and Belgian territory, out of 13,500 
square miles of occupied territory facing them.172  
 
French said he entertained ‘very grave doubts as to whether we have not 
been playing the German game throughout the whole of our operations in 
the last year and a half.’ In a paragraph which must have been music to 
the ears of Lloyd George he added: 
It is quite open to question whether they have not deliberately led 
us on to the capture of ground which is, in the long run, of little 
military importance to them, and which they know they never want 
to keep, even if they could. It is by no means unlikely that their 
object throughout has been to hold on to the Western side, and to 
do so in such a manner as to invite our attack and impose 
enormous casualties upon us, with a minimum loss to 
themselves.173  
 
In sum, the amendments Wilson made to French’s critique of Haig’s work 
were significant but limited, and for the most part involved substituting 
intemperate words with more sensitive ones.  
 
French took a stronger line with Robertson’s paper, condemning it as 
‘chiefly a form of special pleading in favour of continuing the offensive in 
the West.’174 Wilson rewrote the sentence so that it described Robertson’s 
paper as one ‘devoted to advocating to a continuance of’ the Ypres 
offensive.175 French questioned the CIGS’ warning against ‘gambles’ in 
the Middle East. He opposed another offensive in the west as ‘much more 
of a “gamble” than anything we have undertaken in the war.’ This method 
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had been tried already with ‘enormous loss and produced comparatively 
little result.’176 Robertson said he had considered an offensive in the east 
for months, ultimately rejecting the idea.177 French said he believed such a 
strategy ‘offered such favourable chances and possibilities as should have 
induced the General Staff to bring it up for discussion by the War Cabinet 
at a time when it would have been possible to consider it.’178 In the draft, 
the sentence continued ‘namely, some three months ago’ again, Wilson 
crossed this out.179  
 
French took Robertson to task for his criticism of the Nivelle Offensive as 
‘somewhat severe’ and ‘misleading’. Nivelle had captured important 
military features and made ‘as long if not longer advance than we have yet 
accomplished in the Ypres area’. According to French ‘A feeling of 
resentment against our French Allies is somewhat apparent in the mind of 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,’  and ‘I cannot help regarding these 
remarks as somewhat severe.’180  Wilson’s diplomatic pen was employed 
once again to strike out French’s addition of the words ‘and without 
justification’.181 Robertson’s conviction that the Allies could ‘beat the 
Germans every time we fight them’ and inflict heavier losses was, 
according to French ‘not altogether consistent with the facts’.182 Wilson 
toned this down, replacing these words with ‘somewhat optimistic’.183 
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French believed that Haig’s confidence in himself and his troops had 
‘somewhat warped his judgement’. Moreover, the General Staff had failed 
in its primary responsibility of putting all the C-in-C’s assumptions to ‘the 
most crucial test.’ In other words, Robertson had acquiesced in the face of 
Haig’s enthusiastic self-confidence ‘without question or demur’. French 
claimed that ‘statements from the front have not been tested as to their 
accuracy’. 184 As if this slur on Robertson’s professionalism was not 
enough, French claimed that: ‘Wild statements have been allowed to pass 
unchallenged. They have apparently been blindly accepted.’ Wilson 
crossed this out.185 French concluded this section with praise for the 
‘splendid work’ of the Army but which had ‘led to no strategic result, and 
our limited resources in man-power will not allow us to reach a strategic 
end by tactical slogging alone.’186  
 
French rejected the first two of Lloyd George’s strategic options - total or 
partial concentration on the Western Front. A successful offensive capable 
of breaking down the enemy’s morale was impossible unless and until 
sufficient American forces arrived to make a significant difference, 
something he did not expect until 1919. British strength was ‘being 
gradually sapped by the enemy in indecisive attacks which attain 
inadequate results and entail undue loss’.187  As for option four, an 
offensive in the Middle East, French took a similar view to Wilson. He liked 
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the idea in principle, but the window of opportunity had closed.188 As a 
result, only option 3 was appropriate, the ‘Pétain policy’ of standing on the 
defensive until the Allies could recover and align themselves with a 
sufficiently large American force.  This would mean the BEF would have to 
take over more French line, but he expected a compromise could be 
agreed. French backed Wilson’s recommendation for a ‘Superior War 
Council’ to ‘appreciate the general situation and to formulate plans’.189  
 
CONCLUSION 
In the autumn of 1917 Wilson finally found himself in a position where 
politicians, led by the Prime Minister, wanted to hear his views. This was a 
novel situation; for most of the war his interaction with his political friends 
can be summed up as much talk, full of fury, but signifying very little. Lloyd 
George needed a senior soldier prepared to look critically at how Britain’s 
military leadership was fighting the war. Wilson was under-employed, in 
London and desperate to play his part. Haig and Robertson, the leading 
advocates of British policy on the Western Front appeared devoid of ideas 
and for 1918 had little to offer strategically than more of the same. Wilson 
was in the right place at the right time, but he was no dupe. His seminal 
document offered the politicians an opportunity to regain control of military 
strategy, and an overarching inter-Allied body tasked with making key 
decisions had been a Wilson ambition for at least two years. The result, as 
the next chapter will discuss, was the creation of the SWC at Versailles. 
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For both Lloyd George and Wilson its establishment was not the end of 
the process for revising Allied military strategy, but the beginning.  
 
 124 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL 
The SWC, the direct result of Wilson’s strategy paper discussed in the 
previous chapter, was officially constituted at a meeting of Allied leaders in 
Rapallo, Italy, on 7 November 1917. Wilson was appointed as Britain’s 
Permanent Military Representative (PMR) to work with his Allied opposite 
numbers in what was effectively an inter-Allied general staff. Lloyd 
George, having successfully sought military advice from outside the War 
Office, was determined to formalise the principle. He and Wilson had 
secured French support for some form of superior direction of war 
strategy, a long-held priority for the latter. As this chapter shows, Wilson 
and his Prime Minister did not have things all their own way. Robertson 
and the War Office machine conducted a ‘rearguard action’ to stymie the 
influence of the PMRs, and by extension the Council itself. The 
historiography agrees that Lloyd George’s main purpose in establishing 
the SWC was to weaken the stranglehold he felt his generals, specifically 
Robertson and Haig, held over British war strategy by ultimately removing 
either man, or both.1 Robertson took a sinister view of the Prime Minister’s 
motives. Referring to the recent overthrow of the moderate ‘Provisional’ 
government in Russia by revolutionary Bolsheviks, he condemned 
Wilson’s secretariat at Versailles as ‘the new Soviet’.2  Hankey’s 
biographer took a different view. While there was ‘an element of truth’ in 
                                            
1 See, for example, Woodward, Lloyd George, p. 221; idem, Robertson, p. 191; French, 
Strategy, p. 164. 
2 LHCMA, Robertson papers, Robertson to Haig, (7/7/66), 15 November 1917; Orlando 
Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution (London: Bodley Head, 2017 [1996]), 
pp. 191, 484-6. 
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Robertson’s fears ‘it is equally certain that it was not the Prime Minister’s 
only, or indeed his main purpose – which was, quite simply, to establish a 
centralised and coordinated system of strategic direction.’3 While this is an 
overly-generous interpretation of Lloyd George’s motives, this chapter 
argues that it could fairly be applied to those of Wilson. His diary entries 
for 1917 contain references to his belief in the need for a move from 
independent national commands towards a more coordinated and co-
operative Allied strategy; one the British might shape and eventually 
dominate. While the downfall of Haig and Robertson might have been 
Lloyd George’s ultimate aim, there is no evidence in Wilson’s diary for this 
year, nor in his correspondence, of a desire to see Haig removed. In fact, 
Wilson supported Haig’s retention as C-in-C, only reluctantly concluding 
that he be replaced in mid-1918.4 As for Robertson, Wilson was critical of 
his strategic judgement and appears to have concluded that, as his 
authority as PMR grew, Wully’s would decline. At that point, professional 
criticism evolved into personal animosity, but Wilson’s priority remained 
that of establishing ‘superior control’ of war policy. 
 
Wilson attempted to formalise this ‘superior control’ by using the SWC to 
take hold of the strategic debate. Despite initial setbacks, in three months 
Wilson and his colleagues produced 14 ‘Joint Notes’, or position papers, 
covering a range of strategic issues with several more soon after.5 While 
some of the more contentious of these documents have received attention 
                                            
3 Roskill, Hankey, p. 454. 
4  See p. 245. 
5 Wilson started work at Versailles on 19 November 1917 and became CIGS on 18 
February 1918; Wilson diary, November 1917-February 1918. 
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in the historiography, the range of the subjects deserves further study, 
illustrating as they do Wilson’s breadth of view.6 In addition, the SWC 
secretariat during Wilson’s tenure and its aftermath, produced a range of 
other policy documents which illuminate key aspects of British strategic 
thinking. Greenhalgh dismissed the Council as ‘nothing more than a 
sounding board or talking shop’.7 This study favours Jeffery’s description 
of the creation of the SWC as ‘an extremely important advance in the co-
ordination of Allied policy- and decision-making’.8 The Joint Notes (JNs) 
embodied Wilson’s long-held strategic views, many of which received their 
first official scrutiny in his paper of 20 October 1917.9 JNs 1 and 12 built 
on this and ended Haig’s hopes for another offensive in Flanders in 1918.  
 
CREATION OF THE SWC 
The day after Wilson drew his outline for an inter-Allied council on the 
back of a Ritz Hotel menu card, his admiring Gallic audience of the French 
Premier Painlevé, Propaganda Minister Franklin-Bouillon and Foch, visited 
Lloyd George. He floated the notion of supplementing meetings of heads 
of Allied governments by ‘the establishment of a Permanent Staff of 
military officers who would study the war as a whole and give the several 
governments their views as to the strategy which should be adopted’. The 
‘defect of the system hitherto pursued had been that each General was 
interested mainly in his own front’. As a result, when C-in-Cs met they ‘did 
not draw up a plan in which the war was treated as a whole but they each 
                                            
6 See esp. Jeffery, Wilson, pp. 211-113, and French, Strategy, pp.  189-90. 
7 Elizabeth Greenhalgh, Victory Through Coalition, p. 174. 
8 Jeffery, Wilson, p. 216. 
9 CAB 27/8, WP 61. 
 127 
approved each other’s plans…This, however, was not a real co-operation 
such as was needed to ensure victory.’10 Hankey was ‘horrified’ by Lloyd 
George’s suggestion, ‘I had no time to warn the PM that in Robertson’s 
bruised and suspicious frame of mind’ he would see the move as a 
proposal to ‘upset his authority and may resign. When I warned him of this 
afterwards he was astounded, and hardly credited it! Why is he so blind, 
sometimes?’11 Whether Lloyd George was blind or not, Franklin-Bouillon 
welcomed the suggestion and thought ‘the Staff ought to be constituted 
this very week’.12 The Prime Minister had obtained the French support he 
needed, a week before Wilson and French submitted their policy papers. 
One of the unresolved questions was for the BEF to take over 100 
kilometres of front from the French. Thus, Wilson and Lloyd George 
secured French support for the SWC by making an extension dependent 
on an assessment by the body they were proposing to establish. For the 
present Lloyd George stressed the negative impact an extension would 
have on British effectiveness and morale, and suggested Haig and Pétain 
conferred on options.13 
 
Wilson had been busy promoting his ‘big idea’ amongst his friends and 
supporters. Before submitting his policy paper, he had tried to convince his 
ally Lord Milner that his proposed inter-Allied staff was the mechanism for 
curbing the obsession the politicians felt some generals had for large-
                                            
10 TNA, CAB 28/2, War Cabinet, IC (Allied Conferences), Volume II, IC 28, ‘Secretary’s 
notes of a conversation at Chequers Court,’ 14 October 1917. 
11 CAC, Hankey diary, HNKY 1/3, 14 October 1917. 
12 TNA, CAB 28/2, IC 28, 14 October 1917. 
13 Ibid. 
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scale and costly offensives in the west.14 Milner ‘seemed as determined as 
LG to stop any more of these attempts at final decisions by Haig and he 
was just as dissatisfied with Robertson, and he is no longer afraid that if 
Robertson resigned the Government would fall. He was all for “the fellow 
going and be hanged to him”.’15 The two met again the next day once 
Milner had read both papers: 
“At last” he said “the tyranny is over” and he was looking forward to 
the end of the “reign of terror”! It seems to me there will be a holy 
row over all this, and of course the frock coats will quote Johnnie 
and me against Haig and Robertson. We must avoid this as much 
as possible. It is the system and machinery I am aiming at and not 
the man.16 
 
With the benefit of hindsight vis-a-vis Robertson this seems a particularly 
disingenuous remark, but Wilson’s diary for the period, while critical of his 
military policy displays little outright personal animus towards the CIGS. 
That changed once it became clear Robertson and his supporters would 
not easily accept the new policy machinery. On 23 October, the diehard 
Tory Morning Post carried a leader ‘about Cabinet interfering with Haig 
and Robertson’. Wilson, suspecting Robertson, told the editor H.A. 
Gwynne that: 
I thought he was barking up the wrong tree, that LG had - so far not 
interfered with Robertson - that, in my opinion the machinery was at 
fault and until we got a superior body we should never have unified 
action, and so on. … We will see in the next few days whether I 
made any impression.17 
 
                                            
14 A.M. Gollin, Proconsul in Politics: A study of Lord Milner in Opposition and in Power 
(New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 454-5. 
15 Wilson diary,18 October 1917. 
16 Ibid., 19 October 1917. 
17 Ibid., 23 October 1917. 
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A few days later Wilson saw Milner again. He was ‘in one of his 
pessimistic moods…He saw insurmountable difficulties to my proposal for 
a Superior Direction! He said that I was the only possible soldier to put 
there but great difficulties in that!...Milner did not know what LG proposed 
to do [regarding Wilson’s future strategy paper].’18 Milner was not only 
pessimistic about Wilson’s prospects. Two days earlier Austro-German 
forces began a major offensive in Italy, the Battle of Caporetto, ‘the most 
disastrous reverse suffered by Italy in the First World War’.19 Robertson 
and then Wilson were shuttled off to Italy to assess the damage and 
advise on an Allied response. The set-back strengthened Wilson’s hand in 
his argument for coordinated strategic planning. On 27 October, he 
recorded that the French had decided to send four divisions to Italy, the 
British would play second-fiddle by sending only two: ‘So again we are 
governed by Haig and R[obertson]. If anything was needed to prove the 
necessity of my “Superior Direction” we have it here.’20  
 
On 30 October Lloyd George warned the Cabinet that Painlevé was again 
demanding the British to take over more line. Before a decision could be 
taken, he wanted a review of options for 1918. Lloyd George felt ‘we were 
being out-manoeuvred and beaten by an enemy who was inferior in 
material and personnel…every year the enemy succeeded in ending up 
[sic] his campaign with a great success.’21 The setbacks in Italy were ‘due 
                                            
18 Wilson diary, 26 October 1917. 
19 George H. Cassar, The Forgotten Front: The British Campaign in Italy, 1917-1918 
(London: Hambledon Press, 1998), p. 65. 
20 Wilson diary, 27 October 1917. 
21 TNA, CAB 23/13/27, War Cabinet, 30 October 1917, (draft), p1. 
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to the fact that the [strategic] situation was never considered as a whole. 
The Conferences we had with our Allies, which had lately increased in 
number, were not really Conferences. They were only meetings of people 
with preconceived ideas who desired to find a formula which would 
reconcile them.’ He therefore felt that Wilson’s advice for an ‘Inter-Allied 
Staff’ was ‘sound’. Its functions would not be to give orders:  
No government could concede the right to issue orders, but their 
duties would be to examine the military situation of the Allies…No 
one was thinking out the whole plan as though he were responsible 
for the whole battle-front of the Allies. In order to achieve success 
the War ought to be conducted as though there were one man 
sitting in the centre with equal responsibility for all fronts.22  
 
Lloyd George outlined the structure and function of what was soon to 
become the permanent military staff of the SWC, and that of the Council 
itself. What was needed was ‘for the first time, a real Inter-Allied General 
Staff, to examine the situation as a whole and to advise, without divesting 
the Government or General Staffs of their responsibility.’ Stressing the 
body’s advisory status, he said it would receive plans from the Allied 
commands and then ‘suggest’ what action should be taken.  
It was essential that this Inter-Allied General Staff should be an 
entirely independent body, not consisting of representatives of the 
National General Staffs, as in that case each representative would 
simply fight for the views of his own General Staff.23 
 
The Cabinet debate centred on the role and powers of the permanent 
‘Inter-Allied General Staff’ which ‘would make a continuous study of the 
Allied War plans, just as the General Staff of the War Office made a 
                                            
22 TNA, CAB 23/13/27, War Cabinet, 30 October 1917, (draft), p2. 
23 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
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continuous study of our own military plans.’ The draft minutes recorded ‘It 
was pointed out that this was a change which might, to some extent, 
diminish the authority of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but it was 
suggested that in practice it would not do so very materially.’ This 
sentence was later crossed out by Hankey along with a subsequent one 
concerning the sensitivities of Robertson and his War Office colleagues:  
Some doubts were expressed as to whether the scheme could be 
carried out without friction with the present Military Advisers of the 
Government, and as to whether in practical working this scheme 
would not involve great friction, and as to whether the new 
machinery would, in fact, cure the evils mentioned by the Prime 
Minister.24 
 
A key question for the new body would be ‘the nature of the offensives for 
next year, and whether the main effort of the Allies was to be made in 
1918 or 1919.’25 It was agreed that the Prime Minister would write to his 
French counterpart proposing the establishment of the SWC. Such a body 
was essential because after three years of war ‘the German Government 
is still militarily triumphant.’ Furthermore: 
As compared with the enemy the fundamental weakness of the 
Allies is that the direction of their military operations lacks real 
unity…There has never been an Allied body which had the 
knowledge of the resources of all the Allies, which could prepare a 
single co-ordinated plan for utilising those resources in the most 
decisive manner taking into account the political, and diplomatic, as 
well as the military weaknesses of the Central Powers.  
 
As for taking over more French line, there was no point in discussing this 
until the campaign for 1918 was agreed and this was ‘exactly the sort of 
                                            
24 TNA, CAB 23/13/27, War Cabinet, 30 October 1917, (draft), original deletion as 
indicated, pp. 4-5. 
25 Ibid., p. 5. 
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question which would be referred to the Allied Council’. 26 Wilson saw 
Amery and ‘pushed into him the absolute necessity of a Superior Direction 
which if properly handled would give us a dominating influence in all plans. 
He came to see me before dinner to tell me he had seen Milner and he 
thought Milner was now convinced of the necessity.’ That evening he 
recruited Winston Churchill, then Minister of Munitions, to his cause: 
Had a long chat with Winston. He is enthusiastically in favour of my 
paper and has written a whole paper – which he sent me – on the 
par[agraph] in my paper where I urge the enormous increase in 
materiel – guns, aeroplanes, tanks, railways etc.  … Winston is 
quite clear that we must have a Superior Direction. He tells me that 
LG thinks this also but is afraid to take the plunge because of the 
opposition of Haig, Robertson and Asquith. I told Winston that I did 
not for a moment think that Squiff would take up the challenge for 
one moment if LG put his case properly, for neither Haig nor 
Robertson would have a leg to stand on. …I quoted also my 
example of the different strategies – ours and the Boches 
1. We take Bullecourt, they take Roumania 
2. We take Messines, they take Russia 
3. We don’t take Pachendaal [sic], they take Italy27 
 
This was one of Wilson’s favourite lines of argument, the one which had, 
he told Esher, persuaded Lloyd George to back his new scheme.28 Lloyd 
George and Painlevé agreed to set up the SWC, with the issue of the BEF 
taking over more line to await advice from the PMRs.29 The War Cabinet 
agreed a constitution for the SWC and the terms under which Britain’s 
PMR would work. It is hard to disagree with Woodward’s conclusion that 
the Prime Minister had ‘cleverly’ manoeuvred Major-General Sir Frederick 
Maurice, Robertson’s DMO, into this invidious task while Wully was visiting 
                                            
26 TNA, CAB 23/13/27, Appendix to War Cabinet minutes, 30 October 1917, (draft), 
‘Letter from Lloyd George to M Painlevé’.  
27 Wilson diary, 30 October 1917. 
28 CAC, Esher journal, (ESHR 2/20), 4 November 1917. 
29 TNA, CAB 23/13/28, War Cabinet, 31 October 1917. 
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the Italian front.30 Article 4 of the draft said the PMRs would receive 
proposals for future plans from their general staffs and ‘in consultation’ 
would then produce a ‘coordinated statement of those plans together with 
proposals for the combined action of the Allies.’ The next sentence 
confirmed Wilson’s future as a driving force in British strategic planning: 
‘Should the plans received from the Chiefs of General Staffs not be, in the 
opinion of the military representatives, the best for ensuring such 
combined action it will be within their functions to suggest other 
proposals.’31 In an illustration of how closely the two were working together 
Lloyd George had shown Wilson the draft the night before: 
He [the PMR] is not to be on the council because Robertson is not 
on the War Cabinet. All plans to be submitted to him by CIGS, and 
he has the power to alter, or even to make fresh plans without 
reference to the CIGS. I asked this particularly for it was in a formal 
note in Maurice’s handwriting at the dictation of LG! The Mil[itary] 
Member can call for any and all information, and on the whole I was 
satisfied with the proposals.32 
 
When the War Cabinet met on 2 November 1917, Lieutenant-General 
Wilson was formally confirmed as the British representative on the 
‘Permanent Inter-Allied Advisory General Staff’ of the ‘Supreme Inter-
Allied Council’ (the working title of the SWC). He was to hold the 
temporary rank of General and Derby, as Secretary of State for War, was 
instructed to help Wilson set up his staff.33 The insertion of the word 
‘Advisory’ into the title of this new ‘General Staff’ served as a fig leaf to 
Lloyd George’s assertion that the initiative did not erode the authority of 
                                            
30 Woodward, Lloyd George, p. 213. 
31 TNA, CAB 23/4/36, War Cabinet, minutes and Appendix III, 1 November 1917. 
32 Wilson diary, 31 October 1917; CAC, Hankey diary, HNKY 1/3, 31 October, 1 
November 1917. 
33 TNA, CAB 23/4/37, War Cabinet, 2 November 1917. 
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the Robertson-dominated Imperial General Staff at the War Office. At the 
previous two War Cabinet meetings, Derby had tried to stymie progress, 
firstly by asking for more time for the military leadership to consider the 
issue and then by asserting that the Maurice ‘constitution’ had been drawn 
up at short notice and that ‘in the circumstances it would not represent 
considered military opinion. It was for discussion only.’34 Derby eventually 
bowed to the inevitable and ‘expressed his approval’ of Wilson’s 
appointment.35 Wilson recorded in his diary: ‘I went then to see Derby who 
is in the devil of a funk of what Robertson will say, and he (Derby) thinks 
he may have to resign.’36 
  
Wilson pressed home his belief that current strategy, comprising large-
scale offensives on the Western Front, carried out by national armies with 
minimal Allied co-operation, would not bring victory. After seeing Derby, he 
met Haig’s Chief of Staff Kiggell: ‘He pleaded that in another 8 days 
D[ouglas] H[aig] could take enough of the Paschendaal Ridge to make 
himself secure for the winter and that this operation ought not to be 
stopped.’ Kiggell, enunciating GHQ’s anxiety over manpower and in an 
oblique reference to the upcoming Battle of Cambrai, confided that Haig:  
…had another secret operation in view which promised most 
satisfactory results provided no more troops were sent to Italy. Kigg 
said the Boches had skinned the whole front in a manner they had 
never done before and that therefore this was a great chance. I 
could not help saying that if this was so ie the skinning, then all our 
attacks had had a very disappointing result as they had not saved 
Russia nor Italy nor prevented the Boches weakening the front in 
face of us! Kigg found this difficult to answer.37 
                                            
34 TNA, CAB, 23/13/27 and 23/13/28, War Cabinet, 30 October and 31 October 1917. 
35 TNA, CAB 23/4/37, War Cabinet, 2 November 1917. 
36 Wilson diary, 2 November 1917. 
37 Ibid. 
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In the historiography, Robertson at this stage in the war is painted as a 
hapless, even helpless, victim of the cunning and mendacious Lloyd 
George, ably assisted by the wily Wilson. According to Woodward: ‘Lloyd 
George marched under the banner of unity of command, but his primary 
objective was to diminish Robertson’s influence over future British 
strategy.’38 While this is clearly the case, the CIGS, with some support 
from Haig, fought a rearguard action aimed if not at derailing the SWC, 
certainly limiting the powers of the PMRs. Robertson received the terms of 
reference for the new organisation while touring the Italian front.39 He 
asked Haig what he thought of ‘the new Allied Council System & of our 
representative. It has all happened in my absence, & I think Derby has let 
the Army down badly, as I shall tell him.’40 Lloyd George asked Haig for 
his views of the SWC:  
I told him that the proposal had been considered for three years 
and each time had been rejected as unworkable. I gave several 
reasons why I thought it could not work, and that it would add to our 
difficulties having such a body. The PM then said that the two 
Governments had decided to form it; so I said, there is no need to 
say any more then!41  
 
Haig’s willingness to accept the rulings of his political masters, regardless 
of his personal views, was one reason why he prospered both before and 
during the war, especially at times when his position was under critical 
scrutiny. By contrast Robertson was unwilling to stay silent; he thought the 
                                            
38 Woodward, MCWR, p. 245. 
39 LHCMA, Robertson Papers, ‘Foreign Office telegrams to Robertson’, (4/8/2-3), 
November 1917. 
40 Haig to Robertson, 4 November 1917, in MCWR, p. 251. 
41 NLS, Haig papers, Haig (manuscript) diary, Acc.3155/97, 4 November 1917. 
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government was wrong and that its actions would lead to confusion about 
where military authority lay, leading to defeat. When the Allied leaders met 
at Rapallo, Robertson submitted an amended version of Lloyd George’s 
scheme which Wilson had accepted on 1 November. Article 4, the crucial 
paragraph which gave Wilson and his colleagues power to over-rule the 
General Staffs, had been reworded, and toned down, by Lloyd George: 
(4) The general war plans drawn up by the competent Military 
Authorities of the Allied countries are submitted to the Supreme 
War Council which, under the high authority of the Governments, 
ensures their concordance. If the plans submitted to the Supreme 
War Council do not appear to them to be the best for ensuring 
combined action, it will be within their functions to recommend other 
proposals.42 
 
Although the wording was more diplomatic than in Maurice’s original, 
Robertson was not mollified. He submitted an alternative, striking out the 
second sentence and replacing it with: ‘…and submits if needed any 
necessary changes.’43 This minor alteration made little difference to the 
overall tenor of the clause, and the Prime Minister accepted it.44 
Henceforth the plans of the General Staffs would have to be submitted to 
the SWC (and thus its PMRs) for approval and/or amendment. Robertson 
‘persisted in his opposition to the last’, Hankey wrote in his memoirs. 
‘During the meeting at which the scheme was being examined in detail he 
got up rather ostentatiously and walked out of the room, stopping on the 
way out in order to ask me to record the fact that he had withdrawn, a 
                                            
42 LHCMA, Robertson Papers, ‘Scheme of Organisation of an Inter-Allied War Committee 
(Amended draft proposed by Mr. Lloyd George),’ (4/8/5), 4 November 1917. 
43 TNA, CAB 21/91, War Cabinet, Formation of Supreme War Council, ‘Scheme of 
Organisation of an Inter-Allied War Committee (Amended draft proposed by Mr Lloyd 
George, and amended by R 42, from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,’) 7 
November 1917. 
44 Ibid. 
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request with which I complied.’45 Hankey’s biographer believed that: ‘After 
such a display of intransigence, not to say public bad manners, it is 
surprising that Lloyd George did not dismiss Robertson on the spot.’46 
While Hankey thought the incident so worthy of note that he included it in 
his memoirs four decades later, he made no note of it in his diary at the 
time. Most relevantly for this study, Wilson himself, although present for 
the whole meeting, made no reference to it in his own diary. The omission 
is hard to understand if, as some sources have suggested, Wilson and 
Robertson were so at odds personally. A likely explanation is that Hankey, 
never a fan of Robertson, simply repeated a similar story included in Lloyd 
George’s unreliable war memoirs.47  Whatever the facts of the incident, 
Wilson was more concerned with the new body’s structures and 
procedures than personal arguments with the notoriously prickly 
Robertson. These would come later. 
 
The French favoured Paris as home for the nascent SWC, but Wilson was 
‘entirely opposed’ because it was too big to allow the staffs to confer 
easily.48 ‘We had a conference from 10am to 1.30 trying to draft a paper 
bringing the Supreme Council into being …Another meeting at 5’o’[clock] 
when the Supreme Council sat for the first time and gave Foch and me our 
orders. It was also decided to have our HQ at Versailles.’49  The orders 
                                            
45 Hankey, Supreme Command, (vol. II), p. 721; TNA, CAB 28/2, War Cabinet, IC (Allied 
Conferences), Volume II, IC 30c, ‘Procès-verbal of a Conference of the British, French 
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46 Roskill, Hankey, p. 454. 
47 Lloyd George, Memoirs, (vol. II), pp. 1440-1. 
48 TNA, CAB 28/2, War Cabinet, IC (Allied Conferences), Volume II, IC 30c and 30d, 
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were for the two generals to set off immediately to the Italian Front to 
‘advise as to the amount and nature of the assistance to be given by the 
British and French governments, and as to the manner in which it should 
be applied’.50 
 
ROBERTSON’S REARGUARD 
While Wilson was away, Robertson and the Army Council got to work 
undermining the SWC, or more specifically its Staff. Robertson was aware 
of Lloyd George’s antipathy towards him and his strategic priorities. Put 
starkly, the Prime Minister’s ‘primary motive was to wrest strategic control 
of the war from Robertson’.51 When he accepted the post of CIGS at the 
end of 1915 Robertson had insisted that he should give advice to the 
government directly, not via the then Secretary of State for War, the 
beleaguered Kitchener. ‘Our Bargain’, as Wully called it, bestowed powers 
on Robertson as CIGS which were ‘unprecedented in British history’.52 
Lloyd George resented the arrangement when he succeeded Kitchener in 
mid-1916, and the issue lay at the heart of the tension between the two 
when he became Prime Minister.53  Therefore, Robertson’s principal, and 
understandable, argument against the role of the PMR was the risk that 
politicians would receive mixed and potentially contradictory advice; 
Robertson’s opinion and Wilson’s opinion. In this spirit Major-General Sir 
                                            
50 TNA, CAB 21/91, War Cabinet, Formation of Supreme War Council, ’Draft terms of 
reference to the Allied Military Council’, 7 November 1917. 
51 Woodward, MCWR, p. 245.  
52 Woodward, Robertson, p. 25. 
53 LHCMA, Robertson papers, memorandum from Robertson to Kitchener (4/3/27), 5 
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Marshal, pp. 239-243. 
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Thomas Furse, Master General of Ordnance (MGO), submitted a 
memorandum to the Army Council condemning the proposals as 
‘unpractical and dangerous to the best interests of the Allies’.54 For the 
government to receive the best advice the General Staff needed to be in 
close, detailed and ‘hourly’ contact with the numerous ministries of 
government, and military departments. To suppose that the PMR could do 
so from Versailles was ‘chimerical’ and ‘the inevitable result of the scheme 
will be that the Prime Minister of this country will have two official military 
advisers belonging to our army, the Army Council in the person of the 
CIGS and our Permanent Military Representative on the Supreme War 
Council’. Friction between the two would ‘inevitably be mirrored in the 
relations between their respective staffs and will spread throughout the 
Army’. He concluded:  
It is in a crisis such as this that the Army looks to us, the Members 
of the Army Council, to watch over their interest and the interests of 
the country and we shall fail in our duty to the army and the country 
if we do not protest immediately and persistently against the 
formation of a Supreme War Council on the lines agreed upon at 
Rapallo.55 
 
The Army Council informed the War Cabinet it ‘presumed that the 
technical advice given by the British Military Representative will be given 
on behalf of the Army Council, and that he will be subject to the authority 
of, and receive his instructions from, the Army Council’.56 The following 
day Macready, the AG, weighed in, informing Derby that the details as to 
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Wilson’s powers and responsibilities were so slight that ‘I can only draw 
upon my imagination to visualise that officer’s functions’.57 Condemning 
the proposals as ‘nebulous’ and ‘half-baked’ Macready reminded Derby 
that as a soldier Wilson must be appointed by the Army Council and 
receive orders from a branch of his department: ‘In the event of the 
technical advice given by him to the Supreme War Council being at 
variance with the expressed views of the Army Council, it is legally in their 
power, so long as he is a soldier, to remove him from his post.’ Macready, 
so recently a supporter of Wilson, insisted that his understanding of the 
new system was that the PMR would only act in an advisory capacity 
providing information supplied by the Army Council. If the Representative 
was to have greater powers then he concluded that the CIGS should have 
the role and ‘in the event of him exceeding his powers there could be no 
question as to how to deal with the situation.’58  
 
Derby asked Robertson for his opinion. The CIGS said he was in general 
agreement with the MGO but that instead of an Inter-Allied Staff, ‘a 
misnomer without an Inter-Allied C-in-C’, he would establish a Military 
Secretariat for the SWC. This would co-ordinate information from the 
various Allied forces, point up contradictions and lack of co-ordination, and 
prepare agenda: 
Beyond this all military advice to the Supreme Council should 
remain in the hands of the responsible military advisers of the 
respective Governments. Dual advice can only lead to delay, 
                                            
57 LHCMA, Robertson papers, Adjutant General to Secretary of State, (4/8/10), 13 
November 1917. 
58 Ibid. 
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friction, weakening of responsibility and lack of confidence amongst 
the troops.59 
 
The War Cabinet had no immediate answer and deputed members Smuts 
and Carson to seek advice from the Attorney and Solicitor Generals.60 
Their reply recognised the Army Council as the ‘Supreme Military 
Authority’, and that as Wilson was a British Army officer he was subject to 
their authority. The draft continued ‘…the Army Council are entitled to 
issue instructions to him, in connection with his work on the Supreme War 
Council, so far as the military forces of the Crown are affected’.61 This 
latter sentence was crossed out by Hankey, who thought the Army 
Council’s paper ‘absurd’, and was omitted from the final version.62 This 
recognised the Army Council’s legal authority over Wilson but pointed out 
that the new procedures had been drawn up: 
…to meet the requirements of an exceptionally grave situation. 
They [the War Cabinet] realise that the success of the new scheme, 
will depend largely upon the cordial co-operation and goodwill of 
the Army Council, on which they count. 
The War Cabinet desire to express their wish that, in developing the 
work of the Supreme War Council, it should be understood that the 
British Permanent Military Representative will have unfettered 
discretion as to the advice he offers.63 
 
Lloyd George had acknowledged the Army Council’s authority but 
appealed to their sense of duty, insisting on Wilson’s independence. The 
Army Council were not to be bought off by smooth diplomatic language 
                                            
59 LHCMA, Robertson Papers, Robertson to Secretary of State for War, (4/8/11), 15 
November 1917. 
60 TNA, CAB 21/91, War Cabinet, Formation of Supreme War Council, ‘Minutes of the 
War Cabinet’, 14 November 1917. 
61 TNA, CAB 21/91, War Cabinet, Formation of Supreme War Council, ‘Relations 
between Army Council and British Military Representative: Draft reply to the Army 
Council,’ 15 November 1917. 
62 CAC, Hankey diary, 14 November 1917. 
63 TNA, CAB 23/4/50, War Cabinet, 16 November 1917. 
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and responded that they felt it ‘their duty to point out the great danger that 
may arise from the powers proposed’ for the PMR. It would create ‘duality 
of military counsel’ leading to delay which could ‘imperil the successful 
prosecution of military operations’. The best way of minimising such 
dangers would be for the CIGS to attend SWC meetings. It was essential 
that Wilson should not tender any advice to the Council ‘without first 
informing the Army Council of the nature of that advice.’64 In response, 
Hankey prepared a eulogistic note for Lloyd George, making a virtue of 
Wilson’s Francophilia, which stated it would be difficult to find any officer 
‘more peculiarly suited’ to the new role than Wilson: ‘Very few British 
Officers of any rank have the same intimate knowledge of any sympathy 
with the French Army.’65 Under pressure from both the Army Council and 
Derby, Lloyd George agreed that Robertson could attend SWC meetings, 
but sidestepped further discussion about Wilson’s obligations by saying it 
was too early to be prescriptive.66 The War Cabinet noted the Army 
Council’s ‘desire to co-operate cordially’ in the work of the SWC ‘with a 
view to better co-ordination of effort’ and felt assured the new machinery 
could be made to work ‘in spite of the difficulties referred to by the Army 
Council’.67  
 
 
 
                                            
64 LHCMA, Robertson Papers, ‘Proceedings (Draft) of the Army Council: response to War 
Cabinet’, (4/8/12), 19 November 1917. 
65 PA, Hankey to Lloyd George, Lloyd George papers, (F/23/1/27), 16 November 1917. 
66 Woodward, Lloyd George, p. 227. 
67 TNA, CAB 21/91, War Cabinet, Formation of Supreme War Council, ‘Minutes of the 
War Cabinet’, 29 November 1917. 
 143 
CREATING THE SWC 
Unlike their Allies, the British lost no time setting up their new secretariat. 
Hankey ‘determined that it must be linked up with the War Cabinet 
Secretariat’; in other words, he, and ultimately the Prime Minister, would 
control the functions of the British PMR’s office.68 On 2 November Wilson 
told Sackville-West that he would be going with him to Versailles as CoS.69 
He also wanted his Aide-de-Camp (ADC), Duncannon. As discussed 
earlier, he organised his staff ‘in the same way I did my old MO Office viz: 
one branch to be Allies and one branch to be the Enemy’.70 Hankey 
helped Wilson assemble his team while they travelled to Rapallo.71 
Hankey ensured that two of his men, Amery and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Lancelot Storr were attached to the secretariat. Both had worked under 
Hankey as Assistant Secretaries to the War Cabinet. To Wilson’s irritation, 
the War Office placed obstacles in his way. Sackville-West ‘told me of the 
way the WO is blocking things, Eddie Derby terrified, Wully sulky, Maurice 
hostile. All this will have to be straightened out.’72 Esher urged Hankey to 
send Milner to support Wilson ‘for heavens [sic] sake don’t weaken in the 
face of opposition or we are done here...Now that the PM has embarked 
upon this Allied G[eneral] S[taff] (whether wisely or not) he must go 
through with it to the bitter end with extreme boldness.’73 Matters came to 
                                            
68 Hankey, Supreme Command, (vol. II), p. 718. 
69 Wilson diary, 2 November 1917. 
70 Ibid., 3 November 1917; SWC History, pp. 13-15. 
71 CAC, Hankey diary, 5 November 1917; the diary entry for this date included a simple 
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together with ‘F[oreign] O[ffice]’ and ‘Liaisons’. 
72 Wilson diary, 19 November 1917. 
73 CAC, Esher papers, Esher to Hankey, 15 November 1917. 
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a head when, faced with further disagreements over his staff, Wilson saw 
Derby, who was: 
...terrified of Robertson. He said I could not have Tit Willow 
because “it was not considered he was any good”, and I could not 
have Duncannon because of the National Party…so I got cross and 
said “very well then LG can’t have me.” 
This startled poor Eddie and he did not know what to say and I am 
not sure that he is not more frightened of me than of Robertson.74 
 
The argument simmered: ‘I went to see Derby and of course he withdrew 
his objections to Tit Willow but he still stuck out about Duncannon! Silly 
ass.’ Bonar Law, ostensibly an ally of Wilson’s, was also against the 
appointment but Derby gave in eventually.75 The dispute over this 
seemingly minor matter, and delays in providing the wherewithal to 
establish his secretariat, caused friction between Wilson and the War 
Office. From this point on Wilson’s criticism of Robertson in his diary 
became more personal. There was further evidence of War Office 
pettiness when Derby refused to allow Amery to travel to France to an 
SWC meeting, and insisted Duncannon wear plain clothes at Versailles 
because he was a civilian. Derby, wrote Wilson, was ‘a fool’.76 By the next 
day the gloves were off: 
Long talk in the train with Milner and LG. Milner is furious with 
Derby for his stupid obstruction about my promotion [to full General] 
about Duncannon and about Amery and Milner says he won’t stand 
it. It is quite clear to me that Robertson and his gang mean to 
obstruct all they can. Well we shall have a fight.77 
 
  
                                            
74 Wilson diary, 21 November 1917; Derby relented in December. 
75 Ibid., 22, 23 and 24 November 1917. 
76 Ibid., 26 November 1917. 
77 Ibid., 27 November 1917. 
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WILSON IN ITALY 
The first formal session of the SWC instructed Wilson, and Foch to report 
on the state of the Italian Front and recommend future policy.78 They were 
given complete authority to move the six Allied divisions already in Italy, or 
on their way, to wherever they could be useful.79 Wilson left for Italy the 
next day and was back ready to start work at Versailles on 19 
November.80 The 10 days he spent as the British Army’s roving adviser on 
military policy are relevant as much for what they reveal of him as a 
diplomat as a strategist. An abiding theme of this work is that in 
comparison with his peers, Wilson stood out as a soldier able to quickly 
gain the confidence of senior officers and politicians, British and Allied. 
While in Italy, Wilson and Foch met almost daily and seemed in general 
agreement about the disposal of their relative units, and those of their 
hapless ally.81 For the most part Wilson appeared to defer to Foch, 
indisputably the more experienced field commander. Foch told Wilson and 
Robertson that he believed the defending forces ought to make a stand on 
the River Piave, the last natural barrier before Venice and the Adriatic. 
Robertson agreed but was ‘much more pessimistic’ that the river barrier 
could be held; Wilson shared the same view for the next week.82  
 
                                            
78 TNA, CAB 28/3, War Cabinet, IC (Allied Conferences), Volume III, IC 30d, ‘Procès-
verbal of a Conference of the British, French and Italian Governments, held at the “New 
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79 Ibid., Four (later increased to six) French divisions began arriving in Italy on 31 October 
with two British (later four) the following day; they were all in country by 25 November, 
J.E. Edmonds and H.R. Davies, OH: Military Operations, Italy: 1915-1919 (London: 
HMSO, 1949), p. xxvii. 
80 Wilson left the Italian front for France on 17 November 1917, Wilson diary. 
81 Ibid., 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15 November 1917. 
82 Ibid., 5 November. 
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All agreed that the key issue was that of command. Foch wanted the 
Italian commander General Luigi Cadorna replacing, as did Lloyd George 
who held the ‘overbearing’ Italian in ‘utter contempt’.83 Cadorna was 
dismissed, at Lloyd George’s insistence, at the Rapallo meeting and at 
Hankey’s suggestion nominated as the Italian representative on the SWC: 
‘I fancy that this suggestion had the double effect of tiding the Italians 
round a difficult corner and rendering Ll[oyd] G[eorge]’s scheme of a 
Supreme War Council more acceptable to them.’84 As for command of the 
British forces, Wilson’s persuasive skills were put to the test on the journey 
to Rapallo. On 3 November, Maurice wrote to Robertson: ‘Latest 
development is that Prime Minister[,] anxious to ensure British Supremacy 
in Italy[,] is going to try to persuade Haig to take supreme command there, 
and if he accepts will try to force this on French and Italians.’85 It is unclear 
where this notion originated; at the War Cabinet meeting the previous day, 
Rawlinson had been discussed as a possible candidate.86 Whatever its 
source, Maurice also mentioned the idea to Wilson as the British 
delegation set off for Rapallo: 
This of course is fantastic and I told LG so on the destroyer, and 
that the best we could do would be to get the English and French 
under one commander who ought to be an Englishman (Plumer for 
example) and who by his knowledge and character would 
practically command the broken Italians also.87  
 
                                            
83 Cassar, Forgotten Front, p. 81. 
84 CAC, Hankey diary, 7 November 1917. 
85 Woodward, MCWR, Maurice to Robertson (via Delmé-Radcliffe), 3 November 1917, p. 
250. 
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In an illustration of Wilson’s influence with the Prime Minister, his proposal 
was accepted and on 6 November Wilson ‘got Robertson to wire for 
Plumer to come down at once, and take up the command - I hope - of both 
French and English’.88 Wilson’s motivation for proposing Plumer is open to 
conjecture, but the result was that his old friend Rawly, who had spent 
most of 1917 kicking his heels, took command of Plumer’s Second Army 
in Flanders.89   While Rawlinson was delighted with the appointment,90 
Wilson’s suggestion was not welcomed by Haig, who was ordered to send 
two more of his divisions to Italy, making a total of four. ‘Was ever an Army 
commander and his staff sent off to another theatre of war in the middle of 
a battle?’, he asked. Unaware that the Plumer idea had originated with 
Wilson and not Lloyd George, he condemned politicians as ‘very ignorant 
and troublesome people!!’91 The loss of at least four divisions from his 
front to Italy caused Haig to protest to Robertson that ‘nothing should be 
done to stop our offensive next spring.’92 It was to no avail. 
 
In Italy Wilson, exhibiting his flexible belief in the notion of unity of 
command, pressed for Plumer to be given overall command of the Allies, 
but it came to nothing. He attempted to over-rule Cadorna’s orders for the 
withdrawal of the Italian First and Fourth Armies from strategically 
important high ground ‘though not attacked and no sign of the 
enemy…this seems idiotic’.93 With Cadorna relieved and his successor 
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89 CAC, Rawlinson papers, War journal, 8 November 1917. 
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General Armando Diaz not yet in place Wilson and Foch were powerless 
to intervene. The next day they met Diaz who accepted Wilson’s advice 
and countermanded Cadorna’s orders.94 A ‘long and heated discussion’ 
over placement of the French forces, which brought out the worst in the 
‘characteristically brusque and dogmatic’ Foch were only brought to an 
amicable conclusion by ‘the intervention of the charming and smooth-
talking Wilson.’95 Nonetheless, Wilson remained pessimistic about the 
prospects for holding the enemy: ‘The loss of Venice means the loss of the 
Adriatic and a serious threat therefore to Salonica and Egypt, but I am 
afraid this is coming.96 A day later, confident of his authority, and 
perceiving Diaz as a compliant ally, he wrote and asked him to prepare 
rearward lines along the River Brenta: ‘Diaz thanked me for my letter and 
would see to the rearward lines at once’.97 As Jeffery has argued: ‘Wilson 
at times operated as if he had executive command of Italian forces’. He 
often adopted a similar approach, or at least an assumption that he was 
first amongst equals, while British PMR to the SWC. 
 
WILSON AT THE SWC 
Wilson arrived in Paris on 19 November. Before he left Italy, he had told 
Foch that ‘I was anxious to get off to Versailles as soon as I could so as to 
get on with next year’s plans, and he said he was equally anxious.’ Two 
days later Foch’s CoS, General Maxime Weygand, informed Wilson that 
his government had decided that as Foch was commander of the French 
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troops in Italy he had to remain until the crisis was over.98 As soon as he 
arrived in Paris, Wilson saw Clemenceau, who had become Prime Minister 
three days earlier. ‘Clemenceau told [me] he had ordered Foch to remain 
in Italy for the present – a stupid thing to do as I told him, for the Superior 
Council has many important things to deal with at once.’99 The incident is 
an example, even allowing for a degree of hubris, of Wilson’s ready 
access and easy manner with both French politicians and soldiers, unique 
amongst senior British military officers at the time. The next day he called 
on the President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré, who was ‘most 
friendly and all in favour of the Supreme Council. I told him to recall Foch 
and he rather agreed.’100 Despite these positive remarks, the matter of 
Foch and the identity of the French PMR rumbled on until the Second 
Session of the SWC when Weygand was confirmed in the role.101 The 
effect of French prevarication was that Wilson and his team got to work 
immediately. From the date of Wilson’s return to France on 19 November 
1917, to his appointment as CIGS on 18 February 1918, the Inter-Allied 
Staff of the SWC produced 15 Joint Notes on a broad range of strategic 
and military policy issues. Nine more, set in train during Wilson’s time as 
PMR, followed over the next two months. From its inception to the 
Armistice in November 1918 the SWC staff produced 40 Joint Notes.102  
 
 
                                            
98 Wilson diary, 13, 16 and 19 November 1917. 
99 Ibid., 19 November 1917, original emphasis. 
100 Ibid., 20 November 1917. 
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THE JOINT NOTES 
This section examines the work of the SWC and its staff while Wilson was 
British PMR and argues that his strategic views dominated proceedings. 
Three of the Joint Notes produced during Wilson’s period at Versailles 
(numbers 1, 12 and 14) feature to a greater or lesser extent in key texts in 
the historiography, but the remainder have not been analysed in detail, 
with little consideration of their broader impact. This section aims to fill this 
gap. The Notes are considered thematically; as a body of work they 
covered three main policy areas: 
• Allied strategy in 1918, with specific reference to the Western Front  
• Policy in relation to theatres away from the Western Front  
• An inter-Allied approach to the tools (especially aircraft and tanks) 
and infrastructure of war, (i.e. supply, transportation and 
communications)  
 
JN12 made proposals for the 1918 Allied Campaign for the Western Front 
and beyond and JN 14 concerned the creation of an Allied General 
Reserve for the Western Front, with an Executive War Board (EWB) to 
control it. Their recommendations, and the controversies they engendered, 
led directly to departure of Robertson as CIGS with Wilson as his 
replacement. As a result, these Joint Notes are discussed in Chapter 5, 
devoted to Unity of Command.  
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WESTERN FRONT STRATEGY: JOINT NOTES 1, 2 AND 10 
 
Joint Note No. 1, ‘Military Policy’, 13 December 1917103 
This report, essentially a shopping list of subjects the SWC’s PMRs 
intended to consider, set the agenda for Allied policy priorities in 1918. Its 
main recommendations appear in the historiography but how Wilson 
worked with the inter-Allied Staff and his fellow PMRs to achieve his own 
strategic priorities merits further examination. In early December, Wilson 
complained that while he and his men were ‘busy in the office all day’ 
there was ‘no sign at all’ of the French, Italian or American staffs.104 
Wilson’s strategy paper of October had begun the process of formally 
questioning the current military orthodoxy and favoured a defensive 
posture until adequate resources were available.105 Once in a position of 
influence, if not authority, he was able to develop these themes.  
 
The context of Joint Note 1 was the imminent armistice on the Russian 
front,106 ‘the present position with regard to Man-power in the Allied 
countries, and the necessity imposed of finding men for production of 
Munitions, the replacement of tonnage, and increase of domestic food 
production’.107 At a meeting of the PMRs on 8 December Wilson: 
…passed round some notes I had made on the necessity for 
producing - as our first paper - recommendations that the whole line 
from N Sea to Adriatic and Salonica should assume the Defensive 
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and develop all means of Defence, rest troops, form Reserves, 
develop rail communications, develop material, manpower, etc, and 
I said I wanted this matter considered and a paper written as soon 
as possible.108 
 
Wilson’s staff prepared a draft and Weygand submitted a version which 
was ‘slightly different’. In an illustration of Wilson’s influence over this 
group, he and Cadorna accepted Weygand’s contribution ‘subject to any 
slight alteration General Wilson might wish to introduce later’.109 Although 
he appeared to be making progress, Wilson’s travails with the War Office 
continued. The Army Council repeated its insistence that Wilson send his 
recommendations to them first: 
Another bid by the Army Council to keep a hold of me by an order 
to submit first to them any advice I was going to give to the 
Supreme Council. I wrote at once to Hankey enclosing a copy of 
the order and pointing out that I (Wilson) did not advise the 
Supreme Council but I was only one of four and that all our advice 
was collective and therefore could not be sent to the WO of any one 
country. This is a stumper for that old fool Robertson who is not 
playing the game.110 
  
In direct defiance, Wilson, who had already told Lloyd George he would 
send his reports only to him, persuaded his fellow PMRs to agree that their 
first report should go to their respective Prime Ministers ‘and to no one 
else’.111 It recommended that ‘a definite and coordinated system of 
defence from the North Sea to the Adriatic must be adopted by the Allies.’ 
This would be achieved by a review of existing defensive arrangements 
and, in the expectation of a German offensive in 1918, the construction of 
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‘further and successive defensive lines to check an advance by the 
enemy’.112 JN1 did not rule out ‘minor forms of active defence’ necessary 
for maintaining the offensive spirit of troops: 
Furthermore the policy of a strong defensive not only does not 
preclude, but actually prepares for any offensive measures in any 
theatre of war as may be decided upon for 1918 when the present 
political situation in Russia, and the military situation in Italy are 
more clearly defined.113 
 
The PMRs recommended a defensive posture in the Balkans but 
acknowledged a major enemy attack leading to ‘a systematic and pre-
arranged retirement’ from the existing front was possible. Significantly for 
future events, Wilson and his colleagues also mooted the need for a 
‘mobile reserve’ and called for men to be rested and trained to serve in 
it.114   
 
The note raised another abiding theme of the SWC, the need for 
improvements to, and closer integration of, rail and sea communications, 
particularly in respect of the Italian front, and in the event of a German 
attack through Switzerland.115 On the same co-operative theme it 
recommended ‘co-ordinated development to the utmost’ for the 
manufacture of war materials, together with a ‘study of the possibilities of a 
coordinated Air offensive on the largest possible scale’.116 In summary, 
JN1 advocated a strategy of strong defence in the west and in the 
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Balkans, while forces were marshalled and material stockpiled for an 
offensive. Future notes addressed these issues in more detail. 
 
Joint Note No. 2, ‘Increase in the number of divisions in the Belgian 
Army’, 20 December 1917117 
The second session of the SWC met at Versailles for its first substantive 
meeting on 1 December 1917. Diminishing manpower resources had 
plagued both the British and French armies in 1917. In his opening 
address, written by Hankey,118 Clemenceau said sending troops to Italy 
was ‘a considerable drain on the strength of the Anglo-French forces on 
the Western front, and correspondingly weakens their power of offence 
and defence’.119 The war had become ‘largely one of exhaustion’. It was 
essential to make better use of the Belgian Army ‘which so far had been 
doing very little except issuing communiqués’. The Council asked the PMR 
to advise.120  
 
The issue of Belgian military strategy had been a sore point for both the 
British and French since the beginning of trench warfare. The Belgians 
never formally declared war on Germany and since the autumn of 1914 its 
six divisions had sat on the defensive behind inundated land adjacent to 
the River Yser ‘as secure as any force along the Western front, for the 
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next four years.’121 The Belgian King, Albert, who commanded his 
country’s forces, refused to participate in what he considered to be costly 
and ineffective offensives and maintained an abiding suspicion of the 
expansionist motives of Britain and France. At the end of 1914 Wilson had 
asked Tom Bridges, GHQ’s liaison officer with the Belgian Army, to 
propose that the country’s divisions be incorporated into the British forces 
in Flanders.  King Albert refused.122 Both France and Britain attempted to 
amalgamate Belgian units with their own, with similar results.123 By the 
end of 1917, at a time of acute manpower shortages, Britain and France 
were running out of patience with their ‘obstreperous ally’ and expected 
her to do more.124 
 
In fact, the Belgian General Staff had already considered reorganising its 
army, which since 1913 had comprised six divisions, each of 18 battalions 
(a total of 108 battalions), by increasing its complement of artillery. The 
PMRs decided that this would create ‘very cumbrous’ divisions.125 The 
French, who would provide the guns, produced a scheme increasing the 
six divisions to nine, each of nine battalions (a total of 81 battalions). The 
remaining 27 battalions would be used to create the newly equipped 
artillery units.126 The British Staff supported the plan, Studd noting the 
‘many disadvantages in having a Belgian division which differs so widely 
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from that of the British or French’.127 At Wilson’s insistence the Joint Note 
made clear that the provision of additional artillery ‘must be conditional on 
an increase in the offensive or defensive activity of the Belgian Army, 
according to circumstances and governed by the general plan for the 
employment of the armies of the entente’.128 The efficient working of the 
Inter-Allied staff, especially on non-contentious issues, is illustrated by the 
fact that these proposals were formally approved at the Third Session of 
the SWC at the end of January 1918, by which time they had already been 
put into effect.129 
 
Joint Note 10, ‘Extension of the British Front’, 10 January 1918130 
The length of trench held by the BEF and the French had been a bone of 
contention since the outbreak of hostilities. In the first 18 months of the 
war Britain had been the junior partner with a small but growing army.  
Following enormous losses in the first two years, the French wanted the 
British to take over more of the front from them. Britain argued, especially 
from mid-1917, that it was doing more than its share of offensive fighting. 
Further, the Flanders sector straddling the Franco-Belgian border, 
although short in comparison with the line held by the French, was 
strategically vital - and vulnerable - because of its proximity to the Channel 
Ports. Wilson’s advice to the Cabinet in October 1917 had been that no 
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decisions should be taken until Allied strategy for 1918 had been settled. 
Wilson’s prominent role in the deliberations of late 1917 and early 1918 is 
worthy of further attention, illustrating his powers of persuasion, levels of 
access and, ultimately in this case, their limits. Because the issue of 
extending the British front was entirely dependent on manpower, the 
deliberations over JN 10 are discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
STRATEGY IN OTHER THEATRES: JOINT NOTES 3,4,5, AND 6  
 
Joint Note 3, ‘Reinforcements to Italian Front’, 21 December 1917 and 
Joint Note 6, ‘The Italian Problem’, 25 December 1917131 
By the time the PMRs met, the crisis on the Italian front had been averted 
and the line stabilised. JN3 acknowledged the pressures on the Western 
front following the ‘total collapse of Russia’. There had been no new 
developments in Italy, therefore no additional reinforcements would be 
spared. The PMRs agreed that the British and French General Staffs 
should reinforce the Italians ‘at the most dangerous points’ with all the 
artillery they had in theatre.132 The related JN6 took a similar line, 
repeated the agreed Allied policy on standing on the defensive and urged 
the Italians to continue building defence in depth, especially around 
Venice. Due to man-power problems the Italians were urged ‘with all 
despatch’ to push on with the reorganisation and retraining of their army to 
facilitate the withdrawal of all or part of the Anglo-French [forces] in Italy at 
                                            
131 TNA, WO 158/57, Joint Note 3, 21 December 1917, and Joint Note 6, 25 December 
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the earliest possible date.’133 Wilson’s 11-day sojourn in Italy in November 
inevitably influenced his contribution to JN3 and 6 and, as will be shown in 
Chapter 6, his creative approach to British strategy away from France and 
Flanders ensured it retained priority at the War Office. As CIGS during the 
German Spring Offensives of 1918 he attempted to finally impose British 
control over the Italian Army in response to what he feared was an 
inevitable attack.134 
 
Joint Note 4, ‘The Balkan Problem’, 23 December 1917135 
This note represented a clear example of ‘joined-up’ Allied strategic 
thinking of a kind not seen before the SWC was created. Although the 
Third Session of the SWC on 1 February merely asked for additional 
details, thanks to the work of Wilson and his team, its findings had already 
been accepted as Allied policy on the ground. JN4 recommended the 
abandonment of the important Greek port city of Salonika (modern 
Thessaloniki) if it was attacked by overwhelming forces. This, Wilson 
successfully argued, was better than the loss of the whole of mainland 
Greece.136 Since 1916 an Allied force of French, British, Serbian, Greek, 
Italian and Russian divisions had been under the unified command of 
French General Maurice Sarrail. Clemenceau’s call at the Second Session 
of the SWC on 1 December for the PMRs’ advice on strategy resulted in 
Wilson taking the initiative. He conducted a ‘war game’ and on 10 
December produced a draft report which introduced the prospect of 
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134 Cassar, Forgotten Front, pp. 136-150. 
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withdrawal ‘in the event of a powerful attack’.137 Amery produced a 
typically detailed study.138 It calculated that following the enemy’s 
occupation of much of Romania, with its strategically valuable rail network, 
the Allies’ 23 divisions around Salonika could soon be facing 45 of the 
enemy. The mixed composition of the Allied force was exacerbated by 
internal political issues. The Serbian Army, ‘which in actual fighting value 
may be regarded as superior to any of the other Allied contingents’ had 
suffered terribly from continuous fighting and ‘not too considerate or 
sympathetic treatment’ from its officers. Large-scale desertions could not 
be ruled out, Amery warned. As for the three ‘weak’ Greek divisions 
‘though they do not want to fight at all, would probably just as soon fight 
against the Allies as for them’.139 In the event of a major offensive, the 
Allies had three options; keep control of Salonika but lose Greece, 
abandon Salonika to retain Greece, but suffer the consequences for Allied 
prestige, or defend Salonika for as long as possible while strengthening 
the defence of the Greek mainland.140 The paper favoured the third option, 
with the proviso that Salonika itself might have to be given up eventually.  
 
Wilson rehearsed the findings in Amery’s paper when he met Sarrail’s 
successor General Adolphe Guillaumat: 
I told him I thought his first duty was to make love to the Servians 
[sic] and put a Servian on his staff, that Sarrail had treated the 
Servians very badly with result that if we retired from Monastir it 
                                            
137 TNA, CAB 25/120/11, Supreme War Council: Papers and Minutes, ‘Draft by Sir Henry 
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was quite possible that the Servians would leave us. … It was quite 
clear that he had not considered the problem at all…he did not 
impress me.141  
 
The French still felt it possible to hold both Salonika and protect Greece.142 
It was hardly surprising, therefore, that they reacted badly when Wilson 
gave his recommendations about Italy and Salonika to his colleagues: 
‘This brought Weygand flying to my room to say the Italians must stand 
etc. etc. He got quite excited and said he would never agree to my notes. 
Quite amusing. …When Weygand left me he posted off to see Foch!’143 
The French ultimately accepted Wilson’s analysis. On 30 December 
Guillaumat read out his orders, signed by Clemenceau and Foch, to 
Lieutenant-General Sir George Milne, the commander of the British forces:  
In these it was laid down that the Allied Armies under his command 
would be based not only upon Salonika but upon the whole of 
Greece…in the event of a retreat, it was more important to cover 
Old Greece than to retain Salonika.144 
 
Joint Note 5, ‘The situation in Russia,’ 24 December 1917145 
When Russia signed an armistice with Germany in mid-December 1917 
the Allies had no agreed strategy. Wilson and his fellow PMRs had a blank 
canvas. His team produced several policy papers and the resulting JN5 
was their outline of the challenges facing the Allies. The War Cabinet had 
asked whether the PMRs believed anti-Bolshevik forces in Southern 
Russia, and the Romanian Army, could resist Bolshevik forces ‘assisted 
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and controlled by the Germans’.146 The Representatives restricted their 
Note to the consequences if the Bolsheviks were left unhindered: 
1. Wheat from Odessa and oil from Batoum (Batumi in modern-day 
Georgia) would be appropriated by the Central Powers, negating 
the Allied blockades of neutral Holland and Scandinavia. Germany 
could supply wheat to Switzerland, in place of supplies from the US, 
and ‘would be able to force the Swiss to concede a free passage to 
their armies’ into Italy. 
2. Even if Southern Russia was lost it was important for the Allies to 
retain key naval bases on the Black Sea, including Batoum, 
Trebizond (modern Trabzon) and Novorissisk (Novorissysk). 
3. The Allies should help Romania by establishing relationships with 
the Ukraine and ‘the Cossack countries to secure supplies’. 
 
The advisors were of the opinion that ‘all national groups who are 
determined to continue the war must be supported by all means in our 
power’. They realised such resistance could not be sustained indefinitely 
unless the Allies found alternative supply routes.147 
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COORDINATION OF THE ‘TOOLS OF WAR’: JOINT NOTES 7,8,9, AND 
13 
 
Logistics: Joint Note 8 (‘Transportation’), 8 January 1918148, and 
Joint Note 13 (‘Supply’), 25 January 1918149 
By 1917 the British Army had mastered the art of logistics, supplying the 
troops in the field with the tools they needed to fight an industrialised 
war.150 France had done the same. What the Allies had not done was 
establish mechanisms for sharing these hard-learned lessons and 
combining activities to mutual advantage. What was in place, and for the 
most part worked well, was a port and railway infrastructure which ensured 
men and supplies reached the front lines, but which for the most part 
operated independently. One of the raison d’etre of the SWC was to 
ensure better co-operation between France, Britain and Italy. The growing 
presence of an increasingly important US partner made this even more 
urgent.  
 
Transportation 
The PMRs said Inter-Allied transportation should be placed on a ‘definitely 
coordinated basis’ urgently. They recommended a ‘small strong Inter-
Allied Expert Committee’, reporting to the SWC. This would assess current 
systems, future projects and possibilities and make recommendations on 
‘their co-ordination on the most efficient lines’. The initial priorities were: 
                                            
148 TNA, WO 158/57, Joint Note 8, 8 January 1918. 
149 TNA, WO 158/57, Joint Note 13, 25 January 1918. 
150 See Ian Malcolm Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919 (Westport, 
CT. and London: Praeger 1998). 
 163 
1. Co-ordination and improvement of railways behind the British, 
French and Italian fronts ‘and the machinery necessary for their 
employment as one system. 
2. Rail and shipping facilities in Greece to serve as alternative lines of 
defence to those already in place. 
3. A railway scheme to help in the defeat of Turkey in Palestine. 
4. Identification of sites on the enemy communications system ‘where 
the maximum effect could be obtained by aeroplane attack’.151 
 
As with the other Joint Notes in this section, the common sense and non-
controversial nature of the proposal meant that the Third Session of the 
SWC approved it on 1 February 1918, a decision which ‘reflected the 
crucial importance of transportation in the way the war was fought.’152   
The Inter-Allied Transportation Council began work in late March, and, 
alongside other achievements, ‘improved the lines of communication, 
especially those with Italy, and brought about better use of various Inter-
Allied rolling stock’.153 
 
Supply 
Again, the Joint Note proposed an expert committee to co-ordinate Allied 
supply systems, identify areas of need and speed up organisational 
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structures. This expert committee met simultaneously and alongside the 
Transportation body.154  
 
Joint Notes 7 (‘Aviation’), and Joint Note 9 (‘Tanks’), 8 January 
1918155 
As with the previous two notes, Inter-Allied Expert Committees were set 
up. The priorities of the Aviation body were to establish the minimum 
requirements of the national air forces on each front, the creation of Inter-
Allied strategic air formations and their deployment, to plan ‘systematic 
and scientific obliteration of areas in enemy territory vital to his munition 
supply’, and the use of air power in the Eastern Mediterranean to disrupt 
Turkish military operations.156 Wilson had bemoaned the state of Allied 
aviation strategy in December. No country, except possibly the French, he 
said, ‘had any programme that was real’ and recommended Lord 
Rothermere, who had just taken over the new British Air Ministry, come to 
Versailles to ‘explain his views.’157 The Inter-Allied Aviation Committee met 
first on 9 May 1918 and ‘studied and unified’ the future programme of 
Inter-Allied aviation. In addition, it led to the creation of an ‘Inter-Allied 
long-distance bombing force, the British nucleus of which contributed in 
the course of its …operations to the partial and total destruction of lines of 
communication’, hampering the supply of food and munitions.158 Wilson 
promoted this body at Versailles and as CIGS. One of his deputies at the 
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SWC, Brigadier-General Frederick ‘Freddie’ Sykes became Chief of the 
Air Staff in April 1918. Wilson supported Sykes’ appointment and the two 
worked closely together for the rest of the war.159 
 
JN9, setting up the Inter-Allied Tank Committee, illustrated the absence of 
coordinated thinking on use of the new weapon. The knowledge gap was 
to be filled by a review of needs for the proper deployment of tanks on 
each front, the ‘speedy’ creation of Inter-Allied reserve formations, and 
suggestions for the immediate creation of Inter-Allied anti-tank 
measures.160 Despite the explicit call for haste, it first met on 6 May. The 
SWC history credited the initiative with improving co-operation around tank 
design, promoting best practice, and establishing an Allied school of 
instruction. It also claimed the body speeded production by hastening the 
construction of the Inter-Allied tank factory at Chateuroux. This enterprise, 
set up under an Anglo-American agreement, has been described as ‘one 
of the most far-sighted and enterprising bits of industrial co-operation in 
the whole war’.161 In fact, the project was beset with difficulties. Churchill, 
at the Ministry of Munitions, complained in August 1918 that labour 
problems meant that the factory was not finished, despite the materials 
being available for the tanks themselves. The factory was eventually 
completed and met its production targets for 1919.162 
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CONCLUSION 
Wilson’s seminal strategy paper of October 1917 led directly to the 
establishment of the SWC the following month, but there was no 
guarantee that it would serve any useful purpose. Despite recent setbacks 
on the Western Front the alliance of Haig and Robertson retained powerful 
friends in government, at Court and in the Press. Allied enthusiasm for the 
Council was lukewarm, particularly in France whose new Prime Minister 
had not been involved in its creation. Wilson and his team were 
encouraged by the Prime Minister and Milner but faced a rearguard action 
from the CIGS and the Army Council, and the Secretary of State for War. 
Wilson had a challenge if the new body was to make a difference. As the 
discussion above has shown, Wilson’s energy in galvanising an able team 
ensured British ideas dominated the work of the inter-Allied Staff and fed 
directly through to the decisions of the politicians on the War Council. 
Rather than a ‘talking shop’, as one authority has described the SWC, it 
ensured, for the first time in the war, that the Allies considered strategy 
options co-operatively and thoroughly and presented their conclusions to a 
formal gathering of statesmen. The German Spring Offensives of 1918 
superseded several of the Joint Notes produced by Wilson and his 
colleagues, perhaps explaining why the majority of them have received 
limited critical attention until now. Conversely, those concerned with future 
Allied military policy on the Western Front formalised the approach Wilson 
had outlined in October; no new offensive in Flanders in 1918 while the 
Allies regrouped and awaited the arrival of the Americans. The issue of the 
length of the British line, so long a bug-bear in Anglo-French relations, had 
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at its root the even more controversial issue of manpower resources. The 
next chapter considers Wilson’s contribution to this vexed question. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MANPOWER CRISIS 
In 1918 the British army on the Western Front was ‘able to prosecute a 
“rich man’s war”, possibly for the only time in its history.’1 This alludes to 
the successful focusing of Britain’s economic and manufacturing 
resources on the production of war materiel. For Wilson and his 
colleagues, when it came to that other fundamental resource, manpower, 
the country was in dire straits. Wilson summed up the problem: ‘It is clear 
to me that L[loyd]G[eorge] is getting into a beastly mess about manpower, 
about Ireland and about taking over the lines, and if he is not careful he 
will be swamped by this.’2 The BEF’s manpower reservoir was draining 
faster than it was being topped up. France, on its knees after three and a 
half years of war, was pushing Britain to take over miles of trench line. The 
Allies’ much-vaunted saviour, the USA, had been disappointingly slow to 
provide the troops the entente powers had been relying on to meet the 
needs of another year of war.3 As Britain’s PMR at the SWC, and from 
February 1918 as CIGS, one of Wilson’s greatest challenges was 
balancing the pressing needs of the army with the realities of coalition 
warfare, and a political establishment weary of the war and the toll it was 
taking on the population.  
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Manpower dominated British policy-making throughout the Great War. By 
mid-1917 it had taken centre stage – a position it maintained until the end 
of the conflict. For the British Army’s commanders, there were never 
enough men, particularly for the Western Front. For the politicians, the 
soldiers’ insatiable demands for troops had to be balanced against a long 
list of pressures at home, with the production of war materiel at the top. By 
autumn 1917 Wilson had a unique perspective on the challenges facing 
Britain’s political and military leadership. He had begun the year with an 
inspection tour of the Eastern Front, and come away dismayed at the state 
of the Imperial Russian Army. This was followed by his second stint as 
senior British liaison officer with the French Army, where he saw the 
morale-sapping failure of the Nivelle Offensive and its aftermath.4 In 
November he had toured the front in north-east Italy following the debacle 
of the Battle of Caporetto.5 As British PMR at Versailles, Wilson helped 
frame Anglo-French responses to the manpower challenge.  
 
Wilson had supported compulsory national service on the continental 
model for years. When his mentor Lord Roberts became president of the 
National Service League in 1905, Wilson drafted his speeches.6 In late 
1917 Wilson believed there were still men to be found if only the 
government had the will to make unpopular decisions, especially in 
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relation to Ireland. If this happened, he believed, British arms would both 
bolster French resolve and ensure Britain dominated the peace. As early 
as September 1915, he had lobbied Lord Bertie, Britain’s ambassador in 
Paris, in favour of compulsion. Robertson, then the BEF’s CoS, had told 
Bertie he was ‘doubtful if conscription was necessary or advisable. The 
d[amned]] old coward and skunk,’ wrote Wilson of Wully.7 In time soldiers, 
including Robertson, and statesmen, came over to the view that 
compulsory conscription was the only answer to the demands of modern 
industrialised warfare.8 What divided opinion was the nature of such a 
policy, its parameters and scope. Wilson believed military conscription was 
essential, plus compulsory national service for essential industries on the 
home front.  
 
The challenge of manpower was a complex web of interdependent 
pressures and often contradictory priorities. In late 1917 Britain’s military 
situation was in a parlous state. The two major campaigns of the year, at 
Arras and Ypres, together with the Battle of Cambrai, had resulted in 
enormous casualties.9 As a result of these set-backs, the War Office and 
GHQ’s power over strategy-making was diminishing, in favour of Wilson 
and the SWC. Although this body grew in influence, it did not exercise 
executive authority. Lloyd George might have enhanced his control over 
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 171 
his generals, but he had not tamed them. The PMRs offered advice, as a 
group; they could neither issue orders nor countermand those of the 
commanders in the field.10 It was up to the heads of government to decide 
whether to accept the advice given. Wilson offered plenty of welcome 
advice to his Prime Minister. Lloyd George sought decisive victory over 
Germany, but favoured a policy of ‘active defence’ in the west while the 
entente awaited the arrival of the Americans. By accepting Wilson’s 
strategy for 1918 the Prime Minister also accepted that successes in other 
theatres would be a bonus, not the priority.11 
 
When Wilson took up his post at the SWC, in November 1917, it was 
apparent that the AEF might not be in place in strategically significant 
numbers until 1919. The capitulation of Russia in late 1917 meant the 
inevitable transfer of large numbers of enemy troops to the west and a 
likely German offensive in the first half of 1918. Facing this threat was a 
British force in need of rest, training and reinforcement. The situation was 
complicated by the SWC’s decision in January 1918 to create an allied 
‘General Reserve’, something both British and French C-in-Cs resisted.12 
Wilson found himself at the heart of this civil-military conundrum, one 
which grew in intensity once he became CIGS. During the final 12 months 
of the war Wilson had real power for the first time, but with it came 
responsibility. This chapter reassesses how he responded to that 
challenge. 
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BRITISH MANPOWER CHALLENGES 
Nearly a month before the Battle of Third Ypres ended, Britain’s politicians 
were given a stark warning of the size of the military manpower problem. 
In the autumn of 1917, in response to the generals’ continuing demands 
for troops, and the government’s failure to develop a coherent manpower 
policy, the Ministry of National Service was created, headed by Sir 
Auckland Geddes.13 He was required ‘somehow to utilise better – given 
the powers provided him by the State – what human resources were left to 
his care’. On 13 October 1917, he submitted to the War Cabinet a 
‘shocking’ document.14 ‘The whole country’ was ‘close to the limit of its 
human resources’. He assumed a ‘wastage’ total for the period 1 October 
1917 to 30 September 1918 of 800,000 men across all theatres; in line 
with losses of the previous 12 months. ‘Combing out’ men from essential 
industries might produce 270,000, with another 150,000 if conscription 
was imposed on Ireland, or if the upper age limit for compulsory service 
was increased from 41 to 50. In other words, even with radical changes to 
recruiting rules, only about half the predicted losses could be made up in 
the coming year.15 The challenge to find men fit enough for front-line 
service was made worse by the poor state of health of many recruits.16 
This paper fell on Lloyd George’s desk two days after he had ordered 
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Wilson and Lord French to consider Britain’s strategic options for 1918. 
Little wonder, then, that the Prime Minister resisted GHQ’s enthusiasm for 
another major offensive on the Western Front in the coming year.  
Wilson’s alternative strategy, a defensive posture, with the possibility of 
limited operations elsewhere, was supported by Churchill, Minister of 
Munitions.17 He recommended that recruitment to the military be kept low 
with ‘all our available labour, especially our skilled labour, being employed 
on shipbuilding, artillery and aeroplanes.’18 At the SWC Wilson oversaw 
the creation of several policy studies into the manufacture of military 
materiel, particularly aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery. 
 
At the end of 1917 the War Office and the Army Council, and GHQ, faced 
an uphill task persuading the Prime Minister of the need for yet more men 
for the Western Front. With Wilson at Versailles Lloyd George had a 
soldier he could communicate with on friendly terms; one who appeared to 
be sympathetic to at least some of his strategic views.19 Wilson was 
acutely aware of the manpower crisis. In October 1917, while compiling 
his ‘State Paper’ for the War Cabinet, Macdonogh, the DMI, gave him the 
‘startling’ casualty lists: 
Since July 1st 1916 up to Oct 10th last [,] Haig has lost 900,000 men 
in killed and missing[,]...it appears that our average monthly 
wastage in France is 50,000 and an optimistic estimate of intake is 
30,000[,] though 25,000 will probably be more the mark. This shows 
a monthly deficit of 20,000 - 25,000. So that a year hence …we 
shall be 240,000 – 300,000 men deficient.20 
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The War Office casualty report for the period 1 January to 30 November 
1917 showed 753,147 men killed, wounded, missing or taken prisoner, 
with 690,218 of those in France and Flanders.21 Rather than helping Haig 
and Robertson’s case for more men, the statistics served to harden the 
War Cabinet’s resolve to take control of manpower priorities. On the way 
to the Rapallo Conference, Lloyd George told Wilson that:   
Haig really did talk the most awful nonsense about his front, said he 
was getting on splendidly that he would have done more if more 
men and guns had been sent to him - this infuriated LG -  that no 
other front mattered and so on and so on. LG also let himself go 
about Robertson’s pig-headedness and narrowness of vision, and 
said he was going to expose, on Friday in his speech in Paris, all 
our gross strategical blunders!22 
 
By late 1917 Lloyd George and his colleagues viewed the assessments of 
Robertson and Haig with scepticism. The case for ‘business as usual’ was 
weakened by a series of conflicting and contradictory reports from the 
military leadership. The Prime Minister confided in Wilson that he was 
‘determined to stop this “butchering” on the West front and I am clear that 
as we cannot hope to walk over the Boches by dint of numbers we must 
develop their means.’23 Derby told the War Cabinet that ‘without a great 
legislative or administrative effort’ to obtain men, the British would be ‘40 
per cent below their present establishment’ by the end of March 1918. 
‘Very grave reports’ had been received from Haig and there was no longer 
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any question of Britain deciding what next year’s military policy would be 
‘as that will be decided by the Germans’. The BEF was 100,000 men 
below its proper strength and ‘so far from there being any question of our 
breaking through the Germans, it was a question of whether we could 
prevent the Germans breaking through us.’24 Wilson’s reaction was that: ‘It 
really is intolerable that one day he [Haig] should ask for 45,000 men 
before March 31st and the next day say he must reduce by 15 Divisions.’25  
Considering the fact that in October the C-in-C had been proposing a 
major British offensive in 1918, Hankey thought his concerns were: 
…absolutely inconsistent with Haig’s continued reports of bad 
German moral[e]…War Office figures and statements are utterly 
unreliable, and their facts are twisted to support their arguments. If 
they want men they make out that they can hardly hold the line … If 
they want to do an offensive they make out that the enemy is 
exhausted and demoralised and that they [the British] have lots of 
men.26 
 
Hankey’s dismay was understandable. The previous day, GHQ had issued 
a manpower assessment for the Western Front which showed 168.5 Allied 
divisions (excluding those in Italy or on their way there) facing 150 
German divisions.27 In response to Haig’s plea, the government 
established a ‘Cabinet Committee on Man-Power’.28 Its conclusions placed 
the BEF at the bottom of the list of manpower priorities for 1918. Matters 
were made worse for Haig when Macdonogh estimated that on the 
Western Front the French and British had ‘1,200,000 more men in the field 
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than the Germans’. Even if the enemy transferred all his troops from the 
east they would still be in a minority and thus: ‘In these circumstances the 
Prime Minister was unable to understand the rather alarmist tone as to the 
situation which had recently been exhibited.’29 Macready, the AG, told 
Wilson that the result had been ‘three days of Armageddon’ at the Man-
Power Committee:  
This, and the fact that GHQ France, in October wrote a 
Memorandum… saying in effect that the Germans were worn out, 
and could only bring a limited number of Divisions over from the 
Russian front, has naturally given the civilians the impression that 
we so outnumber the Boche that the need for men is not urgent.  
 
Macready assumed that Charteris had written the report and noted the 
figures included ‘people like Belgians, Portuguese, and Italians, none of 
whom would stand up against the Boche.’ 30  
 
Hankey summed up the political mood: ‘Russia practically out of the war; 
Italy very much under the weather after [her] defeat; France unreliable; the 
USA not nearly ready; our own man-power much exhausted by the 
senseless hammerings of the last three years; and great demands for 
labour…’31 In this climate it is unsurprising that the findings of the Man-
Power Committee ‘represented a wholesale defeat for the War Office and 
a victory for Lloyd George’.32 It gave manpower priority to the Royal and 
Merchant navies, essential as these were in sustaining Britain during what 
was expected to be a year of retrenchment; it was vital to be able to 
                                            
29 TNA CAB 24/4/67. 
30 Wilson papers, (2/2A/1), Macready to Wilson, 13 December 1917. 
31 Hankey diary, 16 December 1917, in Roskill, Hankey, p. 470. 
32 French, Strategy, p. 185. 
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transport both men and equipment from the US to make a decisive 
difference in 1919. The Army came last, after shipbuilding, aircraft, tank 
and food production. It would receive just 100,000 ‘Category A’ men in the 
year, rather than the 600,000 the War Office estimated was needed. The 
report recommended that front-line divisions be reduced, from 12 
battalions (plus one Pioneer battalion), to nine battalions (plus one Pioneer 
battalion).33 Haig and Robertson had feared this policy, which had already 
been carried out by the German and French armies, since early in the 
year.34 In December 1917 Foch and Weygand tried to persuade Wilson 
and Milner of the merits of such a change as an alternative to reducing the 
number of operational British divisions on the Western Front: ‘He [Foch] 
wants the defence made secure before studying plans of offence. He 
wants our divisions turned into 9 Batt[alion]s also the Belgian and the 
Italians.’ The British Secretariat at Versailles came out marginally in favour 
of the change.35 Wilson discussed the suggestion with Kiggell, who was 
‘absolutely opposed’ and said that Haig would ‘rather abolish 15 
Div[ision]s altogether than keep his 62 at 9 Batt[alion]s. I thought Kigg’s 
arguments were wholly unconvincing.’36 Wilson’s unwillingness to jump 
instantly to the French tune disappointed Foch who reportedly told Spears 
                                            
33 TNA, CAB 24/4/36, ‘Final Revise of the Draft Report on Man-Power’, 1 March 1918, 
with covering note by Hankey, 2 April 1918; (the initial draft report was completed on 9 
January 1918); minutes of the meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Man-Power are at 
TNA CAB 27/14; see also Simon Justice, ‘Vanishing Battalions: The Nature, Impact and 
Implications of British Infantry Reorganization prior to the German Spring Offensives of 
1918’, in Michael LoCicero, Ross Mahoney, Ross, & Stuart Mitchell, (eds.), A Military 
Transformed?: Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military, 1792-1945 (Solihull: 
Helion, 2014), pp. 157-173.  
34 LHCMA, Robertson papers, Robertson to Haig, (7/7/5), 13 February 1917. 
35 TNA, CAB 25/120/7, SWC, British Secretariat, Minutes and Papers, ‘Organisation of a 
Division with 9 Battalions instead of 13’, 7 December 1918. 
36 Wilson diary, 6 December 1917. 
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that: ‘General Wilson was not as good as he had thought he was, and 
required a great deal of close support and help; were it not for General 
Weygand Versailles would be in a bad way...’37 Resigned to the reduction, 
Wilson told Lloyd George that if ‘our man-power conditions – and I 
understand this is the case - make it necessary either to abolish Divisions 
or change from 12 to 9 then I would not hesitate for a minute but would 
change to 9’.38  
 
Macready tipped off Wilson that the implications of Man-Power 
Committee’s conclusions made: 
…dreadful reading, and amounts to this, that we must reduce our 
56 Div[ision]s from 12 to 9 Batt[alion]s; that in July we shall have to 
reduce from 56 [divisions] to 44, and next winter from 44 to 30. This 
is simply damnable. 
I wrote Milner a long letter in which I told him that if these figures 
are true then we must do one of two things: 
(a) get more men 
(b) make peace now 
Personally I rejected (b) as being cowardly and fatal in every way at 
least until we were strained to breaking point, but I saw no difficulty 
in (a) which mean real conscription in England and in Ireland, 
neither of which things have any terror for me compared with 
Peace. But I confess all this frightens me, and if Macready’s figures 
prove true and if LG won’t take drastic action then I will.39 
 
It is unclear what the final sentence meant; there is no reference to any 
such ‘drastic action’ in subsequent diary entries, and the most likely 
explanation is that (as was his wont) Wilson was letting off steam in 
private. More men were needed, which would: 
…mean something much more drastic than what we have done, as 
yet, in England and of course it will mean Ireland...Our war game 
                                            
37 WO 106/407, (LSO. 177), Spears to Maurice, 22 December 1917. 
38 PA, Lloyd George papers, (47/7/5), Wilson to Lloyd George, 23 December 1917 
(original emphasis). 
39 Wilson diary, 4 January 1918, (original emphasis). 
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here has shown us that we can look forward with an easy mind if 
we have 56 Div[ision]s each of 9 Batt[alion]s and 1 Pioneer 
Batt[alion] but the war game also shows that a reduction from 56 to 
44 would be a terrible gamble and a further reduction to 30 would 
bring us certain disaster.40 
 
He was so concerned that the next day he sent Amery to London.41 The 
mission backfired when Hankey accused Wilson’s emissary of going 
behind his back to the Prime Minister. These were fraught times, and 
Wilson’s tendency for dramatic interventions sometimes landed him in hot 
water with his colleagues.42 As discussed earlier, Amery was a much more 
independent figure than either Hankey or Wilson gave credit for. After 
himself, his greatest loyalty was to Milner. 
 
The response of the Army Council to the Committee’s recommendations 
confirmed Wilson’s fears. Dominated by Derby and Robertson, it noted 
‘with grave concern’ that only 100,000 Category A men were going to be 
allocated to the Army, as opposed to the 615,000 estimated to be needed 
to keep up to strength. A defensive policy was likely to be as costly as an 
offensive one. The Army Council thought reducing battalion strength to 
nine per division was ‘very undesirable’. They pointed out that the French 
had adopted a similar policy only because of lack of men. The Council 
appeared to have overlooked the fact that this was exactly why the 
Committee was making a similar recommendation. They also opposed the 
creation of a ‘mobile reserve’ for lack of men and calculated that the Army, 
                                            
40 Wilson papers, (2/11/6), Wilson to Milner, 4 January 1918. 
41 Wilson diary, 5 January 1918.  
42 Hankey diary, 9 January 1918, in Roskill, Hankey, p. 479; Amery diary, 9 and 10 
January 1918, in Barnes and Nicholson (eds.), Amery Diaries, (vol. I), pp. 198-9. 
 180 
in all theatres, would be 264,000 below establishment by 1 January 1919. 
The 52 divisions in France in 1917 would be reduced to 42, with five of 
them currently in Italy, leaving 37 on the Western Front – a reduction of 
25% on a year earlier.  The Army Council believed the Committee had 
‘failed to realise the perilous situation’ regarding drafts. There was ‘every 
prospect of heavy fighting on the Western front from February onwards’ 
and even if they withstood the initial assault, forces might become so 
exhausted that they would be ‘incapable of continuing the struggle’. 
Accepting the recommendations would amount to ‘taking an unnecessarily 
grave risk of losing the war and sacrificing to no purpose the British Army 
on the Western front.’43 Nonetheless, accepting the inevitable, the next 
day (10 January 1918) the War Office ordered Haig to reduce his British 
(but not Dominion) divisions to nine battalions.44 A situation Derby had 
long feared had come to pass. It appeared, he had said the previous June, 
as if the Army was provided with men ‘only after all other needs of the 
Nation have been cared for’ and had warned that the strength of the Army 
would ‘continue rapidly to diminish, and, so far as military operations are 
concerned, our chances of winning the war will be correspondingly 
reduced.’45  
 
Ironically, Haig himself put paid to any lingering doubts the politicians 
might have had about the military’s demands for more troops, at a War 
                                            
43 TNA, CAB 24/38/66, ‘Memorandum by the Military Members of the Army Council on 
the draft Report of the War Cabinet Committee on Man-Power’, 9 January 1918. 
44 French, Strategy, p. 186. 
45 TNA, CAB 24/15/66, ‘The Position and Prospects of Recruiting’, Derby to War Cabinet, 
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Cabinet meeting two days before the draft report of the Man-Power 
Committee. Robertson reported that there were 28 more German divisions 
on the Western Front than a year earlier, thanks to drafts from the east. 
The enemy was reorganising and now had ‘the character of an offensive 
force’.46 Carson asked Haig whether ‘it would be possible for the Germans 
to break through our lines in France in the near future.’ The C-in-C said he 
had ‘every confidence that the British Army would hold its own, as it had 
always done in the past’.47 Haig was given the opportunity to clarify when 
Bonar Law, a ‘friend’ of the soldiers, asked: ‘If you were a German 
Commander, would you think there was sufficient chance of a smashing 
offensive to justify incurring the losses which would be entailed?’ Haig said 
he thought attacks of limited scope were ‘more probable’ than one on a 
large scale which would be ‘very costly’. The German manpower situation 
‘did not seem very satisfactory’, but the Allies must, nonetheless, ‘expect 
to be seriously attacked’. He was making preparations and while likely to 
lose ground ‘he felt confident of holding his front provided his Divisions 
were maintained at proper strength.’48 This was exactly the kind of answer 
the politicians wanted to hear. While it makes sense to blame the Field 
Marshal’s ‘inarticulacy’ for this blunder, this performance was a particularly 
sustained example of the malady.49 Robertson was horrified, and after the 
meeting sent Haig a note urging him to clarify his remarks. ‘For months 
past’, Wully wrote: 
 …we have been trying to get more men for the Army. The Cabinet 
find difficulty in getting the men and therefore make every excuse 
                                            
46 TNA CAB 23/5/8, War Cabinet, 7 January 1918. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Sheffield, The Chief, p. 260. 
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for not providing them…For a long time past they have been trying 
to persuade me to say that the Germans may not attack us this 
year. Unfortunately you gave as your opinion this morning that they 
would not do so, and I noticed, as also did Lord Derby, that they 
jumped at the statement.  
 
Robertson’s note ended with the handwritten explanation that Carson’s 
questions had been designed to give Haig the opportunity to ‘rub in’ the 
message about the need to keep the BEF up to establishment: ‘Of course 
you do not quite understand these fellows as well as I do.’50 In fairness to 
Haig, he made several references to the effect that it was essential to 
maintain his forces and predicted monthly losses of 100,000 in the event 
of a German offensive.51 Despite submitting a note of clarification, in which 
he stressed the need to keep the BEF up to strength, the damage had 
been done.52 Haig compounded matters when he told Lloyd George and 
Derby that he doubted the Germans would attempt a breakthrough.53 
Wilson learned of the incident from Robertson who was a ‘good deal 
flustered’. The CIGS informed him that the manpower report had allocated 
only 100,000 men for 1918, ‘this of course would settle the war.’ 
Robertson was visiting the front and appeared to have mis-remembered 
the totality of Haig’s message: ‘He said that the politicians were taking 
increasing charge in military affairs and he called Haig a fool because on 
                                            
50 LHCMA, Robertson papers, Robertson to Haig, (7/7/77), January 1918. 
51 In his diary for this date, Haig noted that ‘In my opinion, the best defence would be to 
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Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen (London: Cassell, 1926), p. 324. 
53 Haig diary, 9 January 1918, in Sheffield and Bourne, Haig: Diaries, pp. 370-1 and 
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Mon[day] last Haig had told the War Cabinet that he could hold the line 
and never insisted on the necessity of being supported with men. Haig 
really is incurably stupid.’54 Wilson was further dismayed by the C-in-C’s 
Dispatch for the campaigns of 1917 which included the claim: ‘In the 
operations of Arras, Messines, Lens and Ypres as many as 131 German 
divisions have been engaged and defeated by less than half that number 
of British divisions.’ Haig added another sentence, weakening the impact 
of his warnings about the increasing German threat: ‘The addition of 
strength which the enemy has obtained, or may yet obtain, from events in 
Russia and Italy has already been largely discounted, and the ultimate 
destruction of the enemy’s field force has been brought appreciably 
nearer.’55 ‘What a lie!’ Wilson wrote in his diary.56  
 
IRELAND 
The German Spring Offensive, which began on 21 March 1918, brought 
into focus the manpower issues discussed here. The BEF’s shortage of 
troops was exposed as casualties mounted, the recent attempts to 
formalise Anglo-French co-operation remained to a large extent ad hoc, 
and the AEF was green and not ready to help in the defence of the British 
line. The War Cabinet met almost daily with Wilson, now in the post of 
CIGS, having succeeded Robertson in February, in attendance. The 
desperate need for manpower led the government finally to adopt a policy 
it had avoided, and which Wilson had doggedly advocated, since the war 
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began: compulsory military conscription for Ireland. Geddes had estimated 
that there might be a manpower pool of 150,000 available in Ireland. 
Nonetheless, he had rejected conscription as unworkable in view of ‘the 
great political difficulties involved and the meagre results to be anticipated’ 
in conscripting a reluctant population.57 Wilson disagreed.58 Unbowed by 
Geddes’s recommendation, on 31 January he ‘had a serious talk with LG 
about Ireland and his theory is that if we put conscription on Ireland, not 
only would we have trouble in Ireland but we would have trouble with the 
English Unions, with the Colonies and with America, and therefore this 
was out of the question.’59 Wilson’s chance came with the desperation 
engendered by the German Spring Offensive. His inability to see the 
evident risks associated with such a policy is a notable departure for one 
normally so politically astute. As his latest biographer observed, Ireland 
was ‘a political blind-spot’ for Wilson.60  
 
On 23 March, he spent five hours with Lloyd George: ‘I insisted on the 
importance of taking a long, broad view of the future, of conscription of 
everyone up to 50, and, of course, on Ireland. I think I did good, and 
Winston [Churchill] helped like a man…Milner disappointing.’61 Geddes 
was urged to tap ‘such new sources as still remain’ because the situation 
‘might afford exceptional opportunity for overcoming difficulties that had 
                                            
57 TNA, CAB 24/4/36, ‘Final Revise of the Draft Report on Man-Power’, 1 March 1918, 
(paras.  62-64). 
58 Jeffery, Wilson, p. 197. 
59 Wilson diary, 31 January 1918. 
60 Jeffery, Wilson, p. 197. 
61 Wilson diary, 23 March 1918. 
 185 
hitherto proved insurmountable.’62 The next day Milner’s view had 
changed; he was now ‘nearly as strong as I was for the necessity of levée 
en masse in England & Ireland which could be carried out with real 
conscription.’ Over dinner with the Prime Minister and Churchill: ‘Winston 
backed me up when I pressed Lloyd George hard to really conscript this 
country & Ireland…I want Lloyd George to summon Parliament, conscript 
up to 50 years of age, & include Ireland. I am not sure he sees the gravity 
of the situation yet.’ 63 The government’s dilemma has been summed up 
thus: ‘Unless the British army could be provided with manpower to rebuild 
the shattered divisions, the BEF would cease to exist. In these 
circumstances the War Cabinet took the most contentious decision of the 
war; they extended compulsory military service to Ireland.’64 On 25 March, 
a ‘wildly optimistic’ Johnnie French, a fellow Irishman, said he strongly 
believed that if troops in Ireland were augmented ‘to maintain order’ it 
would be possible to carry out a recruitment policy.65 The War Cabinet met 
twice on 27 March, the day after Foch had been appointed ‘Generalissimo’ 
at Doullens.66 Wilson outlined the parlous state of the BEF. There were 
signs the Germans were preparing another attack and were just 25km 
from the important rail junction at Amiens. The British Fifth Army ‘could no 
longer be regarded as a fighting unit,’ and had been placed under the 
French who were sending reinforcements. Wilson said there were 193 
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German divisions on the Western Front; 70 had been involved in the 
recent fighting with an estimated 31 in reserve. To make matters worse, 
the AEF C-in-C General John Pershing had refused a plea from Rawlinson 
(now Britain’s PMR) to put American battalions into British divisions. It was 
agreed that Lloyd George, to make Pershing reconsider, would send a 
‘strongly worded’ telegram ‘with a view to ultimate publication’ to the US 
President Woodrow Wilson.67 It made no difference. 
 
The meeting then heard from the government’s senior representatives in 
Ireland. The C-in-C Ireland, Lieutenant-General Sir Bryan Mahon, was in 
favour of the principle of conscription but predicted ‘considerable trouble’ if 
implemented. Brigadier-General Sir Joseph Byrne, head of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary, was in no doubt that compulsory military service ‘would be a 
mistake’ and predicted riots. The most vehement opposition came from 
Ireland’s most senior political officer, the Unionist MP and Chief Secretary 
for Ireland, Henry E. Duke, who expressed grave doubts. The Cabinet, 
having discussed further relaxation of age limits to extend recruitment in 
the rest of Britain, faced a profound dilemma. How could it exempt Ireland 
yet bear down still harder on the rest of the country?68 At the day’s second 
meeting, Duke was adamant that conscription would unite Catholics and 
Protestants against the government and ‘we might almost as well recruit 
Germans.’69 Despite the opposition of three key government-appointed 
figures who, arguably, knew the current political climate in Ireland better 
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than Wilson, French and Derby, the Cabinet decided to go ahead and 
impose conscription.70 Gregory has argued that the government had little 
expectation of recruiting large numbers of Irishmen but acted to avoid 
charges of treating one part of Britain differently.71 This work, while 
acknowledging the strength of this position, argues that Wilson also played 
an important role. Since November he had seen the Prime Minister and/or 
Milner, the most influential Unionist in the government, almost daily. His 
diary contains numerous references to speaking to both men, and others, 
about the ‘need’ to conscript Ireland. Having been instrumental in Wilson’s 
appointment as CIGS, the Prime Minister backed his principal military 
adviser. In the event, while the legislation was enacted, conscription was 
never actually imposed on Ireland; once the spring crisis had passed the 
notion was shelved, much to Wilson’s displeasure.72 
 
TAKING OVER FRENCH LINE 
One of the most intractable problems Wilson faced at Versailles 
concerned the extension of the British line to relieve the hard-pressed 
French. The issue had been on the Allies’ agenda since early 1915.73 
Lloyd George had effectively ‘kicked the issue into the long grass’ on 7 
November 1917 at the inaugural meeting of the SWC, by insisting that a 
joined-up Allied strategic plan for 1918 had to be agreed first. French 
pressure increased when Clemenceau became Prime Minister nine days 
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later. Wilson was heavily involved in trying to find a solution acceptable to 
both allies. For much of the winter he acted as a conduit for British policy 
and a lightning rod against French impatience. His friendship with Foch, 
and his more nuanced relationship with Clemenceau, helped preserve 
fragile Anglo-French relations during a crucial period, and both merit 
further study.  
 
While ‘Chief of British Mission to the French Army’ in 1917, Wilson had 
wanted to ensure Britain did all it could to bolster France’s commitment to 
the war.74 The failure of Nivelle’s offensive saw him replaced in mid-May 
as C-in-C by Pétain.75 Wilson recorded the ‘disquieting’ news that an 
attack, in support of the imminent British offensive against the Messines 
Ridge south of Ypres, had been cancelled ‘because the moral[e] of the 
French troops is such that it cannot be carried out…if the French continue 
to feel the strain like this, we must expect them to ask us to take over 
some more line.’76 Macdonogh reported ‘serious trouble, practically 
amounting to mutiny, in a number of French regiments... It was hoped that 
this disaffection would be set right in five or six days.’77 As the British 
officer closest to the French high command, Wilson ‘expressed grave 
doubts as to whether we could count on the continued resistance of the 
French army and nation’ before US forces were able to make a difference, 
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something he expected to take 12 to 18 months. The War Cabinet 
understood that Pétain ‘could not absolutely rely on his men’. Wilson could 
not confirm an incident ‘amounting almost to mutiny’, but there was a 
‘good deal of unrest’. Soon the British would be asked ‘to take over a 
further section of the line on the Western Front. A case …which it would 
be very difficult to resist.’ Macdonogh agreed that there was ‘a strong 
feeling in France that we ought to hold more of the line’. Wilson said the 
French were ‘good comrades’ who would not press their case while the 
Messines offensive, and the actions which were to follow, were in 
progress.78  
 
Wilson’s views carried weight. He had been in regular contact with Lloyd 
George since joining GQG.79 The issue lay dormant in the latter half of 
1917 but re-emerged when it became clear that Third Ypres had failed to 
meet its objectives. Despite British losses, the French once again pressed 
the BEF to take over more line. On 6 December Wilson, as British PMR, 
and Milner met Foch and Weygand: 
He [Foch] does not yet realise how badly we are off in recruiting 
though I let him know rather vaguely that we were in straits... He 
was angry with Haig for the waste of life and upset at 
Passchendaele and at Cambrai, and he said that these individual 
efforts were fatal and upset the general plan, as for example our 
taking over French line which now we appeared incapable of 
doing.80 
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Wilson canvassed views in a bid to resolve the issue. Esher told him 
Clemenceau ‘was furious with the English’ and he went to see him at 
once. At a ‘memorable and stormy meeting’: 
The old man was difficult. He raged against the English and then 
fastened on Haig and in a minor degree on Robertson. He told of 
the [French] War Cabinet this morning in which Pétain said that 
unless he was given 200,000-300,000 men from the interior for 
some works to dig backward trenches and put up wire and unless 
we (English) took over the line to Berry-au-Bac ... he - Pétain - 
would not be responsible for his front. This, said Clemenceau, had 
a very great effect on the War Cabinet. 
Clemenceau then undertook to  
(a) Get the 200,000 men from the Interior 
(b) Make the English take over to Berry-au-Bac 
OR 
                (c) Resign 
 
Wilson employed his diplomatic skills and eventually ‘I got the old man a 
little quieter’. Despite the histrionics, Wilson had been struck by the French 
Première’s argument: ‘When all allowance is made it is perfectly clear that 
we must handle this business of relief and of the future with the greatest 
care and consideration…Before leaving old C I told him to submit the 
whole case to Versailles [in other words to Wilson and the other PMRs] 
and not to London and I think he will.’81 Haig thought it ‘quite impossible 
for us to take over any line, that our troops are exhausted, that we have 
been fighting all the summer and up to now, that the French have done 
nothing, that we have sent 5 Div[ision]s to Italy, that DH won’t take over 
more than to the Oise. All this will be very difficult.’82 Wilson sent Amery to 
London ‘with a rather anxious message’ to recruit Milner’s, and the Prime 
Minister’s, support.83 He made another visit to Haig, who was ‘very nice to 
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me… I begged DH and more particularly Kiggell with whom I can speak 
with greater freedom, to look at the question of the relief of the French 
from as broad a standpoint as they could, as otherwise there would be 
trouble, but I did not make much impression, I am afraid.’ Nonetheless, 
Wilson had convinced the Prime Minister, who ordered Haig and 
Robertson to ‘lay the case before Versailles. I will get the French to do 
ditto. I am sure it is wise.’84 Robertson’s response was to tell Wilson that: 
‘This extension of the line is a d___d nuisance. Haig certainly ought not to 
go anywhere near Berry-au-Bac.’ Robertson said the BEF was ‘played out’ 
and needed rest.85 Haig and Robertson both resented the interference of 
Versailles. Haig preferred to deal directly with his French opposite number; 
a practice he maintained well into 1918. Haig and Pétain met but failed to 
agree a way forward. Haig, who apparently arrived at the meeting with ‘no 
papers or figures’, said he could extend his line by no more than two 
divisions by mid-January 1918 ‘and under no circ[umstance]s could he do 
any more! It is clear that my talk did not do any good,’ wrote Wilson.86  
 
Having secured Lloyd George’s support, Wilson persuaded Clemenceau 
to let the PMRs decide this important issue provided that ‘he was prepared 
to accept the Versailles decision as final. He asked who Versailles was 
and answered it himself by saying “Nous: Wilson” he then thought a little 
and finally said “Yes I will agree to that proposal.”’ Clemenceau then 
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asked Wilson to dictate what he wanted to say: ‘This is an epoch making 
step because it really calls Versailles into being as the Supreme advisory 
(military) body and as the Supreme executive body also. I told the Tiger 
that I thought well of him and liked him and he said he liked me too!’ 
Unsurprisingly, considering he knew Wilson was sympathetic to the 
French request for British help, Clemenceau ‘said that when first he spoke 
to me ... he was hostile to Versailles but that now he admitted that he was 
entirely wrong.’87 Wilson thought the first report Haig submitted to 
Versailles was a ‘feeble defence’ of his position and asked for ‘much more 
information.’88 Wilson suggested Haig send two officers to Versailles to 
help him develop the British case, ‘as otherwise, I am afraid we shall be 
swamped.’ Haig refused, saying there was so much information it would 
be easier to examine it at GHQ; in other words, the C-in-C was not ready 
to dance to Wilson’s tune.89 Wilson continued to worry away at the 
problem, including working on the issue on Christmas Day.90 
 
The PMRs produced their recommendation in Joint Note 10 (JN10), a 
compromise extending the British line 14 miles beyond Barisis to the left 
bank of the River Ailette, between the Ailette and the Laon-Soissons road 
‘the exact points to be fixed by the Commanders-in-Chief.’91 The note also 
allowed for the British to support the French if an attack further south 
                                            
87 Wilson diary, 17 December 1917. 
88 Ibid., 18 December 1917.  
89 Wilson papers, (2/7A/1) Wilson to Haig, 18 December 1917, and (2/7A/2) Operations, 
GHQ to Wilson, 19 December 1917. 
90 Wilson diary, 25 December 1917. 
91 TNA, WO 158/57, Joint Note 10,10 January 1918; the extension proposed was, 
roughly, the equivalent of 2.5 British divisions, Callwell, Wilson, (vol. II), n. p. 57. 
 193 
meant they had to move forces there. The French would support the 
British if the latter were attacked and the junction between the Allied 
armies was threatened. In a detail of significance for the future, it excluded 
the prospect of French forces moving deeper into the British sector, for 
example around Ypres, or vice-versa. The recommended extension fell 
well short of Berry-au-Bac, the French preference, and Weygand made 
clear he thought it inadequate, pointing out that the French held 520 
kilometres of line, a burden ‘which was more than they could bear.’92 As 
the date for the Third Session of the SWC approached it was far from 
certain that the C-in-Cs would support the Wilson compromise. Robertson 
warned Haig that while ‘the Versailles people’ were no doubt doing their 
best ‘they cannot help being a probable source of mischief unless we 
responsible people have made up our minds on all points beforehand and 
are in accord with the French.’ Wully recommended that he and Haig 
confer with Foch, Pétain and Pershing, beforehand to be ‘in a position to 
get done what you want done without the interference of the young men at 
Versailles.’ The PMR’s compromise had been reached as a result of 
Wilson’s war games ‘their panacea for everything.’ It would all be ‘very 
funny if it were not such a nuisance, not to say serious.’93 Wilson was not 
the only senior soldier who could play a political game.  
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While Robertson and Haig considered their tactics for the SWC 
conference, Lloyd George continued to cast around for ways to limit their 
power. On 13 January Amery asked Wilson’s opinion ‘of a proposal to 
make Joffre C-in-C and me as his CGS!’94 Wilson apparently put a stop to 
this short-lived notion by telling Milner ‘that in my opinion we cannot have 
a Generalissimo but that if this was tried it would make it still more 
impossible if he was given a foreigner for Chief of Staff.’95 The Prime 
Minister’s anxiety over the issue of the French line is illustrated by the fact 
that he wrote to Wilson on consecutive days asking why the PMRs had 
settled on the Laon-Soissons road compromise: ‘Another wire from LG 
wanting more information about our taking over the line. It is clear that he 
finds it difficult to get his Cabinet to agree to Versailles and go against 
Haig and Robertson.’96 On the same day Wilson saw Foch who was 
allegedly:  
…rather contemptuous of LG who he says seems afraid of 
everyone, of Haig and Robertson, of the Trades Unions and of the 
Irish. Then he told me of Robertson’s little plot to square [sic] the 
pitch of Versailles. R is trying to get up a meeting of Haig, Pétain, 
Pershing, Foch and himself before the Versailles meeting so as to 
be able to say at that meeting that all was already settled! Foch 
much amused.97 
 
Wilson, who warned Milner that the French were ‘getting cross’ about the 
unresolved issue, had begun to see it as a personal contest between 
himself and the Haig-Robertson alliance.98 Lloyd George had to decide 
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whom to support.99 In the end, he backed Wilson, but then did nothing to 
ensure Haig and Pétain obeyed. Once in the role of CIGS, such 
apparently black and white issues took on a more nuanced hue for Wilson 
himself. 
 
When the heads of the British, Italian and French governments met for the 
first meeting of the Third Session of the SWC on 30 January, Haig and 
Pétain had not resolved their differences. Ten days earlier Haig had 
reported to Robertson that relations with Pétain were ‘good’. The CIGS 
noted: ‘I only hope that he [Pétain] will represent them as being equally 
good when we come to the discussion of the extension of the front. I 
daresay this will be difficult for him because his politicians wish for you to 
take over more front.’100 Robertson’s fears were well founded. Wilson 
recorded that Haig agreed to his idea of the Allies taking an active 
defensive position in 1918 and to the principle of creating a reserve force: 
‘He went on to show that by the autumn his present 57 Div[ision]s would 
be reduced to 30! Such was the state of the manpower; he was also far 
from nice to the Americans saying they would be no use till 1919.’ Then, in 
order to illustrate how vital it was that the BEF took on more French line, 
Pétain ‘showed that he would have to reduce by the autumn to the tune of 
25 Divisions if he had no fighting and by 50 divisions if he had some 
fighting.’ According to Wilson: 
This was all too much for LG who said he was absolutely 
dumbfounded that 77 Divisions were going to be wiped off in this 
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manner & that he really could not accept these figures …all this is 
extraordinary. 
About three weeks ago Haig gave evidence before the War Cabinet 
& said that if he was the German C-in-C he would not attack 
because it would be so hopeless an undertaking. A week later 
(about a fortnight ago) he wrote an official letter to say that in view 
of the critical situation which now existed the Divisions now in Italy 
must be at once brought back. Yesterday Haig told us that he was 
not afraid of any Boche attack. Today Haig told us that he was 
going to lose 27 Divisions & the position is very critical. The man is 
a FOOL. The real fact seems to me to be that if we allow the 
conduct of the war to rest in the hands of Haig, Pétain & Robertson 
we shall be beaten by the Boches. This is a serious state of affairs, 
& I think LG must take some action.101 
 
This ‘absolutely desperate picture of the future manpower situation’ was 
painted ‘in an apparent attempt to frighten Lloyd George away from his 
“Eastern” schemes and towards increasing the flow of recruits to the 
British army’.102 Wilson thought so, and had reminded Robertson of the 
confusion created by Haig’s recent manpower statements:  
I asked him [Robertson] why Haig claimed to have “defeated 131 
Divisions” with less than half that number & why - that being so [-] 
he was now afraid of being attacked by 50 or 60 Divisions & called 
for the Divisions now in Italy to be returned to him. I asked him also 
why[,] if Haig claimed to have caused 900,000 casualties with a 
loss of 600,000 he was now afraid of being knocked out by 
numbers. Robertson said that all that was “very stupid”.103 
 
When the first meeting ended, in an effort to get in first and prevent his 
adversaries combining to carry their point, Wilson advised Lloyd George to 
keep military advisers out of the meeting until needed:  
As regards Haig and Robertson he does not know what to do. I told 
Milner later that if it would help them to solve the problem I would 
resign with pleasure…this Haig is the same man who in his 
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Dispatch a month ago claimed to have “defeated 131 Divs with less 
than half this number!”104 
 
Lloyd George watered down Wilson’s suggestion. For future meetings, the 
permanent attendees would be the three prime ministers, three war 
ministers, four PMRs, Haig and Pétain and Robertson and Foch, as C-in-
Cs and CoSs respectively. Clemenceau, also stung by the generals’ dire 
warnings, ‘begged me to use all my power to get LG to get more men and 
I told him I was always working in that direction.’105  
 
The conference accepted JN10, and Wilson’s proposed extension to the 
mid-point between Barisis and Berry-au-Bac, but not without a strong 
rearguard action from Haig with, perhaps surprisingly, his Prime Minister in 
support. Haig had given a clear warning that, if he ‘had to extend his front 
[beyond Barisis] he could not be responsible for the security of his line’. No 
doubt conscious of the political fall-out at home if he overruled Haig and 
disaster ensued, Lloyd George argued that the BEF held a line which 
covered indispensable ports and valuable coal mines, British troops 
received far less leave than their French comrades and had ‘borne the 
brunt of the fighting during the past year’. While approving JN10’s 
recommendations ‘in principle’ Haig won the caveat that the timing and 
other details would be left to the C-in-Cs.106 Wilson considered this a 
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victory too.107 In fact, ‘not one additional yard of trench beyond Barisis had 
been taken over’ when the German Offensives began on 21 March.108 
 
This meeting also created the Strategic Reserve and the EWB to control 
it.109 The agreement to place a strategic force under the authority of 
Versailles represented a significant victory for Wilson and was an 
important building block in the path to Allied Unity of Command. The fact 
that no Strategic Reserve was in place when the German Spring Offensive 
began on 21 March reflected the reality of the manpower crisis facing the 
British and French, and the limits of Wilson’s authority. 
 
THE AEF 
One of the main planks of Wilson’s strategy document of 20 October 1917 
was the need for the Allies to go on the defensive in the west while they 
waited for the arrival of sufficient American forces to make a difference.110 
Wilson expected a German offensive in the spring, long before the AEF 
could have a significant impact. As a result, he devoted a lot of time to 
attempting to persuade the Americans to get their troops into the British 
line quickly. Wilson, as his diaries reveal, found the task frustrating and, in 
terms of getting the Americans to do Britain’s bidding, ultimately fruitless. 
His diplomatic skills were tested to their limit, but he was successful in 
brokering a key agreement between the BEF and AEF.  
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The USA entered the war on 6 April 1917, but it was clear that this knight 
in shining armour would not be taking the field any time soon. As early as 
17 May the General Staff warned the War Cabinet that it was ‘clear that 
we cannot expect a considerable USA Army to be in the field in any 
theatre of war for a long time to come.’ According to Tom Bridges, by this 
time British liaison officer in Washington, the American military 
establishment was even more ill-prepared for a modern industrialised war, 
on an industrial scale, than its British counterpart had been in August 
1914. Extensive training was needed before the AEF would be ready.111 
Bridges estimated that by January 1918 the AEF might number no more 
than 150,000, with only half a million men in theatre by the end of the 
year.112 In June, when commenting on the reported unrest in the French 
Army, Wilson had estimated, correctly, it would take a year to 18 months 
for the Americans to make a sizeable contribution.113  
 
Nonetheless, Allied leaders made US assistance a priority. On 20 
November Lloyd George told General Bliss and the American Mission to 
Britain that the Allies would soon be outnumbered on the Western Front 
and it was ‘a matter of the most urgent and immediate importance that you 
should send to Europe next year, and as early next year as possible, as 
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many men as you can spare, to enable us to withstand a possible German 
attack…’114 Yet the build-up of American forces in France was ‘painfully 
slow’.115 There were one million men under arms in the US but a shipping 
shortage meant they had ‘no way to get them to Europe, [and] their 
clothing and training were often woefully inadequate.’116 The AEF cadres 
which were arriving comprised infantry and machine-gun units, with the 
French and British expected to provide the artillery and transport essential 
for self-contained effective fighting divisions. The best way to make 
immediate use of those AEF units which were available, it seemed to 
Wilson, Haig and Robertson, was to ‘brigade’ American battalions into 
experienced British divisions. There, US soldiers would benefit from the 
BEF’s experience and training, producing an effective force quicker than 
waiting for fully-formed and independent AEF divisions, corps and armies 
to assemble in France. The added benefit, from the British perspective, 
was that when the German offensive came the Americans would be able 
to fight. It might also stave off the need to reduce the strength of divisions 
from 12 battalions to nine.  
 
By the beginning of 1918 Wilson was not the only senior Allied officer to 
be frustrated with what he considered to be the tardy nature of the 
American response. In the first week of the New Year he emphasised the 
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need to speed up the numbers of AEF troops being trained in British units. 
A few days later, at one of his regular meetings with Clemenceau, they 
discussed ‘the Americans who are dreadfully slow in tumbling to the 
situation and the urgent need of pushing things along.’117 Wilson 
recognised that the key was shipping. Unfortunately, according to Sir 
Joseph Maclay, Minister of Shipping, the Allied effort was uncoordinated: 
‘He [Maclay] discussed matters with Pershing this morning and came to 
the conclusion that Pershing was a fool.’  Wilson thought the AEF’s 
commander was ‘a beaten man already’ and ‘worried and out of his 
depth’.118 Robertson also lobbied Pershing to do more. He told Wilson he 
thought he had persuaded him to attach AEF battalions to the British for 
training: ‘The French want the same thing and Pershing sees Pétain 
tomorrow before giving Robertson his final answer. Clemenceau told R 
(just as he told me) that he did not care who they went to provided they 
came over as fast as possible.’119 Robertson’s optimism was misplaced. 
Wilson saw Clemenceau the following day and found him looking tired and 
depressed. He said the Americans ‘were going to come too late, and that 
he would be dead very soon.’120 
 
Bliss, the recently-appointed American PMR, arrived at Versailles with a 
contingent of 150 AEF officers on the eve of the Third Session of the 
SWC. Wilson had a positive, collaborative relationship with Bliss; his diary 
references to the former US Army CoS suggest none of the tensions he 
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had with Pershing. One reason may have been Bliss’s support for the 
principle of ‘unified command’, of which the SWC was precursor.121 
Fearing an imminent German attack, they discussed the Americans 
sending 150 battalions to France, in addition to the two divisions per 
month which had already been agreed.122 Bliss favoured incorporating the 
additional battalions into British brigades; but Pershing did not. To support 
his argument, Bliss wanted convincing of the speed with which these 
forces needed to arrive. Confident of his powers of persuasion, Wilson told 
Bliss he was sure he could convince him and arranged for a 
demonstration of his War Game.123 Bliss and his colleagues ‘were 
immensely struck by the whole thing and Bliss told me he had never 
dreamt of such a thing and that it was intensely interesting and that we 
had made out an outstanding case for America helping us with every 
single man possible in every possible shape.124 
 
Wilson’s triumph was short-lived. Pershing, Bliss reported, was opposed to 
incorporating the extra infantry battalions and wanted troops to come over 
with all the elements of fully-fledged divisions. Wilson noted Pershing’s 
rationale as being ‘that the Boches could not attack with sufficient force to 
break us. As I said to Bliss: “What on earth does Pershing know about it”.’ 
He and Robertson ‘agreed we must force Pershing’s hand by going 
straight to [President] Wilson.’125 French and British leaders believed 
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Pershing was the barrier to getting American troops into the line. 
Pershing’s obduracy, they believed, was in stark contrast to his 
President’s uplifting promises of help and support. In fact, soon after the 
US entered the war Pershing received clear instructions that his force was 
to be a ‘separate and distinct’ component in the war, ‘the identity of which 
must be preserved’. Bliss had warned the President on 25 May 1917 that 
instead of a large and well trained American army, the Franco-British 
alliance wanted plenty of small units they could feed into their own lines to 
help resolve their manpower problems, although his position softened 
once he arrived in France.126 Pershing did his best to adhere to his 
government’s policy for the rest of the war. Wilson, with varying degrees of 
success, worked hard to modify it. Ignorant of Pershing’s orders, on the 
eve of the Third Meeting of the SWC Lloyd George hosted a conference to 
establish what co-operation Britain could expect. Pershing and Bliss faced 
not only the British Prime Minister but also Milner, Haig, Robertson and 
Wilson. As far as the latter was concerned, the rough way in which the 
British C-in-C and CIGS handled Pershing was ‘a thing to make an angel 
cry’.127 During what, even from the formal minutes, appears to have been 
a strained meeting, the British challenged Pershing about the 150 infantry 
battalions and when they would arrive. Pershing stalled, citing US 
domestic sentiment against American soldiers fighting under another flag, 
the need to maintain military morale and other reasons in favour of 
building full American divisions, complete with artillery.128 According to 
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Hankey, Pershing wanted the troops to be attached for training and was 
willing to allow them to do their share of fighting. Robertson wanted them 
mainly for fighting though he was willing they should be trained.129 
Afterwards, Wilson spoke to Pershing and was ‘convinced that he would 
agree to our command if only he is properly handled and if the case is 
properly put to him’.130 The next day Lloyd George and Pershing agreed a 
compromise to bring over the equivalent of three full-strength American 
divisions with the infantry being trained by the British and the artillery by 
the French.131 The British case was not helped by Clemenceau who told 
Pershing and Colonel Edward M. House, President Wilson’s 
representative to the SWC, that while it might be necessary to brigade 
AEF troops with the French Army and the BEF ‘he was of the opinion that 
if the American troops went in, very few of them would ever come out, and 
that it would be foolish to expect to build up a great American army by that 
method.’132 In his diary Wilson condemned Clemenceau as a ‘narrow 
pedagogue.’133  
 
Lloyd George’s struggle with Robertson dominated Wilson’s life for the 
next few weeks, but once in the CIGS role he returned to the vexed issue 
of American commitment. Matters came to head with the German Spring 
Offensive on 21 March 1918. Three days later, Wilson met the US 
Defence Secretary Newton Baker and the American Ambassador to 
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London Walter H. Page, and ‘explained the present dangerous situation & 
the urgency of immediate dispatch of Batt[alion]s from America. Not 
complete Divisions as that stupid man Pershing wants.’134 They were 
impressed by the seriousness of the situation and Bliss, with the support 
of Baker and Pershing, signed JN18 which asked the US government to 
ship only infantry and machine-gun units during the emergency. Baker told 
his President that the effect was to postpone the creation of an 
‘independent American army’, and was ‘conceded only in view of the 
present critical situation…we must keep in mind the formation of an 
American army, while at the same time, we must not seem to sacrifice 
joint efficiency at a critical moment to that object.’135 There were further 
frustrations ahead. As the first phase of the German offensive slowed, it 
became clear that President Wilson and Pershing, despite their words of 
assurance, did not believe they had made a commitment to parceling out 
the newly arriving American units to the Allies.136 On 31 March, Lloyd 
George told Wilson that the American President had agreed to send 
120,000 infantrymen a month for the next four months. President Wilson 
had also asked Britain not to introduce conscription into Ireland, an act 
which would make his task ‘very difficult’. Considering Pershing’s recent 
intransigence, Wilson found the offer ‘a little fishy!’137 He was right to be 
sceptical. At the meeting at Beauvais on 3 April, when Foch’s role was 
extended to the ‘strategic’ direction of operations, Lloyd George said he 
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understood President Wilson had agreed to send an additional 120,000 
troops a month to France. Pershing said he knew nothing of it.138  
 
Sackville-West, the new British PMR, complained to Wilson that he had 
been unable to get any written commitment from Pershing about future 
AEF contributions. The American was ‘playing the old Pétain-Haig stunt 
[delaying a decision to await developments], he is shoving Bliss on one 
side. The man’s an ass I think, he doesn’t mean business. What Bliss calls 
the [“]God-damned American programme[“] is going to b_____ up the 
whole show.’139 Wilson’s diary for the same day called Pershing a ‘d_____ 
fool’.140 The Germans launched their second major offensive on 9 April. 
Operation Georgette opened in Flanders and British forces gave up 
significant ground.141 The next day Wilson received an ‘alarmist’ telegram 
from Maurice (DMO) ‘saying [the] position was very serious & could only 
be saved by all the French & Americans coming to our assistance.’ He 
also had a ‘long talk’ with Bliss at Versailles. The American was ‘entirely 
on our side, & ag[ains]t Pershing, as regards employment of American 
Batts, so we can count on the old boy & Tit Willow tells me Bliss is 
eminently sensible & practical.’142 Two days later, Haig issued his ‘Backs 
to the Wall’ order of the day.143 Wilson met Plumer, the Second Army 
commander, at his headquarters and was told that ‘if the Boches go on 
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attacking heavily, he cannot hold the line of hills [east of the Ypres Salient] 
much longer.’144 
 
Wilson and Milner, who had just been appointed Secretary of State for 
War, met Pershing on 23 April to establish exactly what American help 
Britain could expect.145 Lloyd George had been told by Lord Reading, 
Britain’s ambassador to Washington, that the White House had 
reconfirmed the contribution of 120,000 men per month for four months.146 
According to Pershing no such agreement had been made and the three 
agreed diplomatically that there might have been a ‘misunderstanding’.  
Less diplomatically, in his diary Wilson described Pershing as ‘a 
hopelessly stupid pigheaded man’.147 Milner said all available transport 
should be used to bring infantry: ‘He considered the crucial moment of the 
war to be here, and that if the Germans reached Calais and the channel 
ports, the American divisions would be too late.’148 Wilson and Milner met 
Pershing again and the British won something of a victory in getting the 
Americans to make a formal commitment. In the so-called London 
Agreement, Pershing agreed to allow six divisions, a minimum of 130,000 
American infantry and machine-gun troops, to join the British in May. 
Pershing told his government that in the four months April to the end of 
July he expected 750,000 AEF troops to be transported to France.149 It 
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was a hard-won but important victory for Milner, and Wilson, who 
complained that Pershing was ‘so stupid, so narrow, so pigheaded’.150 
 
Thereafter American troops arrived in ever-increasing numbers, but it 
would be some time before they were ready to enter the front line. In mid-
May 1918 Lloyd George established the so-called ‘X Committee’ of 
himself, Milner and Wilson, with Hankey, or occasionally Amery, as 
secretary. The triumvirate met at 11am, before the War Cabinet at noon. 
Amery described it as a ‘very interesting and free and easy gathering’.151 
Most of its meetings took place that summer and ‘American co-operation’ 
was regularly on the agenda. At the second meeting, Wilson said Haig 
believed that despite the large numbers of troops being shipped, only 
three US battalions would be in the British line soon, and for instruction 
only. Lloyd George, suspecting British unwillingness to use the AEF 
troops, said he ‘had found GHQ, rather inclined to belittle the American 
battalions.’ Wilson countered that Foch felt the same: ‘He had four United 
States divisions practically under his orders, but he was only using one in 
the battle and only one brigade was at present in the line…’152 The 
following day Reading reported that 250,000 Americans would arrive in 
May, including 180,000 infantry/machine-gun troops. Lloyd George told 
Wilson to ensure they would be used effectively. Milner summed up the 
challenge when he reported that 20,000 troops had arrived in April: ‘Some 
of this first lot, however, had been pretty rough, and hardly knew how to 
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handle a rifle. This may have partly accounted for Sir Douglas Haig’s 
reluctance to use them without a good deal of further training.’153 Lloyd 
George continued to grumble at both X Committee and War Cabinet 
meetings about American policy. Wilson, as his diary and correspondence 
indicate, was more sanguine. This less critical approach seems to have 
been due in part to his relief that American forces were at last available in 
large numbers, even if they were being formed into Pershing’s longed for 
American Army. At the same time Wilson had more pressing concerns, the 
growing power of his old friend Foch and the challenges of Unity of 
Command. 
 
CONCLUSION 
With the shortage of manpower besetting the war weary entente in the 
latter half of 1917, the need for the Allies to co-operate was greater than 
ever. The French felt the British were not doing enough to prosecute the 
war to the full and could and should take over more of their trench lines. 
The British political leadership, for its part, was unwilling to continue to 
feed the seemingly insatiable demands of the generals for men. Wilson’s 
skills as a soldier-diplomat were put to the test when he arrived at 
Versailles where he worked to successfully defuse French frustrations 
while protecting British interests. His relationship with Clemenceau was 
particularly important and they met regularly over the winter of 1917-18. It 
is significant that despite the almost permanent presence of Lloyd 
George’s War Cabinet colleague Milner at Versailles during this period, it 
                                            
153 TNA, X Committee minutes, (CAB 23/17/2),17 May 1918. 
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was Wilson whom Clemenceau turned to when he wanted reassurance 
about British policy. It is equally significant that Wilson invariably managed 
to assuage the ‘Tiger’s’ temper. The British finally agreed to take over 
more French line but the commitment, while significant, was not as 
extreme as it might have been. Wilson had less success when dealing 
with the Americans, particularly the AEF’s C-in-C Pershing. British hopes 
that large numbers of American troops would pour into the front-line 
trenches to fight shoulder to shoulder were stymied by President Wilson’s 
determination that his forces would fight as a national army. In fairness to 
Wilson neither he nor his colleagues knew this and thus condemned 
Pershing for obstinacy. Wilson displayed obstinacy of his own on the 
domestic front when in calling for conscription in Ireland he displayed an 
uncharacteristically myopic view of the politics of the land of his birth. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
UNITY OF COMMAND 
This chapter re-evaluates Wilson’s role in the establishment, development 
and ultimate application of ‘unity of command’ on the Allied forces on the 
Western Front in late 1917 and 1918. In this area of policy Wilson has 
been portrayed as either an opportunist, jumping on the bandwagon of 
others to serve his own directionless ambition, or as a willing dupe, 
moulded by astute politicians with clearer motives and vision than he. In 
fact, Wilson was the principal architect of the structures which led directly 
to the establishment of unity of command on the Western Front in 1918, 
and the appointment of his friend Foch as ‘General in Chief of the Allied 
Armies’ or ‘Generalissimo’. ‘Unity of command’ was not a novel concept to 
Allied military and political leaders in late 1917. The notion had been 
discussed often during the war, with little of substance achieved.1 The 
principle appealed, indeed appeared to make sense, and was cited as one 
reason German strategy had been so effective.2 In early 1917, Lloyd 
George put Haig under the orders of the French General Nivelle for his ill-
fated April offensive.3 Subordinating the British Army to the French was a 
different principle to having a commander who stood above all armies. 
Since then, thanks to an absence of clear political authority, objections 
from senior military figures, and a lack of trust between the Allies, matters 
                                            
1 William Philpott, ‘Squaring the Circle: the Higher Co-ordination of the Entente in the 
winter of 1915-16’, English Historical Review, vol. 114 (458) (1999), pp. 875-898. 
2 Greenhalgh, Victory Through Coalition, p. 3; Hankey, Supreme Command, (vol. II), p. 
597. 
3 Woodward, Lloyd George, pp. 144-156. 
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had returned to ‘normal’. Allied leaders and their senior commanders met 
from time to time, discussed issues of mutual interest, and then returned 
to normal business with only occasional, limited, tangible agreement on 
co-operation and co-ordination. What was not in place was a formal 
structure for policy-making, with either advisory or, more significantly 
executive, powers. Wilson had been a supporter of closer co-operation 
between the Allies since at least October 1915. At that time, as Britain’s 
Principal Liaison Officer with the French Army, Wilson wrote to Bonar Law 
condemning the French-led campaign in Salonika as an ‘insane project’, 
and the result of a failure of co-ordination between London and Paris: 
I have been warning you for many weeks about the dangers of 
strained relations with the French (the only way of losing the war) 
and the necessity of setting up a machinery for obviating this 
pressing danger. However this was not approved but it does not 
alter my opinion by a hair’s breadth. I ask you again to set up a 
small mixed Committee of the [following]:  
2 Foreign Affairs 
2 War Office Ministers 
2 Cs-in-C 
to deal with these problems and to obviate useless and 
mischievous “mass meetings”, visits of high officials bent on saving 
reputations…4 
 
The intervening years reinforced Wilson’s views, but for most senior British 
soldiers in the winter of 1917-18 Robertson’s view prevailed. He found the 
principle of unity of command ‘attractive’, in theory. In practice, however, it 
had led to the failures of the ‘Nivelle era’ and the losses of vital heavy 
guns sent to Italy. So far as unity of command was concerned, he was 
unconvinced: ‘In short the general situation is such that our Allies require a 
                                            
4 PA, Bonar Law Papers, Wilson to Bonar Law, (BL 52/1/10), 3 December 1915. 
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strong military lead, and this necessitates that our forces should be 
provided with the means for giving this lead.’ Robertson’s model was not a 
sharing of authority, it was not unity of command; it was, rather, for 
Britain’s military leaders, and her armies, to replace those of the French as 
the principal players in the Allied balance of power. In 1918 Britain should 
increasingly take the strategic initiative.5 Wilson disagreed. He retained 
the view that the Allies needed to work more closely and in a more 
structured way if they were to win. It was not until late 1917, when his 
credibility with leading politicians rose, that he was able to put his ideas 
into effect. 
 
The other key figures in the equation were Foch, the French CoS, and 
Milner, Lloyd George’s closest ally in the War Cabinet. Wilson’s ‘superbly 
argued case’ for ‘integrated “Superior Direction”’ of war policy was the 
catalyst for the creation of the SWC.6 Its ‘inter-Allied Staff’, although 
overtly ‘advisory’ in nature, filled the vacuum of strategic creativity British, 
and to a lesser extent French, politicians believed prevailed amongst the 
Allied C-in-Cs. Wilson dominated the work of this Staff in its first three 
months and continued to do so, through the auspices of his loyal 
successors, for the rest of the war. He played a leading role in the 
development and concrete expression of the principle of ‘unity of 
command’; an indistinct and elusive concept until then. Many British 
                                            
5 CAB 24/28/42, GT 2242, CIGS to War Cabinet, ‘Future Military Policy’, 9 October 1917, 
p. 7. 
6 Roskill, Hankey, p. 444, in reference to: CAB 27/8, WP 61. 
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colleagues saw Wilson as an uncritical Francophile. This is over simplistic. 
He admired the French Army and enjoyed good relations with some 
French soldiers and politicians, but he was not their puppet. Once Foch 
became commander of Allied forces on the Western Front, rather than 
being the obedient friend, Wilson was a stern critic, regularly warning his 
political masters of his fears of renewed French strategic domination. 
Despite this, Wilson’s diplomatic skills - with ready and, usually cordial, 
access to Foch and Clemenceau - made a major contribution to 
preserving the Alliance at a critical time in Anglo-French relations. 
Nonetheless, the CIGS was not blind to the failings of his own colleagues, 
and at one point recommended that Haig be relieved of his command. 
 
Two fundamentally important ‘Joint Notes’, produced, like those discussed 
already, by Wilson and his team, were instrumental in establishing formal 
Allied ‘unity of command’. JN12 (‘Campaign 1918’), is considered in the 
next chapter. Its underlying emphasis on the need for formal co-operation 
in the Middle East was approved unanimously by the political leaders on 
the SWC.7 The same body also accepted JN14 (‘The General Reserve’), 
and an ‘Executive War Board’ to oversee it, with Foch as chairman. The 
historiography acknowledges the relevance of these two Joint Notes in the 
ongoing dispute between the politicians and the military over strategic 
control, but their function as catalysts in Wilson’s campaign for a more co-
ordinated approach to war policy merits further attention. Their genesis in 
                                            
7 TNA, WO 158/57, Joint Note No 12 ‘1918 Campaign’, 21 January 1918. 
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December 1917 and January 1918, the analysis undertaken in their 
creation and the arguments developed in their promotion convinced Lloyd 
George and his cabinet allies of Wilson’s abilities. Just as importantly, he 
convinced the Allied politicians and senior soldiers that closer co-
ordination of strategy, something which had not been achieved 
successfully in the war to this point, was possible. The work of the SWC 
secretariat has been passed over briefly in the historiography but closer 
consideration reveals the multiple challenges facing the Allied supreme 
command at the start of 1918.  
 
JOINT NOTE 14: THE GENERAL RESERVE 
This was the most controversial paper of the 14 produced by the PMRs 
while Wilson led their deliberations. While there was disagreement about 
action in other theatres, soldiers and statesmen agreed that France and 
Flanders was the principal front. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
problem of manpower and the linked issue of the British taking over more 
line from the French, also concentrated minds. Wilson believed that a 
large, mobile, reserve force was essential if the Allies were to overcome 
the manpower challenge. Wilson’s plan was accepted by the SWC on 2 
February 1918. The PMRs said the formation of a General Reserve ‘for 
the whole of the Allied forces on the Western front, both in France and 
Italy, is imperative’. The politicians were asked to act quickly and to get the 
views of their C-in-Cs and CoSs on the ‘number, situation and command’ 
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of this reserve.8 Wilson’s secretariat began work on the subject in 
November, their war games providing justification for a reserve capable of 
being deployed to any sector. The second meeting of the PMRs on 8 
December agreed the issue of reserves was a key element in deciding 
Allied strategy for 1918.9 In January Wilson lobbied for the reserve, 
pressing Clemenceau, Milner and Lloyd George, with support from Foch. 
Unsurprisingly, the idea did not find favour with Haig, Robertson or Pétain. 
 
The winter of 1917-18 was militarily and politically fraught for the British 
supreme command. The campaigns of 1917 had been disappointing and 
costly for the Allies. In Britain, Lloyd George was unhappy with his 
generals’ apparent obsession with offensives on the Western Front, but 
leading a coalition government he was far from confident of his own 
political security. France had a new Prime Minister who was determined to 
win the war but who argued that his British allies could and should bear 
much more of the burden. As a result, opportunities existed for Wilson to 
influence strategy, but also for him to fail. Although damaged in the eyes 
of politicians such as Lloyd George and Milner, Haig and Robertson still 
had considerable support in Parliament and in the Press.10 Despite Lloyd 
George’s frustration with Robertson, Wilson continued to believe that the 
                                            
8 TNA, CAB 25/120, ‘Supreme War Council, Papers and Minutes’, (enclosure 64), 
Minutes of a meeting of Permanent Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, 
(hereafter SWC Minutes) 23 January 1918, ‘Schedule B’: Joint Note 14: The General 
Reserve; see also Greenhalgh, Foch, p. 287. 
9 TNA, CAB 25/120, (enclosure 17), SWC Minutes, 8 December 1917; Wilson diary, 8 
December 1917. 
10 For a discussion of the role of the Press in this period see Stephen Badsey, ‘The 
Missing Western Front; Politics, Propaganda and Strategy 1918’, in idem, The British 
Army in Battle and its Image 1914-18 (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 185-209. 
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CIGS had a role. On 10 January, he talked to Robertson about ‘the vital 
necessity of having a central reserve under Versailles or under him 
[Robertson] and Foch. He is much taken with this idea, but why the devil 
didn’t he think of it himself.’11 The following day he saw Clemenceau, who 
looked ‘tired and depressed’ and who feared the Americans were going to 
come too late’:   
I told him of my scheme for a central Reserve under Versailles, 
which he said at once meant “under Wilson” to which I agreed, and 
I spoke long & earnestly to him on this question of 3 Boche attacks, 
the 3rd being only launched when the first two had used up all 
Haig’s & Pétain’s Reserves. This would be fatal & my plan of 
Reserves under Versailles or under Foch & Robertson is the only 
possible solution.12 
 
These contradictory diary entries, a day apart, one suggesting Robertson, 
with Foch, should take authority over the reserve, the other accepting the 
responsibility for it himself, has been interpreted as an example of 
Wilson’s artful deceit of a colleague.13 An alternative interpretation is that 
when Clemenceau, who liked Wilson, supported the Versailles option he 
saw an opportunity to settle a problem while advancing himself. It would 
have been stranger for Wilson to have rejected Clemenceau’s confidence 
than it was that he accepted it.  
 
Lloyd George wanted to regain control of military policy. He played 
fleetingly with the notion of calling for the return of Joffre as 
‘Generalissimo’ with Wilson as his CoS. The latter told Milner that he ‘had 
                                            
11 Wilson diary, 10 January 1918. 
12 Ibid., 11 January 1918. 
13 Woodward, Lloyd George, p. 256. 
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always been in favour of one C-in-C in theory and opposed to it in 
practice’. He opposed the appointment of a Generalissimo and, ‘if this was 
tried it would make it still more impossible if he was given a foreigner for 
Chief of Staff’. The ‘real solution to our difficulties’, he said ‘lies in the 
further development of the [sic] Versailles, which the PM himself set up’.14 
He also told Milner of ‘my proposal for a Central Reserve under 
Versailles’.15 At this stage Wilson was gaining in confidence, even those 
for whom he had little regard paid him complements. On 17 January, 
Smuts reportedly told Duncannon ‘that if I [Wilson] played my cards 
properly I would soon decide the strategy of the campaign and that if I had 
been CIGS for the last 2-3 years the war would now have been over...’16 
With Clemenceau’s support in mind, Wilson disposed of the notion that 
Foch and Robertson, as their nations’ respective CoSs, should manage 
the reserve. He and Foch ‘discussed my plan for Central Reserve under 
Versailles with which Foch agrees, & then he thinks we want some 
executive power & authority. He thinks my proposal will do very well as a 
commencement.’17 Encouraged, Wilson took his proposal to the next 
meeting of the PMRs, but Weygand ‘expressed the opinion that no 
General Reserve was possible without a single Commander-in-Chief for all 
the armies to deal with it.’ Wilson argued that such an arrangement was 
‘impossible’ but as a general reserve was ‘highly desirable it was equally 
desirable to find some other arrangement so as to be able to deal with it’.18 
                                            
14 PA, Lloyd George Papers, F/38/3/2, Wilson to Milner, 14 January 1918. 
15 Wilson diary, 13, 14 January 1918. 
16 Ibid., 17 January 1918 (original emphasis). 
17 Ibid., 18 January 1918. 
18 TNA, CAB 25/120, (enclosure 56), SWC Minutes, 19 January 1918. 
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Thanks to Foch, Wilson’s plan suffered only the briefest hiatus. On 21 
January, he noted: ‘Weygand came to tell me he was sorry he had 
objected to my paper about [the] necessity of having a Central Reserve & 
he was now prepared to agree. He had evidently seen Foch!’19 
 
This was a critical period in Wilson’s career. In the days leading up to the 
third meeting of the SWC he convinced his allies of his strategic vision 
while disarming his opponents. The conference would be asked to 
approve fourteen Joint Notes, all of them constructed by Wilson and his 
team, several of them already facing opposition from his colleagues in the 
British General Staff, and GHQ. If standing on the defensive in the west, 
while attempting some form of advance in the east, and the creation of a 
general reserve were not controversial enough, Wilson was also coming 
around to the notion of a commander for the Allied reserve, or a 
‘Generalissimo’.20 On the eve of the conference Wilson met Robertson: 
 We then discussed my paper about reserves and I told him that my 
original idea of having a small pool under Versailles or under Foch 
and him would not do and that on working out the battle carefully I 
had come to the conclusion that all the Reserves must be under 
one authority. I told him that for the first time in the war I was 
wavering about a C-in-C. But he said “We can’t do that” so I left him 
to think over it.21 
 
The principle of a general reserve was accepted by ‘all the soldiers and 
statesmen’ present at the Versailles summit. What was in doubt was the 
question of how to command it.22 Wilson was aware of this problem, but, 
                                            
19 Wilson diary, 21 January 1918; Amery diary, 21 January 1918, in Barnes and 
Nicholson, Amery Diaries, p. 201. 
20 This was a more limited role than the one Foch ultimately adopted. 
21 Wilson diary, 28 January 1918, (original emphasis). 
22 Hankey, Supreme Command, (vol. II), p. 769. 
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knowing he had the support of Foch, Lloyd George and Clemenceau he 
seems to have been content to allow his adversaries to appear narrow-
minded and un-co-operative. The day before the conference he had a 
meeting with Haig and Robertson: 
To discuss taking over the line and also the question of Reserves. I 
was horrified at the ignorance and total inability of Haig, Lawrence 
and Robertson to grasp the elements of either problem. Futile and 
childish arguments were brought forward and LG afterwards told 
me he had formed the lowest opinion of all three men... then before 
dinner a long talk with LG and Milner about taking over the line, 
about the Reserve question, about Palestine. Of course LG is 
longing to get rid of Robertson …23 
 
Much has been written about the third meeting of the SWC (30 January-2 
February 1918), with attention being paid to the debates around JN12 and 
JN14.24 For the most part it has been characterised as Lloyd George’s 
successful attempt to wrest control of war policy from the senior 
commanders, specifically Haig and Robertson, with the latter losing his job 
in the process. The summation, while accurate, is incomplete. This 
‘“personalisation” of the debate, which coloured (and colours) attitudes 
and responses to it’ has led to an over-simplified representation of 
Wilson’s role.25 His diplomatic skills, backed up by his well-argued reports, 
have been overlooked in favour of a simplistic picture of a man with a 
silver-tongue in the right place at the right time. This is to misrepresent his 
pro-active, influential contribution. Wilson had an ability to see issues from 
                                            
23 Wilson diary, 29 January 1918; Herbert ‘Lorenzo’ Lawrence was briefly Haig’s Head of 
Intelligence and replaced Kiggell as CoS in February 1918, Paul Harris, ‘Soldier Banker; 
Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Lawrence as the BEF's Chief of Staff 1918', Journal of the 
Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 90 (361), (2012): pp. 44-67. 
24 Greenhalgh, Foch, pp. 286-287; idem., ‘Paul Painlevé and Franco-British Relations in 
1918’, Contemporary British History, vol. 25 (2011), pp. 5-27; Jeffery, Wilson, pp. 214-
218; Woodward, Lloyd George, pp. 253-260; Woodward, Robertson, pp. 196-201. 
25 Jeffery, Wilson, p. 216. 
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a different angle, challenge established views and explain them clearly to 
politicians tired of what they perceived as dogmatic and inarticulate 
generals.26 For the first time in the war he had an audience of the highest 
authority, the British and French Prime Ministers, the French CoS, and the 
soon-to-be British Secretary of State for War. These men had similar 
views and were willing to listen to his ideas. Wilson’s ability to persuade is 
evidenced by his diary entry for the first day of the SWC meeting. Lloyd 
George, Milner, Clemenceau, the new Italian Prime Minister Vittorio 
Emanuele Orlando, and his Foreign Minister Baron Giorgio Sonnino met at 
Wilson’s villa.27 They talked for two and a half hours and agreed on the 
necessity of a central reserve. Clemenceau, seemingly without concerning 
himself with where the troops would come, from ‘insisted that it must be a 
big one of – he said – 40 Divisions. He would not hear of my original 
proposal of 10 or 12 Divisions.’ Lloyd George continued to grumble about 
Robertson’s attitude: ‘LG discussing the matter with me later said he found 
it very difficult to know what to do about Robertson and me, though he 
said he knew what he wanted.’28 In February the Prime Minister would 
finally achieve his ambition, the forced resignation of Robertson and his 
replacement by Wilson. 
 
After agreeing JN12 on the 1918 Campaign, and 11 of the 12 other Joint 
Notes, the next day and a half were devoted to the creation of the general 
                                            
26 Years later, in an otherwise critical profile, Lloyd George praised Wilson’s ‘lucidity of 
mind...It was a delight to hear him unravel and expound a military problem,’ Lloyd 
George, Memoirs (vol. II), p. 1688. 
27 Orlando became Italian Prime Minister on 29 October 1917, after the disaster at 
Caporetto, Cassar, Forgotten Front, p. 77. 
28 Wilson diary, 30 January 1918. 
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reserve and its command.29 For Foch, ‘the necessity of having a Reserve 
was absolutely indisputable’. It had to be relevant to the whole of the 
Western Front, from Nieuport to the Adriatic. Command should lie with the 
Italian, British and French C-in-Cs working together.30 Robertson agreed in 
principle with the creation of a reserve but doubted the need for one at 
present because ‘most of the Allied troops were needed where they were’. 
Command of reserves was ‘fundamental’, and if one had to be created 
then, as Foch had suggested, it should be directed by the CsOS. Its job 
was to perform those duties which could not be undertaken by one C-in-C 
acting alone on one of the fronts. Robertson was as consistent as ever in 
in his logic. Just as when he had objected to the creation of the SWC and 
its staff of military advisers, he argued for power and responsibility to lie 
together: 
Whoever commands the Reserve must be in a position to issue 
orders immediately the emergency arises. The central controlling 
body, however, should interfere as little as possible with the 
Commanders-in-Chief, who were responsible to their respective 
governments.31 
 
The delegates were unable to reach agreement in a debate Wilson 
described as a ‘great fight’. Robertson, he wrote: 
…wanted the command to be given to Foch and himself. I wrote out 
notes for LG showing the duties of the Commanders of this 
Reserve and how impossible it would be for CIGS to be over here 
to perform them. LG entirely agreed and showed that neither 
London, Rome or Washington could spare their CIGSs, though 
Paris of course was different...There remained, therefore, only 2 
solutions (as everyone agreed a C-in-C impossible) one was 
Versailles and the other was some Generals ad hoc.32 
                                            
29 A decision on Joint Note 4 ‘The Balkan Problem’ was adjourned for further research. 
30 TNA, CAB 25/120, ‘Supreme War Council, Papers and Minutes’, (enclosure 75), 
‘Procès-verbal of the fourth meeting of the Third Session of the Supreme War Council, 1 
February 1918, pp. 2-3. 
31 TNA, CAB 25/120, 1 February 1918, p. 3. 
32 Wilson diary, 1 February 1918; CAC, HNKY, Hankey diary, 1 February 1918. 
 223 
 
Using Wilson’s notes, Hankey wrote a new proposal to put the reserve 
under the control of a committee consisting of the British, Italian and 
United States PMRs with Foch in the Chair.33 Haig felt the decision ‘to 
some extent’ made Foch ‘a “Generalissimo”’.34 The resolution was 
adopted later that day and thus: 
The long duel between me and Robertson has ended in his 
complete defeat. The Executive War Board now set up consists of 
the Mil Reps here, less Weygand but plus Foch. Robertson fought 
to the last to be on it but was badly beaten. I wonder will he resign?  
… Robertson was over-ruled about the 1918 campaign and 
squarely beaten over the question of Command of the General 
Reserve. In other words our Cabinet and the Cabinets of all the 
Allies have backed everything Versailles has advised. This really 
was a triumph.35 
 
THE FATE OF THE GENERAL RESERVE 
The controlling body for the Reserve, the EWB, met the next day and 
twice the following week.36 Foch, who would have commanded it, and his 
friend Wilson, had good reasons to want it to succeed. The events 
culminating in the principle of where command of the reserve lay was at 
the root of Robertson’s resignation from the post of CIGS. Wilson took 
over Robertson’s role at the War Office on 18 February 1918. The 
acceptance of the principle of the reserve and the EWB, with Foch as its 
chairman, ‘constituted a momentous step forward’ towards unity of 
command.37 It did little, however, to ease Anglo-French tensions over 
troop numbers and the extent of front line each army held. One of Wilson’s 
                                            
33 CAC, HNKY, Hankey diary, 2 February 1918; Wilson diary, 2 February 1918. 
34 Haig diary, 2 February 1918, Sheffield and Bourne, Haig: Diaries, p. 378. 
35 Wilson diary, 2 February 1918. 
36 TNA, CAB 25/119, Executive War Board minutes, 3, 5, 6 February 1918. 
37 Callwell, Wilson, (vol. II), p. 63. 
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greatest attributes was pragmatism, his ability to know when to stand his 
ground and when to give way. Virtue or vice, this ‘political’ astuteness 
deserted him on Ireland, but on other issues it was generally sound. On 
the matter of the reserve, his own creation, he was prepared to bend with 
events. Days after becoming CIGS Wilson saw Haig who ‘flatly refuses’ to 
hand over any of his divisions to the Reserve and ‘says he won’t be 
responsible for his line, and rather than do it he would resign.’ Haig was 
prepared to contribute two divisions from Italy, but as such a move was 
another point of Allied disagreement there seemed little chance of 
immediate action. Pétain was ‘in much the same mood,’ according to 
Clemenceau, who also favoured using troops from Italy and perhaps 
growing the force later: ‘I confess I don’t agree, and said so bluntly, but I 
am not in a position to overcome the Tiger, Pétain and Haig.’38 Haig’s 
argument was that he feared an imminent attack and placing some of his 
force under another’s command would put his defence plans at ‘grave 
risk’.39 
 
Apart from pure pragmatism, there are other likely reasons for Wilson’s 
turning away from the reserve. While at Versailles a reserve army under 
him and Foch gave him power and importance. Now he was at the War 
Office, he had both. Haig perceived that ‘with his advent to power as 
CIGS’, Wilson’s interest in Versailles had weakened.40 With Robertson 
vanquished, Wilson made great efforts to work co-operatively with Haig. 
                                            
38 Wilson diary, 25 and 26 February 1918. 
39 Haig diary, 25 February 1918, in Sheffield & Bourne, Haig: Diaries, p. 384. 
40 Ibid., pp. 384-5. 
 225 
Finally, as CIGS Wilson had a first-hand view of the pressures on the 
BEF’s manpower. In contrast, Wilson’s two closest friends on the Western 
Front lined up against him. Rawlinson, his successor as British PMR, 
sided with Foch. He wrote to Wilson four times in a week to press the 
Versailles case, accusing Haig of a ‘non possumus’ [Lat. “we cannot”] 
attitude’ and of negating Versailles’ authority by agreeing informally with 
Pétain that they would each come to the aid of the other if the need 
arose.41 This ‘mere local adjustment’ between commanders was exactly 
the kind of thing Wilson had warned against when lobbying for a strategic 
supervisory role for the SWC.42 Foch, also aware that without a General 
Reserve to command there was little for the EWB he chaired to do, was 
‘very bitter’ at Haig’s refusal to co-operate and wanted the Board’s powers 
enhanced or for it to be wound up.43 Wilson admitted that Haig appeared 
to have:  
…gone back to his original position…which, by the way, I think he 
never left, and refused to ear-mark any divisions for the Special 
Reserve… it does not seem to me that it is worth our while bringing 
the Executive Committee into action for so small a force, unless the 
French and Italians are prepared to put up substantial forces, which 
I very much doubt when they see that we produce none.44 
 
Thus, Wilson put paid to the body he had fought to establish only weeks 
before. Although in his diary he continued to argue the rightness of the 
reserve he recognised that without the co-operation of Haig the cause was 
                                            
41 Wilson papers, Rawlinson to Wilson (2/13A/1) 1 March 1918, (2/13A/3) 3 March, 
(2/13A/6) 6 March, (2/13A/9) 7 March. 
42 TNA, CAB 25/120/3, SWC, British Secretariat, Papers and Minutes, ‘Matters for Action 
or Watching by the Minister in Charge’, 4 December 1917. 
43 Wilson papers, Rawlinson to Wilson (2/13A/10), 8 March 1918. 
44 Wilson papers, Wilson to Rawlinson (2/13A/4), 4 March 1918. 
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lost. Just before the meeting of the Fourth Session of the SWC Wilson had 
another discussion with the Field Marshal: 
He says he can’t and he won’t give any divisions to the General 
Reserve. He explained that he had not enough for [a] GHQ 
Reserve, and he said that, if I wanted a General Reserve, I must 
make some more divisions and I must get more man-power…I 
impressed on him the fact that by refusing to contribute to the 
General Reserve he was killing that body, and he would have to live 
on Pétain’s charity, and he would find that very cold charity. But I 
was quite unable to persuade him.45 
 
Without the support of the C-in-Cs, the SWC resolved to establish a 
reserve when feasible. Wilson acknowledged that his was ‘a nonsense’.46 
Milner disagreed and warned Lloyd George it ‘would look very bad indeed’ 
if the idea were dropped.47 His protest was academic. Less than a week 
later, on 21 March, the Germans launched the first phase of the 
‘Kaiserschlacht’, their Spring Offensive, putting an end to the issue.48 
Failure to reach agreement had convinced Foch that without real 
executive power, bodies such as the EWB were little more than talking 
shops. The German attack gave Foch, with essential support from Wilson, 
his opportunity to gain real authority. 
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Much attention has been paid in the historiography to Haig’s recollection of 
the events surrounding Foch’s appointment as ‘Generalissimo’.49 In the 
typescript version of his diary for 25 March, Haig stated that he 
telegraphed for Wilson and Milner to come to France to arrange that 
‘General Foch or some other determined general, who would fight, should 
be given supreme control of the operations in France.’50 This detail is not 
in the original handwritten (manuscript) version of the diary and Sheffield 
has noted that no record exists of the telegram. He concluded that: ‘The 
simplest explanation is that a tired and stressed man let off steam in his 
diary, apportioning blame and giving himself the credit he believed he 
deserved.’51 Wilson’s role in the decision has received less critical 
attention. His diary adds some credence to part of Haig’s version of 
events, the call to Wilson, albeit with slight differences in timing. Wilson 
received a telephone call from Foch at 5.30pm: 
…asking me what I thought of [the] situation, & we are of one mind 
that someone must catch a hold or we shall be beaten. I said I 
would come over & see him. 
At 7 0’c. meeting at 10 Downing Street … While we were 
discussing, a telephone from Haig to say 3rd Army was falling back 
to the Ancre & asking me to go over.52 
 
He recorded that he arrived at Haig’s headquarters at 11.50am the next 
day: ‘I told Haig that in my opinion we must get greater unity of action, & I 
suggested that Foch should co-ordinate the action of both C-in-Cs. In the 
end Douglas Haig agreed.’ Wilson proposed to Foch and Pétain that when 
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the British and French leaders met he would ‘suggest that he (Foch) 
should be commissioned by both Governments to co-ordinate the military 
action of the two C-in-Cs.’53 British and French political and military 
leaders, including Clemenceau, Poincaré, Milner, Foch, Pétain, Haig and 
Wilson, with General Sir Julian Byng (GOC Third Army), Plumer (Second 
Army) and General Sir Henry Horne (First Army), convened at Doullens on 
26 March.54 Wilson had a preparatory meeting with Milner and Haig, at 
which the latter ‘agreed to my proposal for Foch to co-ordinate’. Milner and 
Clemenceau approved this on behalf of their governments. According to 
Wilson’s diary: ‘Both Lawrence & Haig are delighted with this new 
arrangement about Foch. So is Foch & so really is Clemenceau, who 
patted me on the head & said I was un bon garçon.’55 Clemenceau had 
long supported unity of command under a Generalissimo and knew 
Wilson, while sceptical, was more open to the idea than Robertson.56 Even 
allowing for a degree of personal aggrandisement, Wilson played a more 
active role in Foch’s appointment than has previously been acknowledged. 
At Versailles, Wilson used this independence from Haig and Robertson to 
push his own agenda. Once in the positon of CIGS, with Foch as Allied 
Generalissimo, Wilson’s energy and creativity, together with their old 
friendship, would be put to the test. 
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FOCH AS GENERALISSIMO 
The new, ‘unified’, approach to Allied strategy making on the Western 
Front, combined with a series of major German offensives resulted, 
inevitably, in strained relations. Haig and Pétain found themselves 
operating under a new, unfamiliar and evolving system. Neither C-in-C 
was any longer the final arbiter of how and when to deploy his armies. It is 
incorrect, however, to suggest that Foch’s authority was ‘rarely 
challenged’.57 Wilson, while defending British interests, injected 
pragmatism and exploited his rapport with the French leadership. The 
result was that, unlike in the first 18 months of the war, when Anglo-
French relations lurched from one crisis to another, disagreements with 
the potential to develop into major rifts were defused and smoothed over, 
albeit not without considerable noise and bluster. Wilson successfully 
represented Haig’s anxieties over Foch’s use of his forces, and behind the 
scenes he grew concerned by what he believed were growing signs of 
attempted French strategic hegemony. He invested energy, and personal 
capital, in alerting both Lloyd George and Milner, who became Secretary 
of State for War in mid-April, to these fears. He also worked successfully 
to keep Britain’s French ally ‘on side’, particularly in late May and June 
when the latter’s continued commitment to the conflict seemed, to British 
leaders, problematic. Wilson had his concerns about French conduct, and 
his relationship with Clemenceau was sometimes fraught, but never 
reached breaking point. Nonetheless, the Wilson-Foch dynamic, though 
punctuated by occasional quarrels, remained robust, enabling a greater 
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level of Allied co-operation than had been achieved at any earlier period in 
the war.  
 
When the Doullens Agreement was signed, Wilson was already aware of 
the less accommodating side of Foch’s character. They clashed at the 
second meeting of the EWB over the number of divisions each country 
should allocate to the nascent General Reserve. Wilson noted, with 
apparent surprise, that Foch had been ‘difficult and unreasonable’ and had 
used his casting vote as chairman to overrule the former in favour of his 
own proposal. Typically, Wilson thought his friend was at fault, and told 
Foch afterwards ‘that we must not make things difficult or the machine 
would never work.’58 Over the next year Wilson became familiar with 
Foch’s stubborn determination and self-belief, or ‘clear-sightedness’ as the 
Marshal’s recent biographer has termed it.59 Wilson’s priority after 
Doullens was to ensure the speedy move of French reinforcements to the 
British front. The BEF was undermanned and facing a major offensive, 
with more expected. Wilson’s abiding fear was that the British and French 
armies would ‘lose contact’, the British being forced back on the Channel 
ports and the French falling back to defend Paris. Such a rift, he believed, 
could mean the loss of the war.  Despite British problems, the CIGS told 
the War Cabinet meeting of 23 March that while French assistance was 
‘indispensible’ another attack was expected on their front in Champagne 
and ‘we must not make too great a demand upon them until the situation 
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there was clearer.’ The Prime Minister countered that if the plan for a 
General Reserve had been carried out ‘it would not have been necessary 
to have this bargaining process.’60 The next day Lloyd George complained 
to Riddell, that ‘…one of the disasters of the war was the failure to appoint 
Henry Wilson to high command.’61 Be that as it may, there was no doubt 
about the seriousness of the situation, but maintaining a balance between 
the competing priorities of the two C-in-Cs was one reason Wilson, who 
took a dim view of Pétain’s abilities, favoured Foch as arbiter of strategic 
goals. When Wilson arrived in France to assess the crisis, Haig warned 
him that ‘unless the “whole French Army” came up we were beaten & it 
would be better to make peace on any terms we could.’62 Pétain, with 
Foch’s encouragement, ordered 10 French divisions to aid the British, but 
the question of the size, location and timing of French support dominated 
Wilson’s work for the next month.63  
 
The confusion with which the BEF in France reacted to Operation Michael 
was echoed in London. Wilson briefed Lloyd George, the King and then 
the War Cabinet, reassuring them that, despite serous setbacks, ‘the 
chances were in our favour now.’64 Anxious to verify Wilson and Milner’s 
assessments, Lloyd George sent Churchill to France to see Foch and 
provide ‘any form of assistance’.65 This outraged both Wilson and Milner 
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who both saw it as interference in their areas of responsibility. Wilson 
caught Churchill aboard his train at Charing Cross: ‘He was being sent to 
Foch by LG! I told him I could not agree & I must have this changed & he 
must go to Clemenceau not to any soldier.’ The Prime Minister told 
Wilson, perhaps to mollify him, that he wanted Churchill to see 
Clemenceau because the British Ambassador Lord Bertie was ‘no use!’ 
Wilson speculated that Churchill would ‘advise LG to send Derby to Paris 
& put him (Winston) into the WO!’66 Lloyd George subsequently instructed 
Churchill to ‘stick to Paris and not go directing strategy at GHQ’. 
Regardless, Churchill visited GHQ, and was given a personal tour of the 
forward areas by Clemenceau. His reports to the British Prime Minister so 
upset Milner that he called on Wilson at his home: 
At this morning’s Cabinet LG read out portions of 2 wires rec[eive]d 
from Winston…Milner referred to this and said he was going to tell 
LG that either he (M) must have LG’s full confidence or he would 
have to leave the Govt. I agreed with Milner. This sending Winston 
over – first, with the idea of going to Foch which I killed, & then to 
Clemenceau is a direct snub to Milner who, after all, represented 
the Govt at Doullens & has, all along, been the Cabinet member at 
Versailles.67 
 
Churchill had been urging a major French counter-offensive and reported 
that he was happy with their preparations.68 Wilson was as jealous as 
Milner of Churchill’s access and anxious to get him back to London: ‘He is 
doing mischief in France.’69 The next day the Prime Minister, at Churchill’s 
request and following ‘a serious misunderstanding’ between Foch, Haig 
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and Rawlinson’ over troop deployment, crossed to France with Wilson.70 
Churchill told them ‘Clemenceau wanted Foch’s position strengthened. I 
agreed but not up to C-in-C especially as the Tiger wished this principally 
to allow Foch to coerce Pétain & not Haig who was working smoothly.’71 
The War Cabinet had already discussed extending Foch’s powers to give 
him the right to issue ‘directions or orders, instead of being limited to co-
ordination.’ Lloyd George had been in favour, but stopped short of making 
Foch C-in-C. Wilson suggested that Foch probably did not need any 
additional powers and that it would be ‘inadvisable’ to change something 
that seemed to be working well.72 Woodward has argued that Wilson’s 
motivation in seeking to restrict Foch’s powers was ‘self advancement’ and 
a desire to ensure his friend did not become too powerful.73 An alternative 
interpretation, favoured in this work, is that Wilson was still coming to 
terms with the impact of the position of Generalissimo on Allied strategy. 
Despite his confidence in Foch, he had an abiding fear of French 
domination of this strategy, one which grew as Wilson’s relationship with 
Clemenceau came under pressure. When Lloyd George and Clemenceau 
met at Beauvais at the beginning of April, Wilson opposed changing 
Foch’s remit because, he said, he wanted to avoid any opportunity for 
Haig and Pétain to willfully ‘misunderstand’ the Generalissimo’s role. He 
argued, unsuccessfully, that the Doullens remit was stronger than the new 
proposal ‘... but the Tiger & LG were in favour of the change…Lloyd 
George said [the] British public wanted Foch to have real power; did 
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Doullens give this power?’74 Wilson then drafted the agreement, including 
the right of either C-in-C to appeal to his government if he believed Foch’s 
orders endangered his army.75 Wilson, Haig and Lloyd George all stressed 
the urgent need for a French offensive. Foch agreed. If Wilson felt he had 
been defeated in his scheme of ‘self advancement’, at Foch’s expense, it 
was not reflected in his usually frank diary, the entry for this date 
concluding: ‘On the whole a satisfactory day.’ 76 Clemenceau suggested 
subsequently that Foch should also be made C-in-C of the Italian theatre:  
I am entirely opposed & said so so strongly that the Cabinet agreed 
& wired saying that they did not agree. Foch is 67; he is not popular 
with the Italians; he has not got a Staff yet; he has not yet by any 
means got our front in hand, & in consequence I think he would be 
entirely overloaded.77 
 
The War Cabinet’s diplomatic response was that they thought it 
‘inadvisable’ to burden Foch with additional responsibilities and that the 
subject should be discussed at the next meeting of the SWC.78 
 
Despite his agreement at Beauvais, Foch failed to honour his promise of a 
French counter-offensive, nor would he agree to Haig’s plea for the French 
to relieve some of the British line, ideally north of the Somme, or in French 
Flanders, where another German attack was expected.79 In a tacit 
acknowledgement of how the balance of power had shifted, Haig asked 
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Wilson to intervene on the BEF’s behalf and the War Cabinet gave the 
latter ‘full powers to do what I thought best.’80 Haig and Lawrence told the 
CIGS they now favoured French support in Flanders. Wilson disagreed 
and wanted the French to relieve the British right in the Somme sector, but 
Haig said he was ‘afraid of French troops taking over our line in front of 
Amiens as he says they are fighting badly & would lose Amiens.’ Haig had 
concluded that ‘the French have neither enough troops nor stomach for a 
big attack ...such as Foch was contemplating last Wed[nesday]’. Wilson 
spent two fruitless hours with Foch. The Generalissimo ‘simply would not 
hear’ of moving troops to Flanders, nor to supporting the defence of 
Amiens. All Wilson got was a commitment to put French reserves astride 
the Somme for deployment further north if required. His mission having 
failed, all he could do was urge Haig, who was worried that the movement 
of French forces would hinder his own, to register a note of protest.81 The 
British C-in-C castigated Foch and complained that Wilson ‘did not help us 
at all in our negotiations…His sympathies almost seem to be with the 
French.’82 It was a reminder to Wilson that his old friendship with Foch had 
its limitations. One outcome was that Wilson persuaded Foch to accept 
Lieutenant-General Sir John Du Cane as principal liaison officer between 
Haig and Foch.83 A recent Haig biographer noted that it was unclear 
whose idea this was, but according to Wilson’s diary he suggested it to 
Haig who did ‘not in the least understand the situation yet’, on 6 April.84 As 
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a former liaison officer, Wilson knew the importance of having a senior 
officer in such a role, at such a time. Foch rejected the idea when put to 
him by Haig, but was persuaded by Wilson.85 Foch told Wilson that he 
wanted a title, the latter first favouring ‘Chief of Staff of the Allied Forces.’ 
Wilson consulted Clemenceau, who suggested ‘C-in-C of Allied Forces but 
I pointed out that Foch did not command in Italy nor in any theatre except 
France so I proposed C-in-C of Allied Forces in France & he agreed.’ 
Lloyd George and Milner also gave their consent.86 The resilience of the 
Foch-Wilson relationship is evidenced in latter’s congratulatory message: 
‘A thousand congratulations on your new title, it sounds almost as grand 
as Monsieur Foch.’87 
 
While Wilson was meeting Foch, news had begun to arrive of the second 
major German offensive move, Operation Georgette, where the British had 
expected, in French Flanders.88 Foch’s reluctance to relieve the British 
with French forces caused more Allied friction. Wilson spent April shuttling 
between London and the front; on each of his four visits he saw Haig and 
Foch, and Clemenceau three times.89 Wilson aimed to cajole the French to 
do more, while attempting to calm GHQ’s irritation with their ally. Wilson’s 
actions demonstrated how misplaced was the label of blind Francophilia 
that had long been attached to him, most recently by Haig himself, and 
deserves examination. Wilson was exasperated with Foch’s apparent 
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refusal to help the BEF, and a perceived absence of foresight in the 
Generalissimo’s strategic planning. Also, he grew increasingly suspicious 
of Clemenceau’s ambitions for France’s strategic position. Wilson began a 
campaign to convince Lloyd George and Milner of this perceived threat, 
one which coloured Anglo-French relations both for the remainder of the 
war, and during the subsequent peace process. His overarching fear was 
that the British Army, facing relentless pressure, would ‘lose contact’ with 
the French. Once separated, the enemy would be able to defeat each 
Allied force at will. The CIGS attempted to take a broader strategic view of 
the campaign than, he believed, Foch or Haig were doing. On 10 April, he 
convinced Clemenceau that if the BEF had ‘seriously to retire’ it would be 
‘death’ to lose the Channel ports. Instead, they finally agreed, the French 
should hold the left (north) bank of the Somme making it impossible for the 
Germans to break through there. He then agreed with Foch that French 
reinforcements could move into place behind them. Most importantly for 
Wilson: ‘I told Foch of my conversation with the Tiger…[about] vital 
necessity of covering the Ports and Foch absolutely agreed, so my mind is 
quite at ease on this most important of all points.’90 It would not stand at 
ease for long.  
 
Wilson continued to brief the War Cabinet on the ‘desperately serious’ 
state of affairs in Flanders.91 His suspicions of French motives grew and 
he ‘violently’ opposed Clemenceau’s request for Lloyd George to go to 
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Paris. He believed the Tiger ‘wanted to interfere’ in military matters. Milner 
went instead, but summoned Wilson to join him ‘as soon as possible as I 
alone can bridge the gulf.’92 The ‘gulf’ was caused by British demands for 
French support for Plumer’s Second Army in Flanders. Haig convinced 
Wilson that without substantial French reinforcements, Plumer could not 
hold on for another 48 hours.93 Haig told Wilson he believed Foch ‘was 
taking only a short view of the situation (which comes so oddly from Haig!)’ 
Milner, Wilson and Haig met Foch and Weygand at Abbeville. Foch 
‘brushed aside’ British concerns and criticised their tactics as ‘not good’. 
Wilson pressed Foch to flood the countryside south of Dunkirk to impede 
any German advance, allowing the BEF to shorten its line, but the meeting 
ended indecisively. The next day, Wilson wrote that: ‘What was certain 
was that our Army would soon be reduced to impotence if the French did 
not directly intervene & take some punishment off us.’94 The next day Foch 
said he would ‘accept battle’ in Flanders rather than fall back. In response 
Wilson wrote a formal note to ‘My old friend…anxious that you should see 
the picture as I see it.’ In a direct criticism of what he perceived as Foch’s 
short-sightedness the CIGS wrote that it was essential ‘that we face the 
facts as they really are and that we look a little more into the future than 
we have been doing.’  The Allies faced two choices, stand and fight, as 
Foch wanted, or shorten the British line in the north where the countryside 
was being flooded. As Foch wanted to fight, Wilson urged him to ‘bring up 
sufficient forces to defeat all the enemy’s attacks’ and to ensure that Haig 
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was in ‘no doubt’ as to his wishes. What was clear was that Plumer could 
not hold on much longer without reinforcement.95 It was as clear a 
message as possible that responsibility for whatever befell the British lay 
with Foch. As it was the British line, although pushed back, held.96 
 
Wilson continued to call for French help. At an Allied conference in 
Abbeville he demanded the French take an equal share of the 
‘punishment’. Since 21 March, 60 British divisions had suffered 300,000 
casualties while the 100 French divisions had suffered just 60-70,000. ‘I 
pointed out that if this went on … the British Army would disappear and we 
should lose the war.’ Foch agreed to consider Haig’s request for the 
French to help the Belgians north of Ypres. Wilson was dissatisfied: ‘The 
attitude of Foch & the Tiger was difficult & it is clear to me that we must 
assert ourselves more.’  Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Spiers, who was 
acting as liaison between Wilson and the French War Ministry, told him of 
a ‘dangerous campaign’ in the press to deprecate the British Army at the 
expense of the French: ‘We talked it over & I am sure we must assert 
ourselves more. I will discuss with Milner. We must take over High Policy 
everywhere, command of the Mediterranean etc.’97 He repeated this to 
Milner.98 These were Wilson’s first direct references in 1918 to his worries 
about French domination of war policy, and his conviction that his 
government should resist. There would be many more.  
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Wilson continued to press for an agreed strategy on whether or not, if 
pressed, the Allied armies should stick together or lose contact, the British 
covering the Channel ports, the French covering Paris. Wilson asked the 
First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, for his opinion of what the 
loss of Calais and Boulogne would mean for the British war effort. His 
assessment was, wrote Wilson, ‘a stupid paper & impossible to make out 
clearly what the Admiralty think but it is certainly not stated that the 
Channel is lost so I presume we could still keep our communication.’99 
Wilson persuaded the Prime Minister and Milner that British policy, if it 
came to it, should be to abandon the ports because the Admiralty believed 
the Channel would be safe. He noted: ‘These are momentous decisions, & 
although I trust they may never have to be carried out they certainly ought 
to be determined.’100 To Wilson’s frustration, Foch and Haig both refused 
to consider the prospect of a retreat and therefore would not plan for one. 
Foch continued to favour ‘fighting every yard but not taking long views… 
Haig agrees that in the last resort we should fall back to the South & I 
asked him specifically twice & both times he agreed.’101  
 
The May meeting of the SWC was rancorous. Milner described it as ‘a dog 
fight’.102 Wilson ‘at once’ raised the question of the Channel ports and 
insisted on a definitive answer. Haig and Pétain favoured French and 
British forces remaining in contact, and the politicians agreed 
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unanimously. Wilson’s dogged determination to get the Generalissimo to 
agree a strategy had finally succeeded. The Allies had an agreed policy if 
the need arose. The fact that Wilson’s fears were never put to the test may 
explain why the historiography has paid little attention to this aspect of the 
CIGS’s work. It illustrates Wilson’s ability think strategically while his 
colleagues concentrated on more immediate problems. The same meeting 
made Foch ‘co-ordinator’ of Allied forces in Italy, ‘a d_____ stupid thing to 
do’, according to Wilson.103  
 
For Wilson, much of May was dominated by the government’s evolving 
policy on Ireland, his concerns about Haig’s suitability to remain in 
command of the BEF, and wrangling with the Americans over the use of 
their expanding force. As prominent was his campaign of resistance to 
French policy. He told Milner his fears of ‘the French absorbing us, our 
Army, our Bases, our Mercantile Marine, our Food, Italy, Salonika etc, & I 
warned him once more of this real danger, which would lose us the war.’ 
He delivered a similar message to Churchill. Sackville-West was: ‘…just 
as convinced as I am that the French mean to take us over body & 
soul...Numberless signs of increasing interference.’104 The X Committee of 
16 May was dominated by Wilson’s fears about French policy. His specific 
concern was Foch’s ‘dispersal’ of British troops to threatened parts of the 
French front. Despite British representations, Foch ‘insisted on the brunt of 
the fighting being taken by British divisions. This did not mean that he was 
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not using French divisions, but he did not put the French divisions in until 
the British divisions had been practically knocked out.’ With Milner’s 
support, he insisted that at minimum British divisions should be grouped 
together and not ‘scattered about’. Lloyd George’s unhelpful response was 
that he presumed Foch wanted the British to ‘break the brunt of the attack’ 
before using French forces. It was important the French were preserved 
for fighting in the summer: 
Nothing should be done which would handicap General Foch in this 
respect. For his part he hoped that the French would take a very big 
share in the battle, as he did not want the British Army to be so 
reduced that next year we should find ourselves the third Military 
Power on the Western Front.105 
 
Lloyd George sent Wilson for discussions with Foch, who was eventually 
persuaded that any British troops moved south would be of corps 
strength.106 One unit, IX Corps, had already moved to a reputedly ‘quiet’ 
sector of the French line on the Chemin des Dames. It was then badly 
mauled in the Germans’ first offensive against the French, Operation 
Blücher, which began on 27 May.107 Wilson saw the King who ‘was much 
upset & ranted about the “brutes of French” & how the British Army was 
going to disappear.’ Milner was shaken by the French performance and 
did not think ‘the French Nation will stand a disaster. “I wish we had our 
Army back in England” he kept on saying. But we can’t so what is the use 
of saying it?’108 Milner and Wilson began to doubt French resolve: ‘The 
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French have lost Château-Thierry & Villers Cotterêts. This latter must 
mean that they are not fighting. If this is so, we are done & LG & Milner at 
once went on that assumption & talked of ____ nonsense [sic].’109  
 
The crisis coincided with a meeting of the SWC when Anglo-French 
relations plumbed new depths of animosity and mutual suspicion. Wilson 
began the day thus: ‘I find it difficult to realise that there is a possibility, 
perhaps a probability, of the French Army being beaten! What would this 
mean?’110 Clemenceau and Foch blamed the British for not providing 
enough men, while Lloyd George questioned French statistics. 
Nonetheless, Wilson supported the principle that the BEF should be kept 
up to establishment. French demands for immediate help, including 
moving troops from Salonika and Italy echoed British pleas of a month 
earlier when they were under attack.111 The ill-tempered meeting, the 
record of which Curzon said left a ‘rather disagreeable impression’, ended 
with little resolved.112  
 
Next, Wilson had to arbitrate a dispute between Haig and Foch.113 Haig 
had raised a formal protest after being ordered to move three of his 
divisions south to the Somme. As evidence of the seriousness with which 
the French military position was viewed, the X Committee met twice on 5 
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June. Wilson was ‘absolutely convinced’ moving troops south would 
seriously weaken the British line in the north where an attack was 
expected imminently. Haig was similarly critical of French ‘fighting spirit’, 
claiming many divisions ‘won’t face the enemy.’114 Foch continued to 
refuse to shorten the British line, but both Wilson and Haig now thought it 
essential.115 The CIGS was angry at the French reaction to the latest 
German offensive and convinced that ‘Foch will lose the war if he goes on 
like this… It’s simply d____ nonsense saying he won’t “laché un pied” [“let 
go of the feet”, i.e. maintain contact between the British and French 
armies] & then run from Chemin du Dames to Château-Thierry.’116 Lloyd 
George ordered Wilson and Milner to ‘insist’, with Clemenceau’s support if 
possible, that Foch rethink his plans. They were so concerned that they 
discussed the rate at which troops ‘could be transported from France in 
the wake of a sudden disaster.’117 Wilson warned Lloyd George that if 
Foch did not comply and allow Haig to make his own decisions about 
defending the ports ‘then LG would get a letter from me to say the British 
Army would be lost.’ At GHQ, Lawrence told them that Foch ‘has no plan 
& is heading straight for disaster,’ while Haig said the French were ‘not 
fighting & therefore in his opinion we would be mad to go South & join 
them, but in addition he thinks it is already late.’118 The British met 
Clemenceau and Foch on 7 June and concluded there had been a 
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‘misunderstanding’.119 Foch explained that he had not ‘ordered’ Haig to 
move his divisions, rather to ‘consider’ moving them should the situation 
on the French front be so serious that there was no alternative.120 
Clemenceau admonished Foch for moving forces from Haig’s sector 
without informing him: ‘I never saw old Foch so non-plussed. He simply 
had not a word to say. Clemenceau said such a proceeding was 
impossible & must never happen again,’ wrote Wilson.121 The meeting 
reiterated that the strategic priority was for French and British forces to 
remain in contact; Foch would never move forces until German intentions 
were clear. While the issue was defused and Wilson thought the meeting 
had ‘done a vast deal of good & has been well worth the trouble,’ it was 
almost inevitable the new system of unity of command would throw up 
such disagreements.122 As one authority has noted, ‘matters would have 
come to a head sooner or later’.123 From Haig’s perspective it was now 
clear that ‘the “Generalissimo” can do what he thinks right with my troops’; 
as a result he requested his terms of reference be amended to reflect the 
change.124 
 
WILSON LOSES FAITH IN HAIG 
The German March Offensive inevitably had consequences for Haig and 
his colleagues. It also had repercussions for Derby, a dedicated supporter 
of Haig and Robertson, whom the Prime Minister eventually decided to 
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replace with Milner, his strongest Cabinet ally. Several of Haig’s 
biographers have considered the matter from his perspective. For the 
most part, this has been limited to the Field Marshal’s diary entries and 
correspondence with his wife. The abiding narrative is that Haig offered to 
step down if he had lost the confidence of the government, that the War 
Cabinet briefly considered his removal but could find no suitable 
alternative and shelved the idea. This is a fair but incomplete assessment. 
Wilson’s involvement in these events has received little direct attention. 
Offering formal advice as CIGS, Wilson originally backed Haig’s retention, 
albeit with misgivings. In his diary and in discussion with confidantes he 
was far less steadfast in his support. His doubts continued for several 
weeks after the March crisis to the point at which he concluded that Haig 
should be relieved. 
 
The true extent of the first German attack was still unclear when Field 
Marshal Lord French, who since his forced resignation as commander of 
the BEF in late 1915 had been an implacable enemy of Haig’s,125 went to 
see Wilson ‘mad to get Haig out of C-in-C, & said all sorts of things.’ 
Wilson told Milner ‘that Johnnie French wanted to remove Haig but that I 
was opposed to it at present.’ Privately, Wilson castigated the ‘entirely 
inadequate measures taken by Haig & Pétain in their mutual plans for 
assistance.’126 A few days after Doullens, ‘Johnnie French went bald-
headed for Derby to get Haig recalled.’ Wilson told his friend he thought 
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‘we ought to wait to see how he worked with Foch.’ He told Derby the 
same. Wilson saw Lieutenant-General Tom Bridges who claimed the Army 
would give a ‘sigh of relief’ if Haig was removed.127 The contrast in 
character between the mercurial French and the pragmatic Wilson is clear 
from these exchanges. The latter regularly ‘sounded off’ in his diary but he 
presented a more considered front in his professional dealings. What was 
clear to Wilson was that action had to be taken in response to the events 
of 21 March. In looking to make ‘scapegoats of the generals’ Lloyd 
George’s gaze settled on General Sir Hubert Gough, commander of Fifth 
Army.128 On the eve of the Beauvais meeting Milner told Wilson he was ‘in 
favour of removing Gough.’ Wilson agreed.129 The next day, when Lloyd 
George and Wilson met Haig, the Prime Minister told him ‘Gough must 
go.’130 Haig supported his Army commander, refusing to condemn him 
before hearing Gough’s defence. Lloyd George, he wrote in his diary, 
seemed a distrustful ‘cur.’131 In discussion with Wilson he insisted on ‘an 
order to remove him, which I told him we would send. He wants Cavan in 
[Gough’s] place but I told him he could not have him, he must ask for 
someone else.’132 Wilson helped Derby write the order summoning Gough 
home because his troops had ‘lost confidence in him’.133 In fact, Haig’s 
diary entry says he told Gough it was the Cabinet which had decided his 
fate.134 
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Regardless of the almost inevitable demise of Gough, Wilson’s doubts 
about the British C-in-C himself were exacerbated by his trip to France. 
Lloyd George had complained to Wilson that Haig was ‘not the least 
grateful’ about the agreement to send 120,000 American troops per month 
to France and was a ‘fool’. The CIGS told Lawrence that Robertson was: 
…principally to blame for this disaster because in 2 years of almost 
absolute power he had never insisted on treating the whole line as 
one which was a sure sign of inferior generalship, but that DH was 
also to blame for refusing the subscribe some Divs to the Gen 
Reserve, & that the politicians were to blame for nor producing 
more men.  
 
Wilson questioned Haig as to why Gough had not defended the line of the 
River Somme: 
He said he did not know. He seems to me to have lost grip of the 
situation. He took the most languid interest in the new American 
scheme for which I gave LG full credit. He can’t understand why 
Foch does not attack ... I said I supposed Foch was delaying 
because he had not got enough guns up yet. DH is a very stupid 
man.’135 
 
It seems an unreasonably harsh verdict, considering the stress Haig and 
his team was under at this point. At the War Cabinet the next day, Lloyd 
George attacked Lawrence as a: 
…very ordinary person & quite unfit to be Chief of Staff. Suddenly 
Smuts chimed in & said Haig has proved his complete unfitness for 
C-in-C. ... There was no doubt that the feeling of the Cabinet was I 
think unanimously ag[ains]t Haig & the whole of GHQ. There was 
no question that all confidence is lost. I said very little.  
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Despite expressing doubts in his diary, Wilson protested that he had 
already removed Gough and had called for a report from Haig. He 
‘deprecated further action without further information.’ The CIGS was 
‘ordered to ponder’ and make proposals the next day.136 Despite the 
pressure from the politicians, Milner told Wilson twice in 24 hours that he 
was in favour of Haig’s removal, he refused to be drawn.137 Haig, aware 
that his future lay in the balance, offered to resign if the War Cabinet 
decided it wanted someone else.138 Wilson recorded that: ‘LG asked me if 
I did not think we ought to take Haig at his word but I said that failing some 
really outstanding personality[,] & we have none[,] I thought we ought to 
wait for Haig’s report.’139 
 
Over the next month, apart from candid conversations with Milner, the 
politician he trusted most, Wilson kept his own counsel. His diary records 
that he listened to the views of several soldiers and statesmen, all of 
whom were critical of Haig, but he declined to make a recommendation on 
the C-in-C’s future. Instead, he supported Haig’s views on Anglo-French 
strategy, especially the need to avoid the Allied armies being split apart. 
By the second week in May, with Foch in the ascendant as Allied 
Generalissimo, Wilson finally decided to recommend bringing Haig home. 
The precise reasons for the timing and the rationale of this decision, nearly 
two months after the start of Operation Michael, remain unclear. This was 
a relatively quiet period; the Lys Offensive against the British was over and 
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the first major German attack on the French on the Aisne still a month 
away. It is possible that Wilson saw the lull as the first real opportunity to 
act. What is clear is that he spent most of April and May dissatisfied with 
Haig’s performance and, at times, his fighting spirit. After a dispiriting 
conversation with Foch, who thought ‘nothing’ of Rawlinson and believed 
Plumer ought to become C-in-C, Wilson recorded:  
There is no doubt in my mind that Haig is tired, that he has no 
desire, that he is almost a beaten man, that he is always turning to 
a Peace to get him out of his difficulties – he spoke to me about 
peace 2 or 3 times again today – and that I really begin to think that 
he had better be relieved.140 
 
This was a critical day for the BEF, with a major enemy assault in the La 
Bassée sector, but at a time when several members of Britain’s political 
leadership took a pessimistic view of the war, Wilson was unwilling to 
accept the same from the C-in-C.141 A week later, with the German 
Flanders offensive in full swing, Wilson thought Haig was ‘very passive, & 
has not got full grip of the situation nor any life and drive. In many ways 
there is no doubt he ought to be removed but there is no outstanding man 
to replace him except Plumer & I doubt that change worth doing.’142 
Wilson thus dismissed both the highly competent Plumer, and, by 
omission, his old friend Rawlinson. It is unclear what Wilson considered 
necessary to make a ‘better’ commander than Haig. Wilson’s diary noted 
on several occasions that in the light of Foch’s elevation, Haig’s role had 
diminished and thus, by implication, the latter might be content to accept 
another role. Arguably, Wilson was ‘rehearsing’ this argument to soften the 
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blow for Haig if he had to be removed. Study of his diary and 
correspondence leads this author to suggest an alternative reason for 
Wilson concluding that Haig had to go. By May 1918 Milner and Lloyd 
George were considering replacing Haig with a ‘better’ general. Wilson 
had rejected the notion because, in his view, a more suitable officer could 
not be found.143 Conceivably, Wilson proposed removing Haig from 
command of the British armies on the Western Front to prevent 
Robertson’s effective rehabilitation and appointment to the vacant post of 
Commander-in-Chief of Home Forces. Professional disagreement 
between Wilson and Robertson took on a personal dimension in early 
1918. In the build-up to Robertson’s removal as CIGS, Wilson’s diary 
references became critical and disdainful. Once Wilson was ensconced at 
Robertson’s desk he did nothing to help his predecessor find suitable 
alternative employment, letting him languish as GOC of Eastern 
Command, the lowly post to which he had been assigned on his forced 
resignation.144 The decision to appoint Lord French, who had been C-in-C 
Home Forces since his return from France in 1915, as Lord Lieutenant of 
Ireland, freed up his prestigious, and influential, post at Horse Guards.145 It 
is clear from Wilson’s diary that he was opposed to Robertson replacing 
French. A press campaign in April 1918 blamed Lloyd George for sacking 
Robertson and, by implication, imperilling the war effort on the eve of the 
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German offensives.146 The calls in Fleet Street for Wully to be reinstated 
as CIGS were seen by his successor as a criticism of himself.  
 
French, who made no effort to disguise his long-standing enmity towards 
both Haig and Robertson, realised that if he were to go to Dublin, 
Robertson might succeed him and ‘he hates this’.147  French suggested 
bringing Haig home to replace him ‘otherwise it will fall to Robertson!’ 
Wilson put the idea to Milner who was ‘rather taken’ with it but told him it 
was ‘for him & LG to decide.’ Later the AG, Macready, a Robertson ally, 
told Wilson he wanted Wully to replace French. Unsurprisingly, his diary 
entry ended ‘What a day for my birthday.’148 Wilson, Milner and the Prime 
Minister then discussed French’s successor: ‘I, personally, favour bringing 
Haig home. His position now under Foch is very different, his Divisions are 
dwindling, & he has lost much of the confidence of the Army.’ 
Unfortunately for Wilson’s plans, Milner favoured Robertson.149 The 
following day Robertson’s  ‘alter-ego’ Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice 
committed career suicide by accusing Lloyd George of lying about the 
numbers of British troops available to meet the German onslaught.150 The 
‘Maurice Affair’ is discussed exhaustively in the historiography and will not 
be repeated here.151 Its significance for this thesis is that Wilson and 
Milner saw Robertson and his supporters as the instigators of Maurice’s 
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action.152 The last thing Wilson wanted was the former CIGS in control of 
home defence with all that meant for manpower resources in other 
theatres, particularly France, and Ireland.153 Even the King, a loyal 
supporter of Robertson, tackled Wilson about the government’s position: 
He deprecated Maurice’s action but was loud in abuse of LG & of 
Curzon, who was here yesterday & said Maurice’s letter was part of 
an intrigue. The King said that LG was always trying to get rid of 
Robertson to which I agreed & said LG’s efforts to get rid of R was 
only equalled by R’s efforts to get rid of LG. I told the King what I 
thought of the whole thing & made no concealment of my feelings. 
It gave him something to think about.154 
 
Wilson kept up the pressure on Milner and Lloyd George to recall Haig, 
noting on 14 May that it was the first time in a week that he had not 
discussed it with them. His case, put first on 11 May and repeated to 
Milner 48 hours later, was that the army had ‘more confidence in Plumer’. 
Plumer was better at organising support services behind the lines, Haig’s 
position was significantly changed since Foch’s appointment, and the C-in-
C had ‘lost grip’.155 Wilson suspected that, with the fall-out from the 
Maurice affair still fresh in their minds, the politicians were reluctant to act 
against Haig: 
Milner is afraid of removing Haig & does not want to appoint 
Robertson to Home Command & so is in a dilemma…I realise fully 
that to remove Haig, even if he is put in the Horse Guards is a 
serious matter & I told Milner that he would be faced with hostile 
criticism especially as regards me for people will say that I first got 
Robertson out & now Haig.156 
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The Prime Minister favoured getting Robertson out of London by making 
him C-in-C India, in place of General Sir Charles Monro who would take 
over command of the Home Forces. By implication Haig would stay in 
post, but this fell through.157 Wilson then went to see Haig and ‘told him I 
had suggested to LG that he should bring him (DH) home to succeed 
Johnnie because of the altered status of C-in-C here. He did not say 
anything, but said the way I was being criticised was hateful.’158 At first 
sight this frankness seems odd in a soldier so often accused of mendacity 
and double-dealing. In fact, what Wilson had to say came as no surprise to 
Haig, who almost a fortnight earlier had been told by his wife that London 
gossips were discussing him as successor to French.159 Haig’s 
recollection of the meeting at GHQ was that Wilson seemed ‘anxious to do 
the right thing’, and that the Cabinet did not ‘desire to replace me in 
France’.160 Towards the end of the month Milner made clear he wanted 
Robertson to succeed French. While Wilson believed ‘on the whole’ that 
Haig would have been the better choice, with Plumer becoming C-in-C ‘I 
don’t feel sufficiently strong & clear to really press it.’161 Robertson 
became C-in-C Home Forces two days later.162 ‘I confess I don’t like it,’ 
wrote Wilson, ‘I have no opinion of Robertson as a soldier.’163 
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What is clear is that Wilson took a much more sustained and 
interventionist role in the debate about Haig’s future than the 
historiography acknowledges. Unsurprisingly, considering the date of 
publication, Callwell’s biography omitted all but a few choice criticisms of 
Haig. Jeffery, Wilson’s modern political biographer, made no mention of it. 
Haig scholars have also underplayed Wilson’s role. John Terraine, Gary 
Mead and J.P. Harris omitted these events in their biographies of the Field 
Marshal, while Walter Reid incorrectly stated that ‘once and only once’ did 
Wilson suggest replacing Haig.164 Sheffield noted Haig’s vulnerability at 
this time and related Wilson’s apparent duplicity at Montreuil on 20 May, 
but not the ongoing campaign Wilson had waged behind the scenes.165  
 
CONCLUSION 
As this chapter has shown, Wilson’s role in establishing the principle, and 
mechanism, for unity of command of the Allied forces in France and 
Flanders, was greater than has previously been acknowledged. His was 
an influential voice in the decision to appoint Foch Generalissimo, working 
in close co-operation with both Milner and Haig. Once Foch was in post, 
Wilson continued to perform his soldier-diplomat role, soothing tensions 
between Lloyd George and Clemenceau while maintaining an, admittedly, 
often strained dialogue with Foch. Although Wilson and Foch disagreed 
often and argued robustly, their friendship, and mutual recognition of the 
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invaluable nature of the Alliance, kept the entente together at its most 
critical point. During the next few weeks Wilson found himself embroiled in 
the business of the Imperial War Cabinet (IWC), much of it concerning 
strategy for 1919 and beyond, one which once again exposed Anglo-
French tensions. This is discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
WILSON AND BRITISH GRAND STRATEGY 
This chapter re-evaluates the impact of Wilson’s views on grand strategy 
in late 1917 and 1918, and concludes that it was more significant than has 
so far been acknowledged. The military theorist Basil Liddell Hart defined 
‘grand strategy’ thus: ‘…while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the 
war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It 
should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use 
as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and 
prosperity.’ The ‘various instruments’ which had to be considered, included 
a state’s economic and manpower resources, the balancing of military and 
industrial priorities, and diplomacy.1 More recently, Brock Millman refined 
the definition to a dynamic ‘political-military amalgam which seeks to 
qualify how war aims will be achieved with the means at hand’: in short, 
practising the art of the possible with the future to the fore.2 Earning the 
confidence of Lloyd George, Wilson maintained Britain’s primary strategic 
focus on the Western Front. Other theatres were considered from a long-
term imperial perspective. Wilson differed from Haig, whose focus was 
constrained by the nature of his command, in that he had a strategic vision 
that went beyond France and Belgium. His predecessor Robertson took a 
broader view than Haig, but the pressures on the BEF on the Western 
Front meant that other theatres took second place, with little attention paid 
to long term regional objectives. Like both, Wilson never doubted that the 
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primary theatre was the Western Front and that the principal enemy was 
Germany. Where his thinking diverged was in seeing the war more 
‘holistically’. For Wilson, action in other theatres was not – as it was for 
Lloyd George – an end in itself. He never believed that ‘knocking away the 
props’ from beneath Germany, by eliminating her allies, would lead to 
victory. Action away from the Western Front only found real favour with 
Wilson, especially once he was CIGS, if it was designed to frustrate a 
clear German threat, or if it was likely to protect or strengthen Britain’s 
post-war imperial hegemony.  
 
Several of the Joint Notes produced by the PMRs during Wilson’s time at 
Versailles concerned future war policy. Joint Note (JN)1 was essentially a 
rewrite of his paper to the British War Cabinet of 20 October 1917. JN12, 
of January 1918, echoed the active-defensive tenets of JN1. It differed in 
favouring a ‘decisive’ offensive in Palestine, where Allenby had achieved 
unexpected success, or elsewhere in the Middle East. It advocated 
harassing the Turks, if possible, in Armenia, and opportunities to disrupt 
the Central Powers’ activities in the Caucasus and Black Sea region were 
also favoured. These were ambitious goals, but, JN12 specifically ruled 
out reinforcing campaigns elsewhere at the expense of France and 
Flanders. This thesis suggests that in compiling JN12 Wilson, always a 
‘Westerner’ at heart, satisfied both Lloyd George’s instinctive desire to see 
the prospect of action in the Middle East, while insisting any such 
campaign had to be achieved within current resources. It was a difficult 
balance to strike, but one typical of Wilson’s ‘political’ character. 
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While the Allies faced successive German offensives in the west in spring 
1918, Wilson formulated policy for the following year. He believed the war 
could be won in 1919, in contrast to some of his colleagues who expected 
the conflict to drag on into 1920. To Lloyd George’s irritation, his proposal 
was for a crushing offensive in the west. Britain would play a subsidiary 
role to the French and Americans, preserving British forces to protect and 
preserve her imperial priorities. The fact that his recommendations were 
never put to the test may be one reason Wilson’s contribution to this 
strategic policy debate has been somewhat overlooked in the 
historiography.  
 
JOINT NOTE 12: 1918 CAMPAIGN 
JN12 was a development of JN1. Entitled ‘1918 Campaign’, it repeated the 
SWC policy that the Allies stand on the defensive in the west, and 
proposed a ‘decisive’ offensive in the Middle East, in Palestine or 
Mesopotamia.3 Woodward, although allowing for Wilson’s influence in its 
creation, dismissed it as little more than him ‘taking his instructions directly 
from the prime minister’.4 In fact, it was Wilson who was the architect of 
this new direction for Allied strategy; one at odds with the War Office and 
Haig, with Lloyd George the eager listener. David French acknowledged 
the JN12’s importance, but again Wilson’s role was characterised as that 
of messenger rather than initiator.5 Hughes, while agreeing with 
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Robertson’s view that advances in Palestine were ‘not a threat’ to the 
Ottoman Empire, and thus unlikely to change the course of the war, 
overlooked Wilson’s insistence on the need for unity of action at the 
strategic and political levels.6 Jeffery summarised JN12 and observed that 
it ‘very significantly’ argued for the whole of the Allied front in the west to 
be treated as one strategic field of action, but Wilson’s contribution was 
not examined in detail.7 This chapter fills this historiographical gap, and 
argues that the co-operative strand in the paper, emphasised in the 
section on a proposed offensive in the Middle East, was of major 
importance for the future. JN12 focussed on theatres away from the 
Western Front, embodying Wilson’s political and military, or ‘grand 
strategic’, vision. He strove to develop a formalised inter-Allied approach 
to policy making in the west while articulating a framework for Britain’s 
future strategy in a region crucial to its imperial hegemony.  
 
JN12 examined opportunities for ‘a decisive or, at any rate, far-reaching 
success’ in any peripheral theatres.8 The Second Session of the SWC 
called on the PMRs to consider the nature of the campaigns to be 
undertaken in 1918.9 Clemenceau left Wilson and his colleagues in little 
doubt of what their conclusions ought to be. By this stage in the war, 
manpower was key and it was essential to ensure sufficient shipping to 
                                            
6 Hughes, Allenby, p. 62.  
7 Jeffery, Wilson, p. 214. 
8 TNA, WO 158/57, Joint Note 12, 21 January 1918, p. 1. 
9 TNA, CAB 28/3, IC (Allied Conferences) Series, Volume III, IC-36, Supreme War 
Council ‘Procès-verbal of the Second Session of the Supreme War Council, 1 December 
1917, p. 10. 
 261 
enable the build-up of American forces in Europe. Clemenceau told the 
PMRs to ensure ‘that the conservation of man-power shall not be 
overlooked’. The war had become ‘largely one of exhaustion. It may be 
that victory will be achieved by endurance rather than by military 
decision.’10 While the final objective remained ‘the overthrow of Prussian 
militarism’ Clemenceau instructed Wilson and his colleagues: 
To weigh carefully whether possibly that object may not be brought 
nearer final achievement by the overthrow, first of all, of Germany’s 
Allies, and the isolation of Germany; whether, in fact, the final 
overthrow of Germany may not best be reserved until the forces of 
the Allies, greatly augmented by a fully matured American army, 
can be focused and concentrated as a climax to the war on this 
final objective.11 
 
Wilson’s paper of 20 October 1917 had ruled out an offensive in Palestine 
because it was too late in the campaigning season, but Lloyd George 
remained wedded to the idea of significant action there. Encouraged by 
Allenby’s capture of Jerusalem on 9 December 1917, the War Cabinet had 
directed the GS to consider a project for completing the conquest of the 
whole of Palestine, or, having achieved that, continuing to Aleppo, (350 
miles away in Syria). This would cut rail links between oil-rich 
Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) and the rest of the Ottoman Empire.12 
Robertson’s response was that neither operation could be accomplished 
quickly, nor without severe damage to Britain’s position in the west.13 
                                            
10 TNA, CAB 28/3, IC (Allied Conferences) Series, Volume III, IC-36, Supreme War 
Council ‘Procès-verbal of the Second Session of the Supreme War Council, 1 December 
1917, pp. 10-11. 
11 Ibid., p. 11. 
12 TNA, CAB 23/4/71, War Cabinet, 13 December 1917. 
13 LHCMA, Robertson papers, ‘Future Operations in Palestine, CIGS to War Cabinet, 
(4/5/10), 26 December 1917’. 
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Allenby, aware that he could expect only meagre reinforcement, wanted to 
continue the ‘step by step’ approach he had maintained since taking 
command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) in June 1917.14 He 
calculated that, if opposed by a force of no more than 60,000, he could 
conquer the majority of Palestine by mid-1918. Robertson said that the 
main problem facing the British was lack of reliable communications, 
especially railways. Casualties would be high and ‘it is for serious 
consideration whether the advantages to be gained…are worth the cost 
and risk involved’.15 He said the answer depended on whether the 
conquest of Palestine would put Turkey out of the war. He was clear that it 
would not, thanks to German domination of the Ottoman army and war 
policy. As a result, the GS view was that Britain would ‘incur a great risk by 
increasing our liabilities in secondary theatres’ and ought to reduce these 
commitments to ‘a defensive minimum and concentrate all other resources 
in the West.’16 Robertson urged the Cabinet to come to a decision, ‘at 
once’ in order to plan for the coming year.17 His report was viewed with 
scepticism by the Prime Minister. A month earlier the CIGS had produced 
a report which, although it noted Allenby’s significant advances in 
Palestine, said it was uncertain he would take Jerusalem thanks to strong 
Turkish opposition. Better, Robertson had said, to economise forces in the 
east in 1918 and concentrate on European theatres.18 Weeks later 
                                            
14 LHCMA, Robertson papers, Appendices II, 14 December 1917, and IV, (4/5/10), 20 
December 1917, Allenby to Robertson. 
15 Ibid., 4/5/10, p. 3. 
16 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
17 Ibid., p. 4. 
18 LHCMA, Robertson papers, ‘Situation in Turkey,’ CIGS to War Cabinet, (4/5/9), 15 
November 1917. 
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Allenby, with no additional troops, had entered Jerusalem in triumph. Lloyd 
George showed Robertson’s report to Wilson ‘which amounts to doing 
nothing there, which I can’t agree to.’ Wilson went to see Milner who: 
...agrees with me that we ought to push about like the devil in the 
Caucasus and if possible push on in Palestine… Also we must try 
to get command of the Black Sea. We really must change in 1918 
our puerile, useless, costly strategy of 1916 and 1917. 
This past year has been a terrible disappointment. Russia and Italy 
failing so disastrously. LG has today handed over to Versailles the 
study of all these questions and also of how we shall stand a year 
hence, of the Ukraine and Caucasus, of what chance we have of 
beating the Boches in the field in 1918 or 1919.19 
 
The same day the War Cabinet instructed the PMRs to report on the 
‘military and strategical position in the Turkish theatre and South Russia 
as a whole’.20  
 
Over Christmas the War Cabinet asked Robertson for his views on the 
latest hint of peace negotiations from the Central Powers.21  Wully was 
sceptical and reiterated his belief in concentrating all available resources 
in the west while standing on the defensive elsewhere.22 By spring 1918 
Germany, while slightly inferior to the Allies in infantry, would be 
considerably superior in heavy artillery and therefore: ‘It is so clearly in the 
enemy’s interest to win a decisive success before America can intervene 
in force that it is only prudent to assume that he will make the attempt.’23  
                                            
19 Wilson diary, 31 December 1917; TNA, CAB 23/4/82, War Cabinet 31 December 1917. 
20 TNA, CAB 23/4/82, War Cabinet 31 December 1917. 
21 Woodward, Lloyd George, pp. 239-240. 
22 LHCMA, Robertson papers, ‘The Present Military Situation, with reference to the 
Proposals by the Central Powers,’ Robertson to War Cabinet, (4/6/6), 29 December 
1917. 
23 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
 264 
With a greater clarity than Wilson and his fellow PMRs about the timing of 
the German offensive, Robertson predicted that ‘having regard to the 
necessity for sustaining the morale of his people, he will not defer his 
attack till after February.’24 Robertson recalled the ‘very successful’ 
German attack at Verdun in February 1916 and concluded: ‘We must be 
prepared for a great battle, or rather series of battles, early in the coming 
year...’25 
 
The day before Robertson submitted this assessment, which accurately 
foresaw the events of March 1918, Milner summoned Wilson. Following 
unofficial peace feelers from Austria, the Prime Minister wanted Wilson’s 
opinion of the Allies’ chances of improving their position if the war went on. 
‘This is an amazing wire and looks as though much would depend on my 
military opinion,’ he wrote.26 He met Milner who: 
…wired for me because he & LG having no longer any faith in 
Robertson or Haig wanted to know my opinion. The question seems 
to be: “Shall we be in a better position from the military point of view 
in 12 months & if not why not discuss Peace Terms now.” 
Milner & LG want to know my opinion. In addition, Milner told me 
LG is so angry with Robertson that he proposes to kick him out & 
put me in. As I said to Milner again – I am opposed to this, though 
all in favour of LG giving me more power at Versailles & reducing R 
from the position of a Master to that of a Servant.27 
 
The next day Wilson saw Lloyd George and discussed Robertson’s 
assessment which was:  
                                            
24 LHCMA, Robertson papers, (4/6/6), 29 December 1917, p. 7. 
25 Ibid., p. 9. 
26 Wilson diary, 28 December 1917. 
27 Ibid., 29 December 1917; BLO, Milner diary, 30 December 1918. 
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…very poor... LG, Hankey and Phillip [Kerr]28 all agreed it was a 
miserable paper & of no possible assistance to anyone. We talked 
for hours. I described my present war game at Versailles & our, 
rough, results & LG very much interested... Very friendly to me & 
very hostile to Robertson & contemptuous of Haig’s brains though 
agreeing to his being a sterling fighter.  
 
Wilson wrote that he told Kerr that he did not want Lloyd George to 
remove Robertson and make him CIGS ‘much better for him to keep R 
and gradually give Versailles more power in the large issues.’ Wilson then 
went to see Carson and ‘told him of my war game. He was a little distant 
but nice. He is angry with LG for his constant abuse of Robertson; in which 
he is quite right. A long day, but I think good work, & I hope I may save 
Robertson. LG said he hoped Kigg[ell] was going to be kicked out as well 
as Charteris & Maxwell & others.’29 There is no reason to suppose that this 
comment, which undermines the impression that Wilson wanted 
Robertson’s job at any cost, was insincere. Wilson would have no 
expectation of anybody reading his private journal, and at this stage he 
appears to have favoured the idea that Versailles would be the new centre 
of Allied policy making. Lloyd George and the War Cabinet found the 
CIGS’s response wanting and put the following questions: 
1. Could the General Staff foresee a victorious end to the War? If 
so, when and under what circumstances? 
2. Did the General Staff foresee an improvement in the Allied 
military situation that would achieve better terms than might now 
be available, and if so, would it be worth the sacrifice? 
                                            
28 Philip Kerr, Lloyd George’s Private Secretary, 1916-1921, Roskill, Hankey, p. 184. 
29 Wilson diary, 30 December 1917. 
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3. Could the General Staff suggest how the enemy could be 
prevented from taking control of the resources of South Russia? 
4. Did General Staff foresee, in 1918 or 1919, the likelihood of 
inflicting a ‘defeat that would not leave the military domination of 
Prussia successful and intact?’30  
 
These questions précis the issues facing the British at the beginning of 
1918; if there was a prospect of a negotiated peace, should Britain pursue 
it if military victory was impossible? While these were legitimate questions, 
it is hardly surprising that, as in his earlier paper, Robertson’s response 
was an uncharacteristic exercise in bureaucratic fence-sitting. He repeated 
his concerns about manpower and suggested a review of resources 
devoted to the Royal Navy and home defence. Unless there were 
significant improvements in recruitment, Britain’s 52 divisions in France 
and Italy were likely to be down to 40 by the end of the year.31 Robertson’s 
dilemma was that he was determined that all available resources should 
be devoted to offensive action on the Western Front, because he expected 
a major German effort there. He knew the Prime Minister favoured 
decisive action elsewhere, but the War Cabinet had not settled, clearly 
and unequivocally, on such a policy. Nor was he convinced of their 
willingness to support the military by turning the screw on recruitment 
again. When they made up their minds, he would offer his opinion; until 
then he would not speculate. Wilson dismissed Robertson’s contribution 
                                            
30 LHCMA, Robertson papers, ‘War Cabinet to CIGS’ and ‘CIGS to War Cabinet’, (4/6/8), 
both dated 3 January 1918. 
31 LHCMA, Robertson papers, (4/6/8), ‘CIGS to War Cabinet’, 3 January 1918, pp. 5-6. 
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on western policy as disdainfully as Lloyd George had his CIGS’s advice 
on Palestine. It was, he wrote, ‘a miserable effort and there is no guidance 
in the paper at all. I hope I shall do much better than that.’32 Wilson knew 
what was better; a defensive in the west and the prospect of an offensive 
in the east. These were given voice in JN12. 
 
As for discussions to end the war, Germany was not interested in a 
general peace and its conciliatory words were aimed at the Russians.33 At 
the time this was unclear, and Wilson weighed into the debate to oppose 
any suggestion of a negotiated settlement. In late December Lloyd George 
had sent Smuts to Switzerland to meet the Austrian envoy, Count Albert 
von Mensdorff, and assess whether there was any substance to the peace 
overtures. The following diary extracts from a three-day period document 
Wilson’s level of access to senior figures and gives a flavour of the febrile 
atmosphere at this time. On 3 January Wilson met Bonar Law, by this time 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was ‘thinking about Peace & the 
impossibility of improving our military situation.’ Bonar Law thought the 
Germans might give up her gains in Belgium, France and the Balkans if 
given a: 
 …pretty free hand on the Russian side. I don’t believe a word of 
this, but as I said to Bonar, if she is feeling like that she must be 
nearly beat & if she is nearly beat, then let us beat her & have done 
with it…All this peace talk frightens me … Duncannon saw Esher 
who thinks I ought to be more in London as Milner, Haig and I are 
the only men who want to win right out.34 
                                            
32 Wilson diary, 6 January 1918. 
33 French, Strategy, pp. 193-212; Woodward, Lloyd George, p. 240. 
34 Wilson diary, 3 January 1918. 
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The next day he lunched with Leo Maxse, the editor of the right-wing 
National Review: 
He was full of LG’s treachery in now trying to make peace... it 
makes me uneasy especially in view of LG’s questions as to what 
we soldiers can do to better the situation in 1918 & if we can’t better 
it [,] would it be better to see what terms we can make now! All this 
makes me uneasy & suspicious. 
 
One of Wilson’s most important relationships in this period was with 
Clemenceau whose elevation to the French premiership in mid-November 
provided Wilson with another ally, albeit one initially sceptical of the 
Versailles body.35 Wilson called on Clemenceau regularly in November 
and December and they met privately seven times in January 1918, when 
Wilson and his fellow PMRs were working on their Joint Notes. While 
Wilson wrote admiringly of Clemenceau in his diary, it is clear the 
relationship was mutually beneficial. ‘The Tiger’ used Wilson to influence 
the British government. Wilson cultivated Clemenceau as a supporting 
voice when presenting his ideas to his political masters. The day after 
talking with Maxse, Wilson was summoned to see Clemenceau who was 
‘charming as usual’. As for the peace discussions: ‘It seems to me to be a 
stupid thing, & we English who have suffered the least of all in the war 
should be the last of all the Allies to talk of Peace.’ That evening Wilson 
saw Esher who condemned Lloyd George as ‘a fool’ over the Smuts 
                                            
35 They met first in December 1915. Wilson liked ‘the Tiger’, describing him as a ‘real 
character and personality – one of the few I have ever met,’ Wilson diary, 5 December 
1915. 
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mission and doubted the Prime Minister ‘lasting much longer’.36 Macready, 
acknowledging Wilson’s value as a mediator, noted that Lloyd George was 
‘quarrelling hard with Clemenceau, who was the first Frenchman he 
couldn’t ‘twist around his finger.’37 
 
JN12: Campaign in the West 
The first section of JN12 concerned the Western Front, Italy and the 
security of Britain. Like Wilson’s initial strategy paper, it assumed that 
Britain was defended against ‘all serious invasion’ without interfering with 
forces overseas.38 In other words, Wilson and his colleagues saw no need 
to use scarce manpower and other resources to augment home defence. 
In late 1917, the Home Defence Force stood at just under 401,000, 
including 190,000 ‘mobile troops’ ready for overseas deployment. This 
was 69,000 fewer than at the start of the year, but a significant figure and 
one which continued to be contentious in 1918.39 Secondly, it had been 
agreed, after ‘the most careful and exhaustive examination, that the safety 
of France could also be assured’. There was an important caveat: 
In view of the weight of attack which the enemy can bring to bear 
upon this front, an attack which may possibly, in the opinion of the 
Military Representatives attain a strength of 96 Divisions, exclusive 
of “roulement” [rotation], they feel obliged to add that France will be 
safe during 1918 only under certain conditions.40 
 
                                            
36 Wilson diary, 5 January 1918. 
37 CAC, Amery diary, (AMEL 7/14), 6 January 1918. 
38 TNA, WO 158/57, Joint Note 12, 21 January 1918, p. 1. 
39 Woodward, Robertson, p. 180. 
40 TNA, WO 158/57, p. 1, (original emphasis). 
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Allied forces should be ‘continuously maintained at their present total 
aggregate strength, and receive the expected reinforcements of not less 
than two American Divisions a month.’ As already discussed, Wilson was 
acutely aware of Britain’s manpower problems. Maintaining numbers in the 
west was challenge enough; hardly surprising then that there would be no 
diversion of resources eastwards. That said, the assessment would have 
been music to the Prime Minister’s ears, reinforcing Haig’s own confident 
predictions of 7 January.41 Robertson was suspicious of Wilson’s motives. 
The day before the SWC met to discuss JN12, he sent his ADC, Lucas, to 
see Wilson:42 
He says Robertson is very much upset at our Resolution 12 “The 
1918 Campaign”. R[obertson] seems to think that I have drafted 
that paper on purpose to get him kicked out & that by underlining 
the conditions on which alone we are safe on this front I have 
thrown the whole onus on him for destroying the paper. The 
Monument went so far as to say “of course if you want to get rid of 
the CIGS…” I told him bluntly that if it wasn’t for me he would have 
been got rid of some time ago & that I could have him removed any 
day I pleased. 
 
While there was a measure of bravado in this threat, Wilson clearly felt 
more confident of his position vis-à-vis the CIGS. Nonetheless, he went to 
see Robertson: 
He asked why when I knew that our effectives could not be kept up 
I put in as a condition that the total aggregate of troops now in 
France must be maintained? I replied that … I had come to the 
conclusion that if our effectives were kept up we were safe & if not 
then we were not safe & that I wanted to fix the responsibility on the 
Prime Ministers which is where it must rest.  
This seemed to soothe him.43 
                                            
41 TNA, CAB 23/5/8, War Cabinet, 7 January 1918. 
42 Major C.C. Lucas, nicknamed ‘the Monument’ for his steadfast support of his chief, 
Woodward, MCWR, p. 339.  
43 Wilson diary, 28 January 1918 (original emphasis). 
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This is a crucial point. Wilson was acutely aware of Britain’s manpower 
crisis. He knew Lloyd George wanted to prevent another costly offensive 
in the west, but believed opportunities existed in the Middle East. With 
typical Wilsonian subtlety, JN12 said the Western Front was safe, but only 
if troop numbers were maintained, with none to spare for other theatres. 
Robertson was far from ‘soothed’. He had already taken exception to 
Wilson’s proposal for a central reserve and an executive body to control it. 
On 19 December Robertson had warned the War Cabinet that its troops 
would soon face ‘a very formidable attack’.44 JN12 was a prime example of 
the government receiving contradictory advice from Wilson, something the 
CIGS had consistently warned of. 
 
Less controversially, JN12 called for a ‘substantial progressive increase’ in 
artillery, machine guns, tanks and aircraft, and trained personnel. 
Significantly, these should be effectively co-ordinated between the Allied 
armies. Co-ordination was also essential to strengthen the defence 
‘particularly in the sectors most liable to a heavy attack’. Repeating the call 
for inter-allied co-operation in Joint Note 8 (Transportation)45 the politicians 
were urged to improve and co-ordinate rail transportation across the Allied 
front. In line with Wilson’s familiar refrain, the whole Allied front should be 
‘treated as a single strategic field of action, and the disposition of the 
reserves, the periodic re-arrangement of the point of junction between the 
                                            
44 TNA, CAB 23/4/76, War Cabinet, 19 December 1917. 
45 TNA, WO 158/57, ‘Supreme War Council: Joint Notes’, Joint Note 8, 8 January 1918. 
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various Allied forces on the actual front, and all other arrangements should 
be dominated by this consideration.’46 In one sentence the PMRs 
highlighted the manpower-related problems which had dogged the Allies 
for months, the length of the British line, and the contentious issue of an 
inter-Allied reserve. It was also agreed that, if the Italian Army could be 
reformed, retrained and re-equipped with artillery before 1 May 1918, that 
front was safe also. Again, co-operation was the watchword, with the 
PMRs recommending improved rail transportation between Italy and 
France ‘to secure strategic unity of action over the two theatres’.47 If these 
criteria were met, the enemy could not, in 1918, ‘gain a definite military 
decision in the main theatres which would enable him to break finally the 
resistance of any of the Allied Powers’.48  
 
If Germany could not win in the west in 1918, what of the Allies? JN12 
concluded that unless something ‘improbable and unforeseeable’ 
happened, such as the internal collapse of Germany or Austria-Hungary, 
or if Russia revived as a serious military contender, there was no 
possibility of the Allies achieving a ‘final, or even a far-reaching decision’ in 
1918. Wilson scotched Haig’s optimistic hopes for major success with 
another large-scale offensive around Ypres in the late spring or early 
summer. Although American forces were increasing, they would not make 
a fundamental difference in the coming year. Likewise, skinning the British 
armies in the ‘secondary theatres’ of all men apart from those needed for 
                                            
46 TNA, WO 158/57, Joint Note 12, 21 January 1918, p. 1. 
47 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
48 Ibid., p. 2. 
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local defence would not make ‘a sufficient difference in the relative 
position of the opposing forces to justify the hope of attaining such a 
decision’.49 The paper then took on a more positive tone and urged the 
Allied General Staffs to plan in case ‘an unexpected favourable 
development should furnish an opportunity for vigorous offensive actions’. 
The defensive posture in the west should not be ‘merely passive in 
character, but be worked out definitely and scientifically, with the intention 
of gaining the maximum from any opportunities offered’. A supporting 
paper said the likely increases in forces available to the Central Powers 
imposed ‘an expectant attitude’ on the Allies until the AEF ‘can really come 
into line’. It repeated that this approach was ‘far from being passive’ and 
involved taking every opportunity to take the fight to the enemy while 
planning for a future offensive. Some basic principles would apply. No 
territory would be abandoned; any enemy attack would be halted and 
counter-attacks undertaken. Commanders were also urged to plan 
diversionary counter-attacks.50 The Allied C-in-Cs were advised to 
‘prepare plans of joint operations’ to meet any concerted enemy offensive. 
Exerting their new-found authority, the PMRs felt it was ‘highly desirable’ 
that any schemes should be sent to the SWC ‘which would assure the co-
ordination of this combined action’.51 Notwithstanding the opportunities 
presented by enemy action, rather than an overt Allied offensive strategy, 
the PMRs concluded that with the Russian collapse the Allies faced ‘a 
fundamental, though not permanent, change in the conditions upon which 
                                            
49 TNA, WO 158/57, Joint Note 12, 21 January 1918, p. 2. 
50 TNA, WO 158/57, ‘Annexure to Joint Note 12,’ 21 January 1918, pp. 1-2. 
51 Ibid., p 2. 
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their strategy has to be based’. A change in the ‘balance of forces’ would 
not be achieved until 1919, with the addition of the Americans and the 
‘progressive exhaustion of the enemy’s staying power’.52 Wilson 
succeeded in getting his colleagues to support his proposals: ‘A great 
success this morning. We had a meeting of Mil Reps … on my 1918 note. 
It was passed with quite insignificant alterations in 3 places. A real 
victory.’53 
 
JN12, as might be expected of a policy document to be considered by 
Allied statesmen in plenary session at an international conference, was 
short on detail but a file of analytical reports backed it up. These are of 
relevance for this study because Wilson’s staff produced them all. As a 
body, they are integral to understanding Wilson’s contribution to British 
strategic thinking in the final months of the war. Despite this, apart from a 
brief résumé of one of the papers in the relevant volume of the Official 
History, they have received little attention in the historiography.54 At the 
turn of 1917-18 Wilson’s team played several ‘war games’ and examined 
strategic and operational questions from the Allied and enemy 
perspectives. A third group considered manpower, communications and 
logistics issues.55 Wilson demonstrated the war game to a string of 
visitors, beginning with Robertson on 10 January, who was ‘a good deal 
                                            
52 TNA, WO 158/57, ‘Annexure to Joint Note 12,’ 21 January 1918, p. 2. 
53 Wilson diary, 21 January 1918; Amery diary, 21 January 1918, in Barnes and 
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 275 
knocked about by what he saw’. Wilson put this down to the fact that ‘he 
has a broken staff and so has GHQ, and I have a very good one all of 
whom have been for years in the line and all of whom know their 
business.’56 He showed the game to Pershing two days later, to Smuts 
who ‘really was pleased’, and the American PMR Bliss on 27. Wilson’s 
friend Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Godley (then GOC II Anzac 
Corps) was ‘simply delighted’ with the performance he saw.57 Lawrence, 
who had just succeeded Charteris as Head of Intelligence at GHQ, asked 
for a demonstration. ‘Just imagine!’, wrote Wilson, ‘And GHQ has never 
played one!’58 On the eve of the third meeting of the SWC ‘I played the 
War Game this morning before L[loyd] G[eorge], Milner etc and Hereward 
[Wake] and Bertie Studd did very well. Everyone really impressed.’59 The 
next day’s audience was less appreciative:  
Haig, Lawrence, Davidson,60 Maurice and others came and we 
played our War Game for them. Haig was frankly bored and read 
some memorandum he had in his hand, and Lawrence never 
uttered. Tavish showed a little sense. Haig I find stupider every time 
I see him.61  
 
Haig had already condemned Wilson’s reliance on the war game as 
‘laughable but for the seriousness of it…’62 His irritation appears to have 
been directed against Wilson and his colleagues rather than a contempt 
for the war game concept. One study has described Wilson’s use of the 
                                            
56 Wilson diary, January 1918. 
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60 Major-General Sir John ‘Tavish’ Davidson, Head of Operations at GHQ. 
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war game as ‘novel’.63 In fact, known as ‘Kriegsspiel’, it was used widely in 
the pre-War German Army and was a feature in British General Staff 
exercises as early as 1905.64 Haig organised a war game as part of a Staff 
Ride, while Director of Staff Duties.65 Wilson’s exercises, informed by 
intelligence data provided by the War Office, influenced the reports which 
accompanied JN12 submitted to the SWC at the end of January 1918. 
One of the most significant, produced by ‘E’ or ‘Enemy’ Branch, 
considered a western offensive from the German perspective.66 This paper 
said German divisions had begun transferring from Russia and Italy 
sooner than expected and there were now known to be 169 on the 
Western Front with the actual total ‘possibly’ 185. These were opposed by 
166 Allied divisions. The ‘maximum German effort’, an attack by 110 
divisions, would be possible between 1 May and 1 June over a 55 
kilometre front. By 1 July, the Germans would have a superiority of 37 
divisions and 400 heavy guns.67 Woodward, dismissed the war game as 
‘interesting though hardly fruitful’ and said Wilson was ‘wide of the mark’ in 
suggesting 1 May as the best time for a German offensive.68 In fact, the 
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report by ‘E’ Branch was typically nuanced. It said that the major German 
offensive would best be postponed to May or June when ‘the greatest 
superiority is attained and the weather is suitable’ with preparations being 
started immediately. However, if preparations ‘are already to some extent 
in hand, it is possible that the offensive might commence on 1 March, 
provided that severe weather does not cause a postponement or preclude 
preparations meanwhile.’ At the beginning of March sufficient forces would 
be available, offering an advantage of five divisions but an inferiority of 
600 heavy guns. The enemy position would continue to improve such that 
it would be: ‘…open to the Germans to commence their offensive on 1 
March, but from a purely military point of view it would be better to 
postpone it to 1 May when they have a superiority of about 20 divisions 
over the Allies.’ American arrivals were slower than expected and only 10 
divisions would be in place by 1 June; it had been calculated initially that 
there would be 15 divisions available by 1 July. On that date, the Germans 
would have 96 divisions in reserve, their maximum possible complement 
in 1918 and ‘it would be to their advantage, other things being equal, to 
postpone their great offensive there until they can be certain of delivering 
a smashing blow’.69 In other words, Wilson did not incorrectly predict 1 
May as the date of the major German offensive. Instead, he hedged his 
bets and produced evidence which showed it was possible from the 
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beginning of March, a view supported by his friend Rawlinson, with an 
increasing advantage for the enemy until the end of June.70  
 
Where Wilson and his colleagues were wrong was the likely location of the 
offensive. Three potential sectors were identified. The first, between 
Bethune and Arras, would ‘secure advantages far superior to those to be 
gained by an attack elsewhere’. An attack there, due to the short distances 
between this sector and the BEF’s bases at the Channel ports, would give 
‘immediate and possibly decisive results’. Other sectors offering a 
‘reasonable chance of success’ were south of St Quentin between Reims 
and Ville sur Tourbe or between Nancy and Luneville, west of Strasbourg. 
It was concluded that the German attack would take place between 
Bethune and Arras, with subsidiary or feint attacks east of Reims and/or 
near Nancy to draw in Allied reserves. In fact, the first blow of the German 
‘Spring Offensive’, was struck from just south of Arras, to La Fere, south of 
the Somme.71 
 
JN12: Eastern Theatres 
With no hope of victory in the west in 1918, JN12 then considered possible 
action in other theatres ‘which may enable us to secure a decision far-
reaching in its effect upon the political situation in the Near East and in 
Russia, both during and after the war, and valuable in paving the way 
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towards a subsequent definitive decision against the enemy’s main 
armies.’72 This section focussed, predictably enough considering the 
British Cabinet’s long pre-occupation with matters in the Middle East, on 
proposals for campaigns against the Ottoman Empire. The PMR’s ruled 
out offensive actions in the Balkans, reiterating the position outlined in 
their Joint Note 4, conceding the possibility of giving ground but preserving 
the integrity of mainland Greece and, if possible, Salonika.73  
 
Wilson argued that Ottoman forces in the Middle East had dwindled to 
‘250,000 men at the utmost’, were overstretched and in a state of ‘almost 
complete material and moral exhaustion’.74 Thus, opportunities existed in 
either Palestine or Mesopotamia ‘to inflict such a crushing series of 
defeats upon the Turkish armies as would lead to the final collapse of 
Turkey and her elimination from the war and would…have the most far-
reaching result upon the general military situation.’ It might allow the Allies 
to link up with resistance elements in Romania and Southern Russia. Even 
without such a ‘crushing’ series of victories, Germany would have no 
choice but to reinforce Turkey, diverting resources from the Western Front. 
Such a success, even if limited, would ‘definitely liberate the Arab regions 
of the Ottoman Empire from the Turkish yoke’.75 To this point the actions 
proposed resembled a re-hash of the standard ‘knocking away the props’ 
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debate which had never strayed far from the British agenda.76 Hughes 
characterised the fall of Jerusalem on as the next step in Lloyd George’s 
‘way of redirecting strategy and diverting troops from France’.77 In fact, the 
PMRs rejected any suggestion of diverting troops from the Western Front 
to do the job. While favouring offensives in the east they accepted that ‘in 
view of the potential menace to the Western Front’ there could be ‘no 
question of a transfer of troops on any considerable scale from the 
Western to the Eastern theatre of operations’. Allied forces in Palestine 
and Mesopotamia were already superior enough ‘to justify the hope that 
successful operations can be carried out with these forces providing they 
are maintained at full strength.’78 There might be opportunities for ‘minor 
reinforcements’ by moving ‘superfluous’ cavalry units from France, 
curtailing British operations in East Africa, raising new units in India or in 
the French colonies. If the enemy made no serious offensive in the 
Balkans, and the organisation of the Greek Army made sufficient progress, 
one or two British divisions might transfer from Salonika.  
 
When JN12 was debated at the SWC Clemenceau, in a fine example of 
political grandstanding, said he supported the Western Front element of 
the proposal but not that concerning the Middle East. Ignoring Wilson’s 
                                            
76 Plans for securing the Gallipoli Peninsula to allow British warships access to the 
Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara were first discussed by Churchill in late August 
1914, Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, 1914-1916 (vol. III), (London: Heineman, 
1971), esp. pp. 200-204.  
77 Hughes, Allenby, p. 60. 
78 TNA, WO 158/57, 21 January 1918, pp. 3-4. 
 281 
overt assurance in his paper about no additional troops for the theatre, 
Clemenceau:  
…insisted that the security of the Western front overrode all other 
considerations…He protested against embarking on this Eastern 
adventure, when so dreadful a danger was imminent near to Paris 
itself.79 
 
Lloyd George agreed and asserted that the British government had ‘no 
intention of diverting forces from the Western front or in any way relaxing 
its efforts to maintain the safety of that front, which it regards as a vital 
interest of the whole Alliance.’80 The key Allied operational challenge was 
not dislodging Turkish forces, but following up any initial success by 
converting ‘their retreat into a rout and final annihilation’. For this they 
would need to build railway infrastructure complete with rolling stock, plus 
the opening and improvement of coastal bases for supplies. The PMRs 
accepted that the effort required was ‘a great one’ but upon it depended 
‘the whole prospect of achieving any decisive result for the Allied cause in 
1918’. Thus: ‘Looking upon the resources in material and technical skill 
possessed by the Allies, not only in Europe, but in Egypt, India the British 
Dominions, and the United States, the effort should not be beyond the 
compass of our powers.’81 Avoiding any detailed suggestions as to how 
this logistical challenge might be met, the Note called for an improvement 
in supply lines via the Suez Canal. It identified the importance of aviation 
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in any campaign in the region in 1918. The Allies had air superiority and 
‘the necessary measures should be taken to maintain and, if possible, 
increase it’. Strategic air bases would have to be created in Cyprus and 
the Aegean and the organisation of naval air services for concentrated 
strategic offensives, were ‘essential elements in any scheme of serious 
operations against Turkey’.82 The basis of this note was a study by 
Amery.83 It suggested that the best way to assist anti-Bolshevik forces in 
Southern Russia would be by defeating the Turks in Palestine and gaining 
control of the Black Sea. While Wilson and his colleagues - Amery had no 
combat experience - can be reasonably accused of over-simplification, if 
not naïveté, in their blithe assumptions about military operations, they 
were on safer ground with the political elements of the proposals. Military 
action alone was not sufficient, the PMRs believed. They were ‘convinced 
of the necessity that strategy and policy should go absolutely hand in 
hand’. What was needed was ‘a definite, co-ordinated and vigorous 
political offensive both among the non-Turkish races of the Ottoman 
Empire and among the Turks themselves’. Conscious of the tension which 
existed between Britain and France over their individual spheres of 
influence in the region, the paper warned that: 
Any lack of coherence on the part of the Foreign Offices [of the 
Allied powers] in dealing with the political problems directly or 
indirectly connected with the Near Eastern situation, any evidence 
of mutual jealousy or of individual self-seeking, will be bound to 
prejudice not only the future settlement but the actual military 
operations. 
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This element of JN12, central as it was to Wilson’s philosophy of the 
fundamental importance of effective inter-Allied co-operation, has been 
overlooked in the historiography and therefore merits reproduction in full: 
The aspects upon which stress has been laid in the preceding 
paragraphs emphasises the need for the most energetic co-
operation and the closest co-ordination not only of the Allied Military 
forces in Palestine, Mesopotamia and Armenia, but also of the 
Allied Naval and Air forces along the whole coast of Asiatic Turkey, 
of the local Governments in Egypt, India, Cyprus, or from whatever 
country materials, supplies or labour can be furnished, and not 
least, of the Allied Foreign Offices. It is essential to the success of 
the offensive against Turkey that it should be envisaged not as a 
series of disconnected operations, but as a single co-ordinated 
scheme whose object is to eliminate one of the Enemy Powers from 
the War.84 
 
It was a theme Wilson continued to pursue, and which dominated his 
strategic plan for 1919. The SWC’s acceptance of this strategy 
represented a triumph for Wilson. When the delegates moved to approve 
the resolution, Robertson intervened to say that he ‘did not agree with 
some of the statements made in Note 12 of the Military Representatives, 
or with some of the inferences drawn in regard to a campaign against 
Turkey’. ‘Wully’ was aware of the risk he was running by making this 
intervention, acknowledging he was not a member of the SWC. 
Nonetheless he felt compelled to say that the entente ‘ought to adopt a 
defensive policy in all secondary theatres, and to keep no more troops 
there than were necessary’. He also believed that the resolution in favour 
of ‘a decisive offensive against Turkey’ was ‘not a practical plan and that 
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to attempt it would be very dangerous and detrimental to our prospects of 
winning the war.’85 He objected in vain and the Joint Note was accepted. 
As has already been discussed, the German Spring offensives made JN12 
irrelevant, but it remains a valuable indicator of Wilson’s strategic thinking. 
 
‘BRITISH MILITARY POLICY 1918-1919’86 
After his influential role in the establishment of Allied Unity of Command, 
Wilson spent much of the second quarter of 1918 negotiating with French 
and American commanders over troop allocations and strategic priorities; 
a frustrating and sometimes fruitless endeavour. By mid-1918 the German 
effort in the west was losing impetus and in July Lloyd George asked his 
military advisers for their views on Allied policy for 1919. In Wilson’s 
absence Lloyd George quizzed the Deputy CIGS (DCIGS), Major-General 
Charles ‘Tim’ Harington. The Prime Minister was irritated to hear that Foch 
was already planning western offensives dominated by AEF divisions. The 
DCIGS, who had only been in the job for two months, volunteered that the 
GS was considering a major offensive on the Western Front of up to 70 
divisions, 20 of them British, involving large formations of tanks. Lloyd 
George asked if operations in other theatres had been considered: ‘He 
asked if the General Staff were sure that the Germans were not going to 
break off operations on the Western front and go elsewhere, for example 
to Russia...Would they merely go on hammering at the Western front, or 
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would they follow the German lead?’ Had they considered ‘knocking out’ 
Austria or Turkey? Would it not be possible to get rid of Germany’s Allies 
before concentrating on Germany herself? According to the Prime 
Minister, if the Americans concentrated a great Army on the Western Front 
next year, ‘it might be possible for our Army to follow out its traditional rôle 
of operating on the outskirts of the war area.’ Was anybody studying this? 
Harington assured him they were.87 In fact, as Lloyd George well knew, 
since he arrived at the War Office in February, Wilson had spent time 
studying options for outlying theatres. Operations aimed at either 
distracting German resources from France and Flanders, at minimum cost, 
or/and protecting British imperial interests, had been high on the agenda. 
Policy outlines for these theatres comprised a significant part of Wilson’s 
subsequent strategy document. The fifth and final major German offensive 
on the Western Front, Operation ‘Marneschutz-Reims’, had begun on 15 
July, only to grind to a halt a few days later. It meant that Wilson could 
finish his report. Wilson’s latest biographer provided a summary of the 
findings of the 31-page document.88 A more detailed analysis follows, 
which throws new light on Wilson’s independence of thought and broad 
strategic vision.  
 
Strategy for the Western Front 
Lloyd George was ‘bitterly disappointed with Wilson’s purely “Western 
Front” attitude and described his report as simply “Wully redivivus” 
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[reborn].’89 The Prime Minister was over-simplifying a detailed and closely-
argued document. In proposing and outlining the details of an Allied 
offensive on the Western Front to win the war in 1919, its strategic scope 
went further than he acknowledged. Wilson, this thesis has argued, was 
inclined to consider military strategy in a broader political perspective. His 
predecessor saw the world through a military lens, with the political 
context often relegated to the periphery. It was why Lloyd George 
deprecated Robertson’s seemingly myopic focus and warmed to Wilson’s 
wider vision. But, as his 1919 policy paper illustrated, Wilson was not a 
Lloyd George stooge. The second paragraph summarised his purpose: 
The nearer we get to the end of the war the more necessary is it to 
keep in mind the ultimate aspects of the situation from the British 
side, so that the policy of our war aims and the strategy of our war 
effort may harmonise in securing for the British Empire the best 
possible position at the dawn of peace.90 
 
In other words, strategic planning for the next 18 months needed to be 
undertaken with the outcome in mind. Winning the peace was as important 
as winning the war. As Rawlinson noted after being briefed by the CIGS: 
‘Henry is looking at all the fronts, and wants to hold as many cards as 
possible when the time comes for discussing peace terms.’91 
 
Wilson considered what was, he acknowledged, an increasingly unlikely 
outcome to the German offensives. If the enemy did drive a wedge 
between the Allied armies, the British would have to abandon the 
continent while the French were likely to be defeated. If this happened, 
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Britain and the USA could continue what would become a ‘maritime and 
economic war,’ with land operations in the Middle East. Alternatively, 
assuming ‘as we may’, that the Germans were fought to a standstill, the 
‘immediate pre-occupation of the Allies’ must be to prepare for the 
‘decisive phase and if necessary to detach troops to other theatres without 
misgivings.’ To do this, Wilson recommended a series of offensives with 
the limited objectives of pushing the Germans away from Channel ports, 
the strategically important Bruay coal mines, the Amiens communications 
hub, and Paris. This ‘margin of safety’ had to be established before the 
end of the 1918 campaigning season and would need every man and gun. 
Despite knowing that the Prime Minister and Milner favoured significant 
operations away from the Western Front, Wilson stated: ‘There is 
therefore no possibility of sending any divisions to operate in other 
theatres until this aim is accomplished.’92 
 
An abiding theme of this work has been an emphasis on the overarching 
concern for Britain and France during the final two years of the war – the 
manpower shortage. As a result, the fulcrum of Wilson’s report swung on 
timing; or as he termed it, the ‘choice of the moment for supreme effort’.93 
Should the Allies make this effort in 1919 or in 1920? Wilson argued that 
all rested on the strength of the AEF the following summer. The War Office 
estimated that by June 1919 there would be 80 US divisions in France, 
although shortage of officers and equipment would limit the number 
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available for offensive action. Sackville-West reported that the balance of 
forces would be 181 Allied divisions facing 170 German, a superiority of 
400,000 men. This could be boosted by another quarter of a million if 
‘Allied intervention in Siberia has materialised sufficiently to reconstitute an 
effective Eastern Front in Russia – even partially…’ While this force might 
not be considered ‘overwhelming’ for offensive purposes the impact on 
German morale of large numbers of high quality and enthusiastic 
American troops would be significant. In any case:  
…arguments against deferring the crisis to 1920 are so strong as to 
be irresistible. The war weariness in Great Britain, the exhaustion of 
France and Italy, and the impatience of America, who will by that 
time have been at war for over 2 years will oblige us to strike in 
1919 or to stop the war...all enthusiasm for the war is dead.’94  
 
Equally, the Germans must not be allowed to consolidate in Russia and 
Asia and he therefore had ‘no hesitation’ in saying that the culminating 
period for supreme military effort on Western Front should be no later than 
1 July 1919. To prepare for this major offensive, Wilson recommended 
bringing as many British units as possible back from ‘out-theatres’ and 
their replacement with Indian divisions; hardly the actions of a committed 
‘easterner’. The 1919 offensive would need 43 British divisions, a 
significant reduction from the 59 available in mid- 1918. This echoed Lloyd 
George’s determination that British divisions would be significantly 
reduced by the autumn; the present levels, he believed, were untenable.95 
Artillery and machine-gun units would be expanded and the cavalry 
reduced.  
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Wilson’s scheme, which he shared with Haig and Foch, involved an ‘Allied 
Tank attack’ on a 50-mile front by 70 infantry and eight cavalry divisions, 
supported by 10,500 tanks. The British would contribute 20 divisions and 
3,000 tanks, plus 7,300 mechanical tractors with supplies.96 Wilson’s plan 
failed to impress Haig, who wrote on his copy ‘Words! Words! Words! Lots 
of Words! And little else.’97 In fairness to both, Haig had just attended a 
meeting with Pershing, Pétain and Foch to plan for taking the offensive in 
a few weeks and was unlikely to have been able to give much thought to 
plans for a year hence.98 Likewise Wilson, along with most of his 
colleagues, had little idea of Foch’s plans for taking the offensive, nor 
expectations for their subsequent success.  
 
Wilson was left in no doubt of his political masters’ disdain. The day after 
Lloyd George had dismissed it as ‘Wully reborn’, it was torn apart by the 
Imperial War Cabinet (IWC).99 Milner, normally Wilson’s ally, but a 
longstanding supporter of ‘eastern’ initiatives, expressed surprise that the 
Western Front had returned to the strategic debate ‘in great strength’. He 
had the gravest doubt of an Allied victory there in 1919 because ‘the 
Western Front was a candle that burned all the moths that entered it.’ As 
far as he was concerned ‘it was now out of the question that we could play 
the great rôle on the Western Front.’ Wilson was encouraged by the 
Australian Prime Minister W.M. ‘Billy’ Hughes who thought ‘we must 
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smash the Boches in France’. Smuts also doubted an Allied victory in 
1919, ‘time, space & season have nothing to do with these strategists!’, 
wrote Wilson, disdainfully.100 According to Hankey, the view of the meeting 
was that ‘we were running the risk of shattering the American Army next 
year, as we shattered our own Army in 1916 and 1917, without achieving 
a decision.’101 Lloyd George condemned the soldiers for always expecting 
the government to supply whatever number of troops they asked for. He 
questioned the cost of the proposed 1919 offensive and ‘could not find a 
syllable as to income or wastage’. Wilson said he could not address the 
issue of ‘income’ [numbers of new troops] because he was unclear 
whether the government intended to conscript Ireland; as for losses, he 
estimated 25,000 per month.102 He noted: 
I was able to knock him [Lloyd George] about rather severely by 
showing that the paper itself & the graphic gave the whole of the 
information. Practically all the PMs ie LG, Borden, [Sir Robert 
Borden, Prime Minister of Canada] Hughes (but not so much), 
Smuts, Massey [William F. Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand] 
& Milner are of opinion that we can’t beat the Boches on the 
Western front, & so they go wandering about looking for other 
laurels.103 
 
Two days later, Milner told Wilson that Lloyd George found him ‘too much 
“Western Front” in his ideas and too much like Robertson.’104 Wilson’s 
recollection was that ‘LG was beginning to suspect me of being a “Wully” 
which of course is nonsense.’105  
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Future Strategy and the ‘out-theatres’ 
Where Wilson’s paper differed from his earlier recommendations was the 
secondary role he assigned to some long-standing priorities. In the first 
quarter of 1918 the War Cabinet had been concerned about the future of 
the Italian front. In July, the CIGS concluded that a German offensive in 
Italy was possible later in the year. He recommended improving transport 
communications, and establishing a reserve by sending three or four 
British divisions to augment the three already there. There were no 
proposals for Allied offensive action. At the IWC, Lloyd George and Smuts 
questioned Wilson on options for an Italian offensive, but he stood his 
ground. The weather would have deteriorated by the time the additional 
divisions arrived, and in 1919 effort had to be concentrated on the 
Western Front.106 As for the Balkans, Wilson had no fears of an attack, but 
again opposed a large scale offensive because it would be ‘handicapped 
by the interminable political jealousies between Italian, French, Greek and 
Serbian interests.’107 In Palestine he again favoured ‘active defence’, 
pointing out that German advances in Persia and Southern Russia meant 
she was forging a route to the valuable resources of the east without 
needing Egypt, the Suez Canal and Syria. 
 
The regions in which the Allies needed to concentrate what resources they 
could spare from the west, according to Wilson, were those which had 
recently been under the influence of Imperial Russia. Acknowledging that 
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he was ‘trenching [sic] on the domain of policy, which is beyond the 
bounds of my responsibility,’ he did so because the ‘ultimate security of 
the British Empire depends on the extent to which British policy and British 
strategy are made to harmonise in defence of British interests.’ What was 
needed was a political and military strategy to create ‘neutral zones’ and 
‘Buffer States’ that would help safeguard Britain’s vital interests ‘for years 
to come.’108 In Southern Russia, especially in Transcaucasia, between the 
Black and Caspian Seas, the Germans were making significant inroads.109 
Wilson had similar fears for Persia and parts of Mesopotamia, all of 
strategic importance due to their oil and other natural resources, and their 
proximity to Afghanistan and India, the jewel in Britain’s imperial crown. 
The Germans controlled the Black Sea and were now heading towards the 
oil centre of Baku on the Caspian. If they achieved this they would control 
the railways ‘up to the very borders of Afghanistan.’ Wilson argued that 
this made it essential for Britain to consolidate in Mesopotamia, Persia and 
take control of the Caspian: ‘Indeed it is not too much to say that both with 
a view to winning this war and to securing the safety of India for the next 
generation we should devote our efforts to this theatre rather than to 
Palestine.’110 
 
He recommended bolstering local forces using limited numbers of British 
and Allied troops to hamper German expansionism. A linked priority was 
to force Germany to keep divisions in the east by encouraging anti-
                                            
108 CAB 25/85, p. 31. 
109 Rob Johnson, The Great War & the Middle East: A Strategic Study (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), pp. 235-40. 
110 CAB 25/85, p.18. 
 293 
Bolshevik forces to re-establish an Eastern Front, and distracting German 
resources.111 This element of the report encapsulated the challenge the 
War Cabinet had wrestled with in recent months, the development of a 
cohesive Allied policy for Russia. The proposal found favour with Milner, 
the arch-imperialist. As he told the IWC, he would prefer it if the French 
and the Americans provided the bulk of the forces in the west in 1919, 
allowing Britain to move up to 15 divisions elsewhere: ‘If practically the 
whole of the Germany Army was contained on the Western Front, this 
reserve should be able to achieve a great deal.’ Hughes, one of the few 
IWC members who still believed in victory in the west, pointed out that 
those with the largest forces in that theatre would dominate the peace: 
‘From this point of view it was very undesirable to leave France and the 
United States to finish the war on the Western Front.’112 While agreeing 
this was a legitimate concern, Wilson was not advocating such a risk. As 
usual he wanted to hedge his bets and ensure British effectiveness in both 
theatres. The CIGS had already ordered Lieutenant-General Sir William R. 
Marshall, the commander of the British Mesopotamian Army, to establish a 
line of communication between Baghdad and Baku and had sanctioned a 
small force to take the latter city.113 This action was successful and the 
port was taken, and held, on 4 August 1918.114  
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The other key opportunity Wilson saw for reviving the Eastern Front, was 
encouraging anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia and in Northern Russia. 
These ideas were not new to the 1918-1919 strategy document. Wilson 
and the War Cabinet had been discussing interventionist policies since 
before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk formally ended the war between the 
Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia on 3 March 1918. The fear in 
London was that the new Russian government, which was not in control of 
the whole of the former Tsarist Empire, might ally itself with the Germans. 
At best, it was feared, Germany would dominate Russia and its economy, 
making it a vassal state.115 Wilson believed the answer was encouraging, 
funding and arming anti-Bolshevik forces, and sending them limited 
military support. On Siberia the War Cabinet, and Milner and Wilson in 
particular, favoured encouraging Japan to enter the war. The SWC had 
already agreed JN16 which recommended Japanese intervention in 
Siberia to seize the strategically important railway between Vladivostok 
and the Chinese city of Harbin. The idea was that a Japanese force would 
assist anti-Bolshevik elements and protect the region from German 
incursions.116 The result, it was hoped, would at minimum force the 
Germans to keep significant troop numbers in the east; at best, it would 
protect the British Empire from the threat of a resurgent Germany.  
 
Wilson stuck to this thesis into the summer of 1918. He stated that: ‘The 
resurrection of Russia can only be brought about by Allied intervention in 
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Siberia and the re-creation of an Eastern Front.’ To Wilson’s frustration, 
his ‘cousin’, as he referred to the US President in his diaries, disagreed. 
Worried about American public opinion, and concerned that it might be 
difficult for the Allies to contain a Japanese army once in Siberia, 
President Wilson was reluctant to give his approval. The Japanese 
refused to get involved unless invited specifically by the US.117 In May, 
Wilson told the Japanese Military Attaché in London that ‘from a military 
point of view the Japanese Army could not intervene too soon nor go too 
far & that I was always impressing this on my Govt. & hoped the 
Jap[anese] GS would do the same to their Govt.’ The same day, according 
to Wilson, the War Cabinet discussed Russia, including whether the British 
should occupy Archangel, Murmansk and Vladivostok and whether they 
should ‘blow up the [Russian] Baltic fleet’. How this was to be achieved is 
unclear. There is no record of the discussion in the War Cabinet minutes 
for that date, although Hankey typically avoided recording strategically 
sensitive material.118 The SWC meeting in early June approved an Allied 
force to protect Murmansk and Archangel from German occupation with 
the British Major-General F.C. Poole in command. Wilson was actively 
involved in these X Committee policy debates with the Prime Minister, and 
Milner. Lloyd George displayed a strategic insight greater than his more 
‘gung-ho’ colleagues and, like President Wilson, cautioned against ‘the 
danger of setting Russia against us. This was one of the cases where a 
                                            
117 TNA, CAB 28/4, War Cabinet, IC 66, Procès-verbal of the Third Meeting of the Sixth 
Session of the Supreme War Council, 3 June 1918; for a detailed discussion of this 
aspect of the war see Paul E. Dunscomb, Japan’s Siberian Intervention, 1918-1922: ‘A 
Great Disobedience Against the People” (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011). 
118 Wilson diary, 11 May 1918; TNA, CAB 23/6/31, War Cabinet, 11 May 1918. 
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mistake might prove fatal. If Germany once got the gigantic man-power of 
Russia into her hands the Allies would be bankrupt.’119 While there was an 
overarching logic in Wilson’s commitment to protect Britain’s imperial 
interest, the lack of a co-ordinated Allied strategy in the outlying theatres 
made progress difficult. Manpower was short, and working with disaffected 
local groups with their own agenda was problematic. Wilson was casting 
about for ideas because, as is clear from both his recommendations for 
future strategy and his diaries, in the summer of 1918 he was not 
convinced that the war would end in Germany’s total defeat. He was 
worried that even if the Allies won on the Western Front it was: 
 …difficult to see how we could force such terms on the Central 
Powers as would loosen their hold in the East or close the road to 
Egypt and India. Unless by the end of the war democratic Russia 
can be reconstituted as an independent military power it is only a 
question of time before most of Asia becomes a German colony, 
and nothing can impede the enemy’s progress towards India…120 
 
It was in Britain’s vital interest, he argued, to reconstitute Russia as an 
armed and independent state, strong enough to withstand future German 
aggression: ‘If the war closes without this being accomplished the future of 
the British Empire will be seriously menaced…’121 While Poole’s adventure 
in North Russia fizzled out, a Japanese force did intervene in Siberia in 
August 1918, but this ended as ‘a failure and a sideshow’.122 By then 
Wilson had bigger priorities; the collapse of the German forces on the 
Western Front and the imminent end of the war. In the peace negotiations 
                                            
119 TNA, CAB 23/17/15, X Committee, 19 June 1918. 
120 CAB 25/85, p. 29. 
121 Ibid., p. 31. 
122 Dunscomb, Japan’s Siberian Intervention, p. 56. 
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that followed, many of the fears he had stressed in his policy document 
would come to the fore.123 
 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the abiding characterisation in the historiography, Wilson was 
neither an unquestioning Francophile nor a Lloyd George stooge. Once 
CIGS, and with Foch as overall Allied commander, Wilson had no 
hesitation in challenging his friend in defence of British interests. As far as 
Lloyd George was concerned, he soon learned that while Wilson had a 
strategic view which went far beyond the Western Front, he was ultimately 
a pragmatist. Once it became clear that American forces were arriving on 
the Continent in significant numbers, he began planning for a decisive 
offensive to end the war in 1919. This would be directed against Germany, 
on the Western Front, and not, as the Prime Minister continued to hope, in 
the east. Wilson had always been a ‘Westerner’, but one who as CIGS 
was able to combine the immediate priority of defeating Germany, with a 
broader vision of how the peace might look, especially for British imperial 
interests. While it was to be expected that Lloyd George would have been 
disappointed by Wilson’s proposals for a major Western Front offensive in 
1919, he should not have been surprised. Wilson had signaled in JN12 
that the balance of power would shift back in the Allies’ favour in 1919, 
and by implication an offensive posture in the west would then be 
possible. Condemning Wilson as a Robertson clone was also misplaced. 
                                            
123 See Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World (London: 
John Murray, 2002 [2001]) 
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The second half of JN12 went into much greater detail about strategy 
options for other theatres away from France and Flanders than those of 
his predecessor’s. Importantly, Wilson, in contrast to Smuts, Milner and 
several members of the IWC, was confident the war could be won in 1919. 
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CONCLUSION 
The thesis has taken a broader view of Sir Henry Wilson than the rather 
one-dimensional picture that exists in the historiography. Keith Jeffery’s 
recent biography took a much more even-handed approach than had 
existed hitherto, but its focus was directed towards Wilson’s political 
interests and actions, particularly the politics of Ireland. Wilson’s strategic 
contribution during the Great War was, as this work has shown, more 
significant than has been acknowledged previously. During the final 18 
months of the war Wilson was invested with both influence, and power. 
Study of primary sources, particularly his diaries and correspondence, has 
shown that he played a more significant role in Allied strategy than the 
historiography has acknowledged. Even allowing for the personal 
hyperbole inevitable in first-person recollection, Wilson was no bystander 
to the development of strategy of the Lloyd George government, nor was 
he without influence with the new French premier Georges Clemenceau. 
He helped frame a new focus for Allied strategy in late 1917, one which 
effectively put paid to the notion of a major offensive either on the Western 
Front, or in one of the peripheral theatres. Dominating the deliberations of 
the SWC, he helped improve the co-ordination of Allied strategic planning 
in a number of contentious areas, a contribution which ultimately led to 
unity of command under Foch. 
 
Wilson is one of the Great War’s most controversial British generals. He is 
a constant figure in the strand of historiography that concerns itself with 
the strategy and the general direction of the war; a tense, fluid and 
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ruthlessly disputed no-man’s land where senior commanders and 
politicians met. For almost a century, Wilson’s reputation has rested far 
more on what he said, and more especially on what he wrote, than for 
what he did. In his lifetime, he stood apart from peers such as Haig and 
Robertson because of his fondness for gossip, his willingness to share his 
outspoken opinions, and his overt fondness for the company of certain 
politicians, combined with his ill-concealed contempt for others. Lord 
Esher summed up why soldiers such as Haig, Gough and Allenby never 
understood Wilson thus: ‘He is a bird of such totally different plumage, 
though of the same breed.’1  Such a character, unusual, but not 
exceptional, amongst his contemporaries, might have been passed off as 
a little more than a personality quirk had it not been for events following 
his assassination. Wilson died before his formal Parliamentary political 
career had really begun. His reputation had to rely on Callwell’s biography, 
which painted a portrait that is essentially the image that has survived to 
date. For those who had long disliked Wilson, the diaries were proof of his 
bad faith and untrustworthiness. Hugely entertaining, the diaries have 
defined him ever since. Despite Jeffery’s more balanced account, the 
image remains.  
 
In fact, Wilson’s diaries were a late-night safety valve, no more intended 
for publication in the unexpurgated form in which Callwell presented them 
than were those of many of his contemporaries, including Haig.2 Wilson 
                                            
1 Esher to Clive, 13 March 1918, in Oliver, Viscount Esher, (ed.), Journals and Letters of 
Reginald Viscount Esher (vol. IV), 1916-1930 (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson, 1938), 
p. 186. 
2 Sheffield and Bourne, Haig: Diaries, pp. 3-4. 
 301 
recorded the events of the day, often with irritated comments on issues 
and individuals, spiced with plenty of pungent personal criticism. Callwell 
repeated many, but not all, of these colourful critiques. He provided 
contextual narrative but no comment on Wilson’s more intemperate 
remarks. Thus, Wilson’s snide references found those who might have 
considered themselves his friends, or at least valued colleagues, 
denigrated in public print; hardly surprising then that Wilson’s reputation 
never recovered. As has been demonstrated, Wilson’s professional 
conduct rarely reflected the postprandial sounding off in his journal. Even 
the BEF’s head of intelligence, Charteris, a robust Wilson critic, 
acknowledged that in his liaison role with Nivelle ‘he was scrupulously 
loyal and correct in all is dealings with Haig and with the War Office.’3 One 
of Wilson’s greatest personality traits was his bonhomie and good humour, 
often deployed to great effect in the most trying circumstances.4 
Nonetheless, the abiding image of Wilson remains over-simplified and, 
consequently, misleading. His undeniably colourful character, and the 
unguarded remarks in his diary and personal correspondence, have 
served to obscure, if not conceal altogether, a more complex individual.  
 
Wilson’s great contribution to the British war effort was his skill, not as a 
‘political soldier’ dabbling in domestic political ‘intrigue’, but as a ‘soldier-
                                            
3 John Charteris, Field-Marshal Earl Haig (London: Cassell, 1929), p. 257. 
4 During the British retreat in late August 1914 an officer contrasted the British 
Expeditionary Force’s (BEF’s) Chief of Staff (CoS) Sir Archibald Murray’s lacklustre 
performance with that of the Sub-Chief of Staff, Wilson: ‘The Chief of the Staff is dead beat 
– found him fainting at 5am and poured whisky down his throat ... Sir H. Wilson 
is…splendid, keeping cheery all the time’, IWM, C.R. Woodroffe Papers, diary entry, 26 
August 1914. 
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diplomat’. His close links with, and understanding of, French politicians 
and senior commanders and their concerns served his country well in the 
early years of the war, when the British Army played a subsidiary role, and 
later helped the alliance survive when it was under its greatest pressure. 
His ability to talk the language of British politicians only came into its own 
once Lloyd George had tried, and failed, to persuade Britain’s senior 
soldiers to listen to his views. Wilson understood politicians better than 
any other British military figure of his generation; this was his great 
strength, and – in the opinion of many of his military colleagues – his 
greatest weakness.  He took as dim a view of most ‘frocks’ and their 
motives as any other ‘brasshat’.5 Where Wilson differed was in his ability, 
in the modern idiom, to ‘see the bigger picture’.  Rather than paying lip-
service to the principle of democratic accountability embodied in the 
country’s political leadership, but doing his best to frustrate it, as both Haig 
and Robertson did regularly, Wilson opted to work within the system. His 
strategic vision was characterised by the need to keep Britain’s principal 
ally ‘on side’ while viewing the war in the broader context of his country’s 
imperial future. In the last 18 months of the war Wilson, who had always 
had a voice, at last found willing listeners in Lloyd George and other 
members of the British Cabinet, especially the imperial-minded Milner. In 
France, Foch was restored to a senior military role and Clemenceau was a 
new Prime Minister with whom Wilson, the soldier-diplomat, found 
common cause. In 1918 Wilson’s role of maintaining Allied unity of 
                                            
5 A mixed metaphor alluding to the formal long-tailed frock coat worn by politicians in 
Parliament and the gold braid on a general’s cap.  
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purpose, one he had worked towards with limited success for years, finally 
came into its own. It was a time of great peril for the Allied effort, when 
French commitment was at its lowest ebb, British manpower resources 
under pressure, and US support problematic.  
 
His opportunity came in November 1917 when he articulated, for the first 
time formally, his belief that victory would only be achieved by the 
imposition of overarching strategic control; a genuinely inter-Allied 
approach, rather than the flawed free-for-all he felt had existed until then. 
Failure to establish such a ‘supreme’ authority would lead to defeat, he 
warned. Wilson ruled out renewed large-scale offensive action away from 
the Western Front, on the grounds of military practicality rather than 
ideological aversion. Also, any opportunity for significant gains in other 
theatres had been missed. After receiving Wilson’s advice, the long-
standing strategic debate about ‘knocking the props’ from beneath the 
Germans finally disappeared from the top of the Prime Minister’s agenda. 
In future, military policy would be driven by strategic pragmatism rather 
than emotional conviction. Actions in the secondary theatres would 
continue, but not at the expense of men and material for the Western 
Front. One fundamental reason for concentrating effort on one front, the 
western, in the autumn of 1917, was a manpower shortage. Wilson was 
less optimistic than Haig in his assessment of Allied resilience for 1918; 
and less sanguine in his evaluation of those available to the enemy. His 
conclusion was that in 1918 the time would not be right for a significant 
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offensive in France and Flanders. The Allies would have to bide their time 
until US armies arrived in significant numbers. 
 
The SWC was Wilson’s brain-child. Once it was established he ensured 
his views dominated its work and reports. While acknowledging the 
political support Wilson enjoyed in London and Paris, it was not a foregone 
conclusion that his views would prevail. Without Wilson’s energy and his 
lobbying of political allies the body might well have foundered. Lloyd 
George’s usual clarity of purpose had deserted him. Robertson and Haig, 
although under pressure, still had influential support. Wilson’s views 
chimed with those of Foch and in early 1918 both were, at last, in positions 
of great influence. When it came, Wilson grabbed his opportunity. He was 
‘the only really independent military representative’ at Versailles, each of 
the others beholden to higher commanders.6 He attacked the challenge 
with gusto, ‘going strong and as full of ideas as an egg is full of meat’.7 
 
With political support in London, and for the most part on the same 
strategic wavelength as Foch, Wilson dominated the deliberations of the 
SWC’s military representatives. Their Joint Notes were effectively 
‘Wilson’s Notes’; Wilson’s vision for future Allied military policy, Wilson’s 
strategy for winning the war. Having long espoused the virtue of an 
overarching approach to policy-making, he ensured his fellow PMRs 
concentrated on those areas where an inter-Allied partnership was 
                                            
6 Jeffery, Wilson, p. 211. 
7 PA, Lloyd George papers, (LG/F/38/2/27), Milner to Lloyd George, 23 December 1917. 
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essential if new strategies were to succeed. At the heart of these was 
agreeing military policy for 1918. Unless this was considered holistically, 
Wilson maintained, it was fruitless debating other issues, especially those 
of manpower and whether the BEF should take over more French line. 
The Joint Notes addressed these issues, plus an inter-Allied approach to 
transport and communications and the production and deployment of 
tanks and aircraft. To dismiss Versailles as a powerless ‘talking shop’ 
downplays the value of its contribution to policy co-ordination. It provided a 
focus for structured discussion on Allied military strategy for 1918, and 
helped strengthen a move towards co-operation which had not existed 
between the Allies to that point. Wilson acted as the ‘dynamo’ for the 
deliberations of the Allied staff at Versailles ‘and in large measure 
succeeded in persuading his colleagues to support Lloyd George’s 
agenda for 1918.’8 This was due to his aptitude for managing relationships 
with his fellow PMRs, his diplomatic skills, and his industry. Wilson stood 
apart from his Allied colleagues in seeing the SWC as a real policy-making 
body. Weygand, Foch’s deputy, was for the most part a cypher for GQG, 
and the Italian, Cadorna, was bruised and disengaged after losing his 
command after Caporetto. When he became CIGS, Wilson continued to 
follow the strategic principles he had successfully articulated during the 
production of the Joint Notes, which were formally considered, and almost 
all accepted, at the monthly meetings of the SWC. Although he had no 
way of knowing so at the time, Wilson’s time as PMR was a dry-run for his 
                                            
8 French, Strategy, p. 128. 
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actions as CIGS and contributed to the framing of British strategic policy in 
the final year of the war.  
 
Wilson’s was an influential voice that helped formulate British manpower 
policy in 1918. Accepting the need for the British to do more to support the 
French, he believed the answer was for his government to drive 
conscription harder. Thanks to his access to the British and the French 
Prime Ministers, he had a greater impact on these events than has been 
acknowledged. Some of these impacts, particularly his diplomatic efforts 
with the French – his greatest contribution to the British war effort – were 
vital when relations were fragile and tempers frayed. He also nurtured 
strong links with senior American figures, with mixed results as far as 
Britain’s strategic expectations were concerned. His myopic obsession 
with the imposition of conscription on Ireland, had a less positive outcome. 
Despite contrary advice from experts on the ground, his was an important 
voice in persuading Lloyd George and the War Cabinet to impose 
conscription there. In what with hindsight was a blessing for all concerned, 
the decision was never implemented, but it was not without 
consequences. Jeffery argued that the legislation served to ‘galvanise and 
alienate nationalist Ireland’ leading ultimately to the island’s partition in 
1921.9  
 
Wilson’s greatest contribution to his country’s war effort was his role, in 
varying guises, as the British Army’s principal soldier-diplomat. His long-
                                            
9 Jeffery, Wilson, p. 223. 
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standing association with the French military and political élites had been 
valuable before the war, and was increasingly important as the conflict 
progressed. From late 1917 British and French Prime Ministers found 
Wilson a soldier with whom they could do business. For his part Wilson 
was fortunate that his old friend Foch held sway in the French Army. The 
historiography ascribes considerable weight to Wilson’s undoubted 
‘Francophilia’, creating an image of a British general so enamoured of the 
French that he was little more than a Gallic mouthpiece. In fact, in 
contradiction of the views of some of his contemporaries, Wilson was a 
staunch defender of Britain’s strategy on the Western Front, and 
elsewhere. During 1918 he was a sustained and influential critic of French 
policy, both political and military. His strong relationship with the French 
high command enabled him to defuse inter-Allied tensions; a feat that 
often eluded other British leaders. Wilson by no means twisted 
Clemenceau, or Foch, around his finger, but he was often able to 
persuade them to bend. With diminishing resources, Clemenceau was 
‘playing the game of inter-alliance poker’ with a deteriorating hand.10 
Wilson understood the French dilemma and strove to keep the entente 
strong. Despite his private criticism of Pershing, Wilson, with the more 
flexible Bliss, brokered an agreement which increased the flow of US 
troops to France at a crucial time. He was also quicker than his Prime 
Minister in the pragmatic acceptance that there was more to be gained 
from acknowledging the American vision of their role in the war than from 
continued confrontation. 
                                            
10 Cohen, Supreme Command, p. 83. 
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In the last few months of the war, Wilson’s support for formalised Allied 
strategic co-operation enjoyed a receptive and sympathetic audience in 
London and Paris. A single C-in-C for the forces on the Western Front was 
the inevitable, if to Wilson less appealing, corollary. Contrary to the 
accepted orthodoxy Wilson, while a Francophile, was not a naïve stooge. 
Always suspicious of French hegemony, he was an important lightning rod 
between Lloyd George and Clemenceau, trusted, as much as they trusted 
anybody, by both. His friendship with Foch meant he was often able to 
draw much of the sting from the inevitable tensions created by a coalition 
war and exacerbated by unity of command. Foch ‘was one of the few 
Allied generals who saw the Allied front as a whole, and whose strategic 
vision extended beyond the Western Front.’ Another was Wilson. 
Regardless of this commonality of purpose, it is going too far to suggest 
that as Generalissimo Foch ‘found his authority was rarely challenged.’11 
As this study has shown, Wilson challenged it often, but they had more in 
common than they had points of difference; long personal acquaintance 
smoothed short-term irritations, to the benefit of the Alliance.  
 
In the summer of 1918 Lloyd George established his ‘X Committee’ to 
consider the grand strategic challenges, particularly those concerning 
Britain’s post-War imperial future. The value the Prime Minister and Milner 
set upon Wilson’s advice was evident in the fact that he was its other 
permanent member. Together they decided strategy before the more 
                                            
11 Philpott, ‘Foch’, p.42-3. 
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problematic debates of the War Cabinet. Until Wilson became CIGS, 
Woodward noted, at no time ‘had the imperial-minded statesmen had a 
military adviser who took a broader view of the war.’ While this does a 
disservice to Robertson’s vision, his focus was, inevitably, on the Western 
Front. It is why the arch-imperialist Milner and Wilson found such common 
cause.12 It is also why, despite his subsequent claims to the contrary, 
Lloyd George retained Wilson as his principal military adviser until the 
latter decided to try his hand at parliamentary politics at the end of 1921. 
                                            
12 Woodward, Lloyd George, p. 282. 
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